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2004 Introduction

_Khrischak Muang Nua_ was written in 1984, and in the course of the past twenty years has sold some 900-plus copies out of the original 1000 printed. Effectively, it is out of print and stock. While these sales figures fall somewhat short of the Harry Potter series, the book itself remains important to the study of Thai church history generally and northern Thai church history in particular. In 1984, Thai church history barely existed as an academic field, and _Khrischak Muang Nua_ is one of a handful of publications that helped to expand the study of that history into something more akin to a full-fledged, if still modest, field of scholarship. The book, furthermore, has had a role in discrediting the hagiographic approach to the Protestant missionary past, which dominated the historical consciousness of the Thai Protestant and Thailand missionary communities into the early 1980s. It also, finally, mirrors the times in which it was written, those same early 1980s, and while much of its advice and some of its perspective is irrelevant to the northern Thai churches today, _Khrischak Muang Nua_ is an historical document in its own right and deserves preservation as such.

Reprinting _Khrischak Muang Nua_ has never been, however, an option. For various reasons, it has a number of flaws that simply cannot be patched up. It virtually ignores the vastly complex political and diplomatic context of the Laos Mission, which context had major influence on the life of the mission and its churches. At points, it is a self-important work that is nearly as insensitive to a Thai perspective as its protagonists, the old-time missionaries. Some of its criticisms of the Presbyterian missionaries in northern Siam are overstated, and a few are just plain wrong. In the intervening years since 1984, moreover, a large number of new sources of material have been uncovered, which make this book truly dated.

_Khrischak Muang Nua_, in sum, is too important to toss on the rubbish heap and not well enough done to warrant reprinting without massive revisions that would amount to a new work. This website provides an excellent alternative, one that allows me to make the book available to interested readers without going through the trials and tribulations of a reprint. Although herbswanson.com is not yet a year old at this writing, I trust that it will provide a good home for _Khrischak Muang Nua_ for many years to come.

In this online edition, I have not tampered with the text of the original other than to make a raft of needed corrections of typographical errors and a few errors in fact. I have tinkered with the prose somewhat, but not a lot; it is generally what I wrote in 1984-on a typewriter, if you can believe that. The process of scanning and editing has inevitably contributed a few new typographical errors not found in the original; and while I've done my best to catch all of the mistakes, old and new, I know that several of the sniggering little twerps are still lurking here and there in the text. I have not corrected what I now consider to be errors of interpretation, but there are a number of places where I have toned down my youthful rhetoric and dispensed with the "creative" theatrics.

Let me take this opportunity, finally, to renew the dedication of _Khrischak Muang Nua_, which was and is dedicated to my wife, Warunee. Twenty years later, we are still trekking along together. I cannot even conceive of life without her presence and love anymore, so constant have they both been over the years. Thank you, Nee, now more than ever. Peace.

Herb Swanson
Ban Dok Daeng
February 2004
1984 Introduction

The substance of this study first took form in classroom lectures I presented during the second term of the 1983-1984 school year at the McGilvary Faculty of Theology, Payap College. It was an exciting experience for me to see the response of the dozen or so students in the course. Unlike any previous history course I taught, the students showed an involvement in the "meat" of the course. They learned something about themselves. They learned something about how their identity as Christians emerged. Time-and-again, they said to me, "That is just like my church!" One student said that the course was the first one he had ever taken that was about him.

And that, for me, is what makes the "study of northern Thai church history" so potentially important. I hope that it will say something meaningful and relevant to the struggling church in northern Thailand today about how it came to be and why it is what it is. As a field of study, northern Thai Protestant church history has been ignored since Daniel McGilvary published his autobiography in 1912. (1) Indeed, excepting only Philip Hughes' brief but useful study of the communication of the Gospel in the North and three articles by myself, even northern Thai missionary history has been ignored as a field of study in its own right. (2) The "standard" books in the field treat northern Thai church history only in the context of and as a part of national church history and then only in the context of missionary history. (3)

Yet, the history of the Protestant churches in northern Thailand is something more than just an adjunct to the history of the church in the whole nation. For fifty years the churches in the North had no links with those to the south. The church grew out of a distinctive missionary, cultural, and political environment. At the same time, the history of the church in the North is not the same as that of the missionary movement in the North. Habitually, those who look into the history of the church in all of Thailand see it as simply one manifestation of the history of the missionary movement, a movement that also included the introduction of "modern" education, medicine, and technology into Thailand. In this study, I have shifted that focus by ninety degrees: here the missionary movement is deemed important only for its influence (very significant) on the church. You may find that change of perspective as startling as the students in my course found it.

The purpose, then, of this study is to provide an introduction to northern Thai church history. It is an introduction in two ways. First, the study covers the major events and changes in the history of the Protestant church in the North from 1867 to 1920. Each chapter here could be made into a major study of its own without any problem. Thus, in its brevity and inclusiveness the study introduces the reader to the field of northern Thai Protestant church history. Secondly, it is the first critical historical study of the church in the North, and as such it charts the major themes and patterns of that history for the first time. In hacking through the veritable tangle of historical data available, I found few guideposts, trail markers, or even abandoned campsites of previous researchers to assist me. I fully expect that later researchers will find this "chart" inaccurate at points, inconsequential at points, and misleading at points. Nevertheless, the "chart" does point out where the major ranges and rivers are found. It's a start — an introduction.

As I undertake this study, I am particularly conscious of how little in esteem many in the church and in professional historical circles hold church history. Personal experience tells me that it is useless to try to argue about the supposed relevance of church history to the life of the church and that the experience of the students in my course is not unusual: they could care less about church history as such, but in its concrete form as their own story church history excites and challenges them. Hans Küng has written that, "The real Church is first and foremost a happening, a fact, an historical event. The real essence of the real Church is expressed in historical form." (4) Whatever the theoretical attitude, it is impossible, in fact, to understand the church apart from its past, its accumulation of experiences. Berger and Luckmann put it this way, "Institutions always have a history of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of
the historical process in which it was produced." (5) The church has a history. That history expresses its essence.

There is no more difficult field of historical study than church history. Church history requires the historian to apply a rigorous historical method in the pursuit of essentially theological concerns. Paul Tillich wrote.

Writing church history...requires a double viewpoint in the description of every particular development. First, church history must show facts and their relations with the best methods of historical research and must do so without bringing in divine providence as a particular cause in the general chain of causes and effects. The church historian is not supposed to write a history of divine interferences in world history when he writes the history of the Christian churches. Secondly, the church historian, as a theologian, must remain aware of the fact that he speaks about a historical reality in which the Spiritual Community is effective and by which the Kingdom of God is represented. (6)

This dual task/role of historian and theologian described by Tillich puts the church historian on something of a hot seat. Historiography, after all, is a critical art based on the scientific method's attitude and requires a "neutral" attitude about the subject of study. The historian engages in evaluation and judgment of the sources and the events they describe in order to provide an adequate statement of what actually happened, why it happened, and the significance of what happened. The church historian, however, must also go beyond simply recounting past events. The church historian, as a theologian-historian, necessarily interprets past events in the light of the Gospel. Church history has to do finally, with the church's institutionalized struggle to comprehend the in-dwelling of the divine in the life-shattering servanthood of Jesus of Nazareth. That struggle is an historical struggle that, however, can only be understood theologically.

Therefore, church history, both as history and as theology, necessarily involves the researcher in making critical judgments about the past. We judge what happened. We judge which events of the past are significant. We judge those significant events in light of the Christ Event. It is naive to suggest, as many do, that we should not be critical of people in the past, that we should simply accept that they lived in a different time with different standards. In the first place, the past (whatever past we are speaking of) was not some manner of simplistic place where everyone thought the same way and had the same standards. In the case of the northern Thai church and the Laos Mission that created it, various individuals and groups differed with each other seriously about strategy and policy. Men such as Briggs, Crooks, Freeman, Irwin, and Taylor at various times voiced extremely critical judgments about the Laos Mission. One of the most cogent critiques of that mission was written in 1915 by Robert Speer. It is unlikely that the historian could excel these men in critically judging the missionary movement in northern Siam. Secondly, even if the modern historian treats the past "unfairly" by evaluating it critically (an idea I do not accept), it behooves us for the sake of our present and future to understand how the past has shaped us in the present. The past is a part of us — it belongs to us. If we do not understand it, it chains us to ways of thinking and behaving that are counter-productive. Or, for the church, the past chains us to patterns of faithlessness to the Gospel if we remain ignorant of it.

This, then, is a critical study. One thing needs to be made particularly clear from the beginning: my perspective is not essentially anti-missionary but, rather, it is pro-church in the sense that in spite of its many serious faults the church is still the vehicle for telling the Good News of Jesus Christ. That which weakens the church blocks the paths of grace between God and us. I will warn you now that this entire study is highly critical of the missionary movement in northern Siam in the period of this study. I trust that the reasons for my perspective will become apparent as I present my interpretation of the historical data. It is not that the missionaries were such bad people. In fact, it is clear that many of them were quite the opposite, essentially decent individuals with a deep sense of commitment, a willingness to sacrifice, and even courage. In my studies of the missionary role in modernization, I have discovered that men like Hugh Taylor in Nan and D.G. Collins at the Mission Press in Chiang Mai were very competent administrators and technologists. If one looks at the missionary role in modernization-in education, in medicine, in technology-the missionary record is little short of
remarkable. They brought important forms of human liberation in their introduction of women's education, vaccines, educational techniques, hospitals, and new technologies. People accused of demon possession, people in poverty, and lepers all found a hope in missionary Christianity they could not find in their own society. However, this study is not about these things, it is a history of the church in northern Siam in the period 1867 - 1920.

This shift in perspective is extremely important because it treats both the churches and the missionaries in a way that they have not been treated before historically. It is likely that many of you who read this study are going to conclude that I have "overstated" the negative side of mission work with the churches. One is always at a loss when writing history to be 100% sure he has been totally fair, but I will say this; as I shifted my study of missionary records from modernization to the church I was absolutely astounded at the change in attitude I underwent about those records. I simply did not expect to find the things that I found there which, eventually, began to add up to a serious mismanagement and demeaning of the church by the Laos Mission. Systematic. Consistent. Persistent. My personal sense of the integrity of the church as the church of Jesus Christ was angered and saddened in ways that I did not expect, and I have not tried to hide nor downplay what I learned from my study. As I say, if you think this is negative, you should read some of the correspondence. Good, solid. conservative men like Crooks. Freeman, and Briggs clearly stated that the mission in the North was incompetent and a disgrace.

Yet, I might even be so bold as to argue that, in fact, what you are about to read is quite positive in the sense that it sees the northern Thai church in a new light, one that suggests the very real possibility that this church does have the resources and has always had the resources to witness to the Gospel in a faithful, liberating way. Thus, I would like to invite the reader who shares my concern for a faithful church to also share my perspective, a perspective that looks from the church outward and "past-ward" to discover the roots of the church's present faithlessness, the hope for her future faithfulness.

What is important is the manner in which we pass judgment on the past. Is our judgment fair to the events as they actually took place? Does it portray honestly the significance of those events? Does it tell us something important about them? In short, our interpretation of the past should help to open the past up to fuller understanding rather than shut off the possibility of knowing what actually happened.

It has become a truism among professional historians that there is no such thing as an unbiased history. Each historian has a perspective, which informs and determines the way in which that historian portrays the past. Since biases are unavoidable, the historian has a responsibility to clearly state her or his biases. In fact, historians have come to realize that a well-stated bias can be useful in seeing "old" events in a "new" light. Therefore, you, the reader, need to know the bias upon which I evaluate the history of the northern Thai church and its relations to Presbyterian missions in the North:

From my perspective:

- "salvation" is not dependent upon ascribing to a set of theological propositions (including the proposition that only Christians are saved) but, rather, has to do with reorienting one's life along an axis of servanthood and self-giving.

- the theological test of the historical faithfulness of the church is the depth of its servanthood and self-giving. The church, in order to be faithful, must fully share in the culture of its place and time, be rooted in its culture - even as God in Christ took the immeasurable risk of being born in one time and one place.

- at the same time, the church always questions and challenges the ways-of-power and the ways-of-belief of the culture in which it finds itself. It tells of a "new way" of relating to others. It sets a "new agenda" for living. Being fully a part of its culture, it strains to move itself
and its culture toward the self-draining, self-giving, selfless life of the Servant. It is the representative of love and justice in an unlovely and unjust world.

- ultimately, the church in every culture lives in the freedom of God's grace, which allows it to agonize for others and strive for justice without succumbing to a crushing and anesthetizing burden of guilt because of its inevitable inability to be faithful. Where grace is not the keynote of the Christian message, the church has failed to see the direction and intent of the Old Testament and to hear the message of the New Testament.

As I write this study, I am very consciously asking myself, "To what extent was the church in northern Siam faithful to its Lord and Saviour?" And where I find that it was not faithful, I must ask the further question, "Why not?" Yet, this essentially theological approach will be rendered absolutely useless if I have not credibly carried out the basic task common to every historian. One must be an historian first, then a church historian, and then (and only then) may one incorporate theological concerns into historical study.

No one writes in a vacuum. I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest thanks to a number of individuals and groups who have helped to bring this study to completion. The staff of the Payap College Archives has invested time and concern both as colleagues and as friends in the work that led to this study. The Archives Committee of the Church of Christ in Thailand encouraged the study and assisted in its production. The Slatington Presbyterian Church, Slatington, Pennsylvania USA provided part of the funding needed to print the study. And the people of the Suwan Duangrit Church, Ban Dok Daeng kept my thinking about the northern Thai church's past rooted in the real world of the village church.

My special thanks goes to Josephene Maclean who gave of her time and talents to illustrate this volume and prepare the cover for it. She has provided an artistic relief for the reader's weary eyes!

Finally, dedicating a book to the one who has put up with me and made loneliness an impossibility for a decade seems like a miserly form of compensation, but her patience and her encouragement are responsible for the good things you might find here. Thank you, Nee.
Titles, Terms, and Transliterations

This study follows the transliteration system introduced by the Royal Thai Institute in 1939 without using diacritical marks and with two exceptions: one, place names for which the original cannot be determined, and, two, personal names, for which I have followed the most common form in the historical records.

Regarding geographical terms, I have chosen to use "Siam" to refer to modern day Thailand in the period of study, 1867-1920, and "northern Thai" to refer to the people and language of contemporary northern Thailand -those who refer to themselves as khon muang - in that period. "Siamese" refers to the people and language of central Thailand. I have dropped the usage of the terms "Laos" and "Lan Na" to refer to northern Siam.

The reader should note that this study always uses the contemporary forms for Lampang (formerly called "Lakawn") and Tak (formerly called "Rahaeng").

Finally, common northern Thai titles and honorifics are capitalized and not italicized. The most common are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chao</td>
<td>a member of the upper, ruling class.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao Muang</td>
<td>the absolute ruler of a northern Thai state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kru</td>
<td>&quot;teacher&quot;. Used for clergymen and other educated individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan</td>
<td>honorific for a &quot;retired&quot; monk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noi</td>
<td>honorific for a &quot;retired&quot; novice.</td>
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Part I - Planting

The greatest accomplishment of America is the conquest of the continent, and the greatest achievement of the American churches has been the extension of their work westward across the vast stretches of the continent, keeping abreast with the restless and ever moving population... Throughout this whole period the churches were in continuous contact with frontier conditions and frontier needs, and no single fact is more significant in its influence upon American religion.

William Warren Sweet
*The Story of Religion in America*, 1950, p. 3

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Chapter 1
The Early Years (1867-1869)

The course of events that led ultimately to the founding of the northern Thai church by the Laos Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America in 1867 may be traced back to any number of starting points; the period of great revivals in early nineteenth century America: the beginnings of the missionary movement in England and the United States; or the events leading to the founding of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the 1830s. An enterprising historian might boldly plunge into the frigid waters of Scottish Presbyterianism, the baptismal font of Daniel McGilvary's own religious experience. (1) Or, one might rightly explore the implications of certain concepts coming out of American frontier and expansionist experience-such as the concepts of the "go-getter" and the "booster" as described by Daniel Boorstin among others. (2)

So, then, where to start? For my purposes it is enough to begin with Siam.

Missions to Siam (3)

Evidently, the first Christian tract printed in Siamese and the first Siamese convert resulted from Ann Judson's work in 1819 in Rangoon with Siamese captives carried off by the Burmese. The road to Chiang Mai began there and in Singapore, also in 1819, where Samuel Milton of the London Missionary Society based himself and laid plans for an L.M.S. mission to Bangkok. After a number of unsuccessful attempts to initiate a Bangkok mission, the first L.M.S. (and Protestant) missionaries finally reached Bangkok in August 1828. But they did not stay very long, and the L.M.S. failed to plant the first permanent mission in Siam.

In fact, one could get into quite a little discussion over which mission was first. That honor is usually given to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions since their first missionary couple arrived in Bangkok in July 1831. (4) But they also did not remain as illness drove them out of the country in January 1832. Thus, if "permanent presence" means continuous residence, the Baptist Mission begun in March 1833 established the first permanent mission in Siam. The A.B.C.F.M. did not return until July 1834. For the next fifteen years, then, these two missions, Baptist and A.B.C.F.M., carried on the difficult work of Protestant missions in Bangkok.

They were hard years. The political situation was dangerous since the King of Siam wanted as little to do with the West as necessary and feared Western designs on his nation. The people did not respond to
preaching, and illness and death dogged every effort, every undertaking. The A.B.C.F.M. mission showed the strain within a decade, especially after China "opened up," and the A.B.C.F.M. began to reassign some of its Bangkok forces to China. The specter of theological controversy raised its head in the mission as well, causing the mission's two most capable members, Jesse Caswell and Dan Beach Bradley, to withdraw. The last A.B.C.F.M. missionary left Bangkok at the end of 1849. The Baptist mission was only slightly more successful but considerably more tenacious. Never a strong mission, it too suffered from the opening of China since personnel and resources were drawn off from Siam for China. The mission hung on until the last Baptist missionary finally left Siam in 1893.

While the Baptist mission struggled on, the breakaway Caswell-Bradley mission sought to establish itself. After they resigned from the A.B.C.F.M., Bradley returned to the United States in 1847 to see what he could get started. He contacted the American Missionary Association, a body primarily concerned with slaves in the American South, and the A.M.A. agreed to accept Bradley and Caswells as their missionaries to Siam. Unfortunately, Caswell died in September 1848. Bradley and his second wife, Sarah Blachly Bradley, returned in 1850 with three others to begin the A.M.A. Bangkok mission, but within a short time feuding erupted in the mission, and by 1855 only the Bradleys remained on the field. The mission lingered on until Bradley died in 1873.

These three missions faced a formidable set of circumstances. Health was a serious limitation. Their political standing fluctuated but was never quite secure. They fought with each other and with other foreigners. (5) The people at home showed more interest in China than Siam. The Siamese themselves totally ignored the religious message of the missionaries. The available resources for the work were always inadequate, the personnel never enough. The missionaries themselves felt alienated from Siamese culture. They had to learn the language without benefit of any linguistic tools or methodologies. They came with cement-hard stereotypical ideas about Siamese culture that only slowly modified through contact with the more benign reality of that culture. Yet, without their efforts the church in northern Siam could not have come into existence.

The Presbyterians

The first permanently assigned Presbyterian couple, the Buells, arrived in Bangkok in August 1840, but "permanent" in Siam in those days was a relative term. They left in early 1844 both ill and disillusioned with the prospects in Siam. The mission was reestablished by the Board of Foreign Missions three years later with the appointment of the Mattoons and Dr. Samuel Reynolds House, all of whom arrived on the field in March 1847. The work developed only slowly and fitfully. More as an act of faith than a sign of evangelistic success, the mission established its first church on 3 September 1849. It took another decade before the first Siamese converted to the Christian faith.

The period around 1850 proved to be a difficult one for all three of the minions in Siam, Presbyterian, Baptist, and the A.M.A. The King increasingly distrusted the missionaries and applied more political pressure on them until the Presbyterians seriously considered withdrawing entirely. But, then, the King died in 1851, and Prince Mongkut, a man friendly with and tolerant of the missionaries, came to the throne. The period of trial by fire ended.

The Siam Mission remained small, its work limited, until the Rev. Jonathan Wilson Family and the Rev. Daniel McGilvary arrived in June 1858. Their arrival marked an important transition period not only for the Siam Mission but also for the possibility of a northern mission. In September, the mission founded the Siam Presbytery to govern its still unborn churches. The year 1861 marked another important turning point for the Siam Mission and all mission work in the country. In June, the mission sent the McGilvrys and the recently arrived McFarlands off to open the first station outside of Bangkok at Phet Buri.

Although the Siam Mission had few converts to show for its first twenty-five years, it accomplished a stability and growth of activities at a time when the only other Bangkok missions were already in decline. It laid
the first foundations for the Siamese church and the base upon which the history of the Laos Mission and its churches was built.

Close Encounters

Although the Presbyterians founded missionary work in the North, the vision for that work began with Dr. Bradley, the premier first generation missionary in Siam. He came to know of the northern Thai through delegations that came down frequently and lodged at a temple near his compound. The northern Thai intrigued him, and he went out of his way to make their acquaintance. (6) Others in missionary circles were also aware of these strangers from the North. House expressed the first Presbyterian interest in them in 1854, and he recorded the first expression of a desire to fund a "Laos" Mission." (7) But it was Bradley who seems to have been most influential in setting the direction towards Chiang Mai.

There is little wonder that the northern Thai, a people the missionaries knew little about and even the extent to which escaped them, intrigued Bradley and others. The six northern principalities were only loosely related to Siam. Centuries earlier they composed a strong union, the Lan Na Kingdom, which was a center of Southeast Asian Buddhist culture and militarily strong enough to seriously threaten the Siamese kingdoms on its southern border. The power of the Lan Na Kingdom came to an end and its culture rapidly deteriorated when most of the region fell under the Burmese. Only in the early nineteenth century did the Lan Na states, now tributary to Bangkok, begin to emerge from the chaos of two hundred years of war and revolution. Chiang Mai led the emergence and remained the central and strongest of the states, something more than just the first among equals, but still a dependent of Siam. It was, however, a distant dependency. The power of the Siamese King in the region was limited, and the Chao Muang of states like Chiang Mai and Nan had considerable freedom, particularly in internal matters. Only a handful of Europeans had ever traveled to Chiang Mai.

Early missionary interest in the northern Thai focused on Phet Buri, south of Bangkok, where there resided people who were, apparently, ethnic northern Thai. In 1859, Bradley visited a number of those northern Thai villages, and the fact that they did not practice Buddhism and resembled the Karens particularly struck Bradley. His appetite for a northern Thai mission increased. He experimented with printing the distinctive northern Thai alphabet and in about 1860 produced the first known example of northern Thai printing, a brief tract. At some point, probably also in 1860, he formally requested funds for the establishment of a Laos Mission from his supporting board, but the Rev. George Whipple, of the American Missionary Association, replied with a regretful but firm. "No." There were no funds available. (8) Bradley did not give up, and it was he who interested the eventual founder of northern missions, McGilvary, in the northern Thai.

Daniel McGilvary, Bradley's son-in-law, was born into a rigid, devout Scottish Presbyterian family in Moore County, North Carolina on 16 May 1828. He grew up in strict surroundings in which religion always played a central part. After teaching for a period, McGilvary attended Princeton Theological Seminary where he came under the influence of Dr. Charles Hodge, a strong supporter of foreign missions. While there, he and another young seminarian, Jonathan Wilson, met and spoke with Dr. House who convinced them to consider joining the Siam Mission. After graduation, McGilvary went back to North Carolina and served as a pastor for one year, then applied for the Siam mission field, and along with the Wilson family arrived in Bangkok in 1858. (9)

Interest in the northern Thai turned into a family affair when McGilvary married Sophia Royce Bradley on 6 December 1860. The couple even used their wedding as an occasion for involvement with the northern Thai. Since the Chao Muang of Chiang Mai, Kawilorot, was in town, the newly weds sent over a piece of wedding cake to him, and the following day he repaid the compliment with a visit, it was the first meeting between two men who would come to know each other all too well. Meanwhile, the Siam Mission sought to take advantage of the invitation of local officials in Phet Buri to open that station. It fell to the McGilvarys and the McFarlands to open the station, and McGilvary reported that one reason far his keen interest in Phet Buri was the northern Thais there. (10)
By this time, it was clear that McGilvary's classmate from Princeton, Wilson, would also be involved in starting a "Laos Mission", if and when that day came. Thus, Wilson joined McGilvary on a survey trip to the northern cities of Lampang, Lamphun, and Chiang Mai. They left Bangkok on 20 November 1863 and reached Chiang Mai on 7 January 1864. The Chao Muang was on a trip to Bangkok (they had missed him on the river), but the two missionaries were very cordially welcomed by the high officials of Chiang Mai who assured them that they would be just as well received if they decided to live in Chiang Mai. McGilvary commented that Bradley's long-standing friendship with the Chao Muang helped them not a little. (11)

McGilvary and Wilson spent only ten days in Chiang Mai, returning to Bangkok on 6 February 1864. (12) McGilvary then wrote enthusiastic letters to the Board describing not only what he had seen but also the wonderful opportunity awaiting the Board in Chiang Mai. The ideas and the language of these letters find their place in the long tradition of correspondence from the field describing the great prospects of some new goal in the North replete with resounding calls to Move Forward! The door is open, McGilvary wrote, and it is God's time. We must depend upon the "divine agency" and trust in God. He urged that Chiang Mai was a distinctly Presbyterian responsibility. It was a special calling for the Presbyterians alone... It is a special opening! How can we let this opportunity pass? A nation, a race is waiting for us! How often northern missionaries in later years wrote in nearly this same way: Always the urgency, the pleas that this, this! is the time... God is calling.' Give us permission! Hurry! As in later cases so now, the ones calling for expansion acknowledged that limiting factors existed, considerations that might make the Board hesitate and then still issued a clarion call for Trust in God. In his request for the Board's sanction for Chiang Mai, McGilvary wrote in this same way. (13)

That sanction came in September 1864, but so did one problem after another. Sophia McGilvary was ill for a good part of the year. There were problems with lack of funding and of personnel. Wilson returned to the United States after both his wife and daughter died. Two years passed. (14)

Things finally came together in late August and early September of 1866. Wilson returned from his furlough; and he went to visit McGilvary in Phet Buri to consult on the proposed Laos Mission. He brought with him news that Kawilorot, again in Bangkok, had been suddenly called back to Chiang Mai and was about to leave. Since McGilvary knew that everything depended upon Kawilorot's permission, he flew off to Bangkok and spent a whirlwind, exciting week consulting with Kawilorot, Siamese officials, the U.S. Consul, and his mission colleagues. At the end of that week, he had permission from everyone concerned to go as soon as possible after the rains stopped to open the 'Laos Mission'. (15) Presbyterian work in Chiang Mai was about to begin.

Getting Started

Hot. Dusty. Chiang Mai in April: the heat clings to the land... no comfort.. at night or in the shade..no getting away from the heat anywhere. The two older McGilvarys and their two small children landed in Chiang Mai on the third of April to live in a crowded little guest sala (rest house) in the hottest month of the year. Chiang Mai in 1867 was weeks away from "civilization", an outpost of the old Asia. The McGilvarys became her first permanent Western residents, and heat was not their only problem. Milling crowds of silent, gawking
visitors for months and months swarmed around the tiny open sala. People watched them eat; listened to them talk; watched them at prayer. They had precious little privacy even a year later.

_Daniel McGilvary_

Although the constant attention must have weighed upon them, the missionary couple also relished this attention because it gave them an opportunity to talk with the people, to engage them in conversations that often led around to the topic of religion. They spent hours and hours in conversations. McGilvary practiced what medicine he could. They also visited and received visits from the Chaos and even the Chao Muang himself. Everywhere they were well received, and what appeared to be a hopeful and auspicious beginning was made in those first months in Chiang Mai. (16)

The excitement of those early months was soon tainted by a growing uncertainty in the McGilvary's relationship with the Chao Muang. Kawilorot was widely respected and feared as a capable but sometimes unpredictable despot who ruled his land with a firm hand. Without his support, the new mission could not have been started, and without his support, it could not continue. By the end of the year, McGilvary reported to New York that Kawilorot appeared to be less supportive than at first. He had acquired an anti-missionary Portuguese advisor who went out of his way to influence his patron to hold the same attitude. McGilvary surmised that he lost some of the Chao Muang's support when one of his grandchildren died after having been inoculated by McGilvary. (17) In light of later events, we may also assume that the Chao Muang had not expected that his people would respond so favorably to the presence of these foreigners. He observed that in Bangkok people showed little interest in the foreign religion of the missionaries. The first Siamese convert being won only after some thirty years of effort. His own people responded very differently.

That difference became more-and-more clear throughout 1867 and into 1869. There would never again be such a hopeful, exciting time in the history of missionary work in northern Thailand. In February 1868, the Wilsons arrived, and in April, as a symbol of their hope, the missionaries established the first church in northern Thailand. Although no one had yet converted at the time, the prospects were bright. By September 1868, Kawilorot became friendlier again (at least outwardly) to the missionaries, and he even selected a site for the mission compound. Sophia McGilvary held a regular Sandy afternoon class of a group of women interested in the new faith, and McGilvary found an increasingly warm response to his medical skills. Most important of all, a "tall, comely, earnest" man with a "taste for scientific information" was close to converting. (18)

He did, in fact, convert. Nan Inta spent many hours in conversation with the McGilvarya's about both religion and the wider world. The things he heard were attractive to him, but what most impressed him was when McGilvary correctly predicted an eclipse in August 1868. That prediction called into question all of his own beliefs about the world, and after much personal struggle and serious thought Nan Inta became a Christian. Since he was a well-known and widely respected man with a reputation for sincerity in searching for truth, popular interest in the new religion redoubled with his conversion, especially as he was also a relative of the royal family. (19)

The new year, 1869, opened with great hope for the mission. The history of the church in northern Siam began on the first Sunday of 1869, January third, when Nan Inta received baptism. At that time, at least two members of the royal family also showed serious interest in Christianity, and other converts were on the way. (20) In May, Noi Sunya [In recent years, Noi Sunya's name has been widely written as "Suriya," a central Thai form. In most of the records of the period, his name is written as "Sunya," and older Christians still pronounce his name in that way.] and Nai ("Mr.") Boon Ma were baptized. In June, Saen (an official rank) Ya Wichai was also baptized, and two months later, in August, another three converts-Nan Chai, Pu Sang, and Noi Kanta-all received baptism.

Along with Nan Inta, three of these last six converts came from what we might consider the "middle class" of Chiang Mai society. Noi Sunya was a well-known traditional doctor and the chief herdsman for the
Chao Muang's cattle herds. Saen Ya Wichai served as a government officer, lived several days' travel north of Chiang Maim and was a client of the Chao Muang of Lamphun. Years later, McGilvary wrote that in point of time Saen Ya Wichai actually accepted the Gospel before even Nan Inta, and McGilvary honored him with the title, "the first Laos believer." Nan Chai was a widely respected Buddhist scholar and a former abbot of a temple who gave up his paid position as caretaker of a temple in order to join the church. (21) Thus, four of the first seven converts were men of position and influence. People knew them, and their conversions gained increased respect for the new religion.

McGilvary and Wilson began to make definite plans for the expansion of the church in northern Siam. Among other things, they asked the Siam Presbytery in Bangkok, nominally the supervising body for their Chiang Mai church, for permission to start churches without having to wait for prior permission from the presbytery, which met only yearly in distant Bangkok. (22) The mission in Chiang Mai expected a great influx into the new faith to take place shortly, and as a further step anticipating that growth, the mission prepared a course of study to train some of the converts for the ordained ministry. The course was to start in October 1869. At the same time, Noi Sunya planned to start a second church in his village a few miles outside of Chiang Mai. (23)

In just a little over two years, the Chiang Mai mission accomplished far more than the Siam Mission in Bangkok had achieved in twenty long years. The McGilvarys and Wilsons expected great things to happen. Thus, when they heard a rumor in September 1869 that the Chao Muang was laying plans to move against the tiny Christian community they discounted the talk as nothing more than "silly rumor." (24)

Confrontation (25)

At least one other person agreed with the McGilvarys and Wilsons that Christianity was on the verge of making serious inroads into traditional religion in Chiang Mai. Kawilorot. We cannot be certain about his thoughts in the months prior to September 1869, but it is quite likely that McGilvary commented on the matter correctly: Kawilorot feared the loss of the old order and his own power. Christianity represented a new set of beliefs and allegiances, which questioned the supremacy of traditional beliefs and allegiances. Kawilorot must have followed with no little concern the problems Nan Inta's patron experienced after Nan Inta became a Christian/ In late January 1869, the patron called him for service, a traditional and mandatory obligation on the part of a client. On this occasion, Nan Inta politely refused to go because it was a Sunday. He could not work on the Sabbath and remain a Christian. The patron did not make an issue of the matter and allowed Nan Inta to makeup the work on another day. However, after this incident was repeated and the patron found that he could not call his client to work on a Sunday, the patron began to grumble. (26)

The right of the patron to call his client to serve him was fundamental to the social structure of Chiang Mai. The corvée labor system replaced taxation as the means by which the authorities secured their power. Nan Inta demonstrated that his new allegiance and faith meant more to him than the traditional system to which he had previously adhered. This must have been an ominous development to Kawilorot, made even more dangerous because foreigners known to be friendly to Bangkok promoted the idea. As an astute ruler, Kawilorot could not have missed the ramifications and potential dangers inherent in the popularity of Christianity.

How clearly the missionaries understood the threat they posed to the ruling powers is hard to tell. The evidence suggests that they did not understand the seriousness of the situation they created nearly as fully as did one of the converts, namely Nan Chai. In fact, in the first ten days or so of September 1869 things seemed to be going very well. Early in the month, Nan Chai applied to the daughter of the Chao Muang to receive him as her client since he had left temple employment and needed a legal patron. McGilvary went with him when he made the application, and he was closely examined by the Chao regarding his beliefs. The missionaries remembered the communion shared on the following Sunday, 5 September 1869, as a particularly happy occasion; all of the converts were present and everything seemed bright and hopeful.
But the future was not really so bright after all. On that Sunday, the first hints of rumors reached the missionaries that the Chao Muang planned to take action against the converts. Still, they did not expect any violence, especially since the rumors indicated only that the converts would be forced into exile. Such an exile might even provide an opportunity to spread the Gospel to new places. Less optimistic than the missionaries, Nan Chai grew more-and-more depressed as the early days of September passed. Nothing that the missionaries said lifted him from his despondency. On Saturday, 11 September 1869, he came into Chiang Mai to receive the papers that made him legally a client of the daughter of Kawilorot, and he paid the traditional three rupees required. This should have pleased him since it meant that he was now under her protection, but he continued to feel depressed.

That very day, the 11th, Nan Chai received word from his wife that the head man (ka ban) to his village wanted to see him immediately about collecting a piece of timber for the city wall that was required of everyone in the village. Nan Chai received the message during the evening, and early the next morning, the 12th, he rushed off through flood-swollen streams and muddied paths to his village, Mae Pu Kha, without even waiting to attend worship. After he arrived home at about noontime, further word came that he should go see the district headman (nai kwan) and collect his friend Noi Sunya on the way. Noi Sunya refused to go. Although they lived within a mile of each other, they had different village headmen, and Noi Sunya's headman had not been the one to summon him. Thus, Nan Chai went on alone, and after meeting, the district headman returned home. It was already evening, and the district headman did not have time to call Noi Sunya through "proper channels."

The next morning, Monday, 13 September 1869, an armed party marched off to fetch the two Christians. Immediately after the party seized Nan Chai, his wife ran to report to the missionaries, but as she approached the mission compound an agent of her village headman stopped her and warned her that if she saw the missionaries she would be killed. She returned. Faced with an armed party, Noi Sunya and his large family immediately understood what would happen and shared in a tearful parting.

When the Christians arrived at the district headman's home, they immediately suffered an examination regarding their beliefs. They were both asked if they had entered the "foreigners' religion" to which both replied that they had. The authorities then bound them in a particularly painful way and examined them further. In the process, Nan Chai was kicked in the eye, causing it to swell up and bleed. They remained bound without relief through the rest of the day and all of that night. Nan Chai's wife appeared and spent time with him, but they could only converse in fits and snatches as the guards prevented anything more. Nan Chai told her that if the missionaries knew their situation the two converts would not be killed. At one point, he also begged the guards not to hurt the employees of the missionaries, as none of them were Christians.

The next morning, 14 September 1869, their captors took the two Christians into the jungle. Nan Chai died at the first blow of the executioner's club. Noi Sunya finally had to be stabbed with a spear thrust before he died.

The McGilvarys and Wilsons had no idea of what was going on. They had been lulled into a false sense of security by the Chao Muang when he left on a three-week "fishing trip." In fact, he went to Lamphun to convince the Chao Muang there to execute Saen Ya Wichai. He escaped that fate only at the behest of his immediate patron who passed him off as an ignoramus who did not understand what he was doing when he became a Christian. But the missionaries knew none of this. They did know something was wrong when the personal servants of both families deserted them on the night of 13 September (Monday). But, for two weeks afterwards they had only conjecture to go on as no one dared tell them anything.

The weeks after that were filled with fear and uncertainty for the two mission families. Rumors flew, one of them having it that a most trusted servant of the mission was executed along with his entire family while en route to Bangkok on mission business The missionaries feared for their own lives and identified their situation with that of the Jewish exiles of the Old Testament whose nation was destroyed and who were carried off into exile in Babylon. McGilvary wrote, "It has been a time of the hiding of God's face. We have had to
"hang out harps on the willows-to weep when we remember our former years." (27) The Christian community was scattered. The servants had fled. The highest authority in the land was moving against them in the security of his own near-absolute power. The whole future of the mission hung in the balance.

Round Two (28)

The mission families lived in a state of suspense and uncertainty for over two months. Outwardly, they carried on as if nothing had happened, and they did not discuss their fears even in front of their children. They felt the sympathetic support of a number of friends in Chiang Mai including the abbot of a temple and some members of royalty. But the uncertainty remained. In the meantime, they sent word of their situation to the mission community in Bangkok where Bradley and members of the Presbyterian mission immediately arranged a conference with the Regent. The Regent agreed to send a special delegation headed by a "Commissioner" (ka luang) to accompany any missionaries who might want to go to Chiang Mai. The Siam Mission selected The Revs. N.A. McDonald and S.C. George to go.

The Chiang Mai missionaries knew nothing about these arrangements until they had word in late November 1869 that a royal delegation and two foreigners had reached Lamphun and were on their way to Chiang Mai. They arrived in the late afternoon of the next day. The Siamese Commissioner carried with him a royal letter addressed to Kawilorot, and arrangements for an audience were quickly made.

28 November 1869. 9:00 AM. Prior to the appointed time for the audience, the Chiang Mai missionaries and their two Bangkok colleagues met for a strategy planning session at which they agreed that the entire matter of the executions had to be brought out into the open no matter what the consequences. With that resolve, they marched off with the procession led by the royal letter to meet with Kawilorot. The audience began quietly enough although McDonald, whom McGilvary called a "naturally timid man," felt that Kawilorot looked pale with suppressed rage. However, when he read the royal letter, there was little of consequence in it; it ordered him to allow the missionaries to stay in Chiang Mai or to leave as they saw fit, and to facilitate their staying or leaving. He was ordered to not harm them.

McDonald then spoke up saying that although the Chao Muang had originally given permission for the missionaries to come to Chiang Mai and had at first received them cordially; more lately there had been some "problems." He mentioned the fact that the servants had all run away and, again, that the missionaries had unsuccessfully sought workers for building their homes. Kawilorot retained his easy manner, replying that he had done nothing to cause these difficulties. He did mention that there had been a couple of recalcitrant slaves executed recently. They disobeyed orders to bring timber to help repair the city wall. With this, Kawilorot prepared to withdraw.

McGilvary could not allow that. He quickly spoke up, accusing the Chao Muang of not telling the truth and of having murdered the two Christians for no other reason than their religion. He charged the Chao Muang with knowing that very few others had brought in their timbers by the time the Christians were killed. In fact, many had not even yet brought in the required timbers.

Kawilorot exploded in rage. In his position of supreme power, few dared speak to him in this manner. Angrily, he declared that he had, indeed, ordered the two Christians executed because of their religion. If anyone dared become a Christian again, he would have him or her executed too. The new religion was treasonous. The missionaries could stay on in Chiang Mai only if they stopped teaching Christianity. It must have been a towering rage, because both McDonald and the Commissioner feared that Kawilorot would attack the missionaries physically. Kawilorot withdrew. The audience ended.
McDonald, George, and Wilson agreed (as did the Commissioner and all of the Chiang Mai friends of the missionaries) that the Chiang Mai mission could not continue, as the situation was much too insecure with Kawilorot so angry. McGilvary did not agree, but he allowed the others to send a message to Kawilorot that the two mission families would leave within a few months. They sent the same message down river to the Siam Mission in Bangkok. Wilson later went to McGilvary urging that they reestablish the Chiang Mai Station at Tak on the boundary between Siam proper and the northern States. McGilvary thought that was a very good idea—for the Wilsons. The McGilvays were not yet ready to leave Chiang Mai.

Not long after this heated confrontation at the palace, Kawilorot began to prepare for one of his months’ long trips to Bangkok. In a surprisingly cordial final audience, Kawilorot assured McGilvary he could remain in Chiang Mai at least until Kawilorot returned. McGilvary assumed that this cordial attitude had something to do with his own boldness at the first audience; and, in any event, he gained what he wanted most, namely time. McDonald and George, however, returned to Bangkok convinced that the Chiang Mai mission was ended.

Kawilorot followed them down to Bangkok. During his stay, the United States Consul did everything in his power to intervene with the Siamese government on behalf of the mission in Chiang Mai. He repeatedly asked the government to force Kawilorot to give assurances that he would not harm the missionaries. As it turned out, Kawilorot was quite ill. The Siamese government did not want to "bother" him and, instead, discussed the matter with the "Second King" (maha upharat) of Chiang Mai who was known to be friendly with the missionaries. At one point, the Bangkok government decided to call the missionaries back down to Bangkok to examine their case. However, the American Consul reminded the government that the missionaries were the victims not the perpetrators of the events in Chiang Mai. He also reminded the government that if it could not protect American citizens in Chiang Mai, it would have serious difficulties with the American government, No recall was ordered. (29)

Finally, still very ill, Kawilorot left for Chiang Mai. He never reached the city, dying virtually under its walls in late June 1870. The Chiang Mai mission was saved.

The Blood of the Martyrs

In the midst of all of these momentous events and even before his confrontation with Kawilorot, McGilvary wrote in early November 1869 of certain prospective converts and of his conviction that, "The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church." (30) In more recent times, McGilvary's statement of faith in the midst of turmoil has become something of a semi-sacrosanct truism among Protestant Christians in Thailand. Such belief gives an aura of association with the persecution of the early church and a flavor of awe-inspiring sacredness to what was, in fact, a bloody and lawless but very effective suppression of the Christian religion in Chiang Mai. The events of the martyrdom of Nan Chai and Not Sunya and subsequent developments as they actually took place suggest that a serious re-evaluation of those events needs to be made.

First, the oppression of the Christians in 1869 and the political pressure put on them for years afterwards wrought a fundamental change in who was willing to become a Christian and measurably reduced the spiritual content of conversion. Four of the first seven converts to Christianity were men who already had a secure place in their society. Others of equal status showed serious interest. McGilvary and Wilson started preparations for much larger numbers of conversions because of relatively important members of Chiang Mai society having already joined the new faith.

Thus, we must observe that the murder of these two Christians had a strong effect on who became Christians. Whereas prior to September 1869, converts were being drawn from the "middle" and "middle high" as well as lower classes, after 1869 the vast majority of converts came from the distressed lower classes and converted more for social than spiritual reasons. The later converts were most often people accused of demon possession or seriously and chronically ill individuals healed by missionary medicine. They often showed little concern with spiritual growth after they had become Christians. (31)
Second, Kawilorot put an end to any possibility of a mass movement to Christianity taking place. By this one cruel act taken before the Christian movement had grown large enough to absorb the impact of persecution, Kawilorot shattered its gathering momentum. In this case, the "blood of the martyrs" did not lead to further conversions but rather to a scattering of the Christians and an end to any church growth for nearly a decade. From this time onward, Christianity was the religion of the foreigners and never attracted more than a tiny fraction of the total population. Considerable weight must be given to this second point in light of what appeared to have been happening before September 1869.

Third, these events led to a change in the relationship between the missionaries and the Christian community. Before 1869, the two mission families lived in relatively humble surroundings much like those of the people themselves and closer to the people than in later years. Living in the circumstances they did, they had not yet become the power figures that they soon would be. The mission had relatively little political pull and attracted people more often out of a genuine concern for religious beliefs than for more mundane reasons.

Here we must note the importance of the audience of November 1869 in changing the missionaries' status in society and their relationship with the church. When McGilvary called Kawilorot a liar, he challenged the most powerful figure of the old order, and did so successfully. At the same time, the Bangkok government demonstrated a certain degree of concern for and willingness to back these foreign missionaries. Thus, the McGilvarya and the Wilsons allied themselves to the growing power of Slam. As time passed, the missionaries enhanced their own status by acquiring large tracts of land, building impressive homes, and hiring considerable numbers of servants. While the Christian "movement" languished, the prestige and the status of the mission grew. As we will see, in later years the missionaries took their place in the highest levels of society and became, for all practical purposes, the real patrons of the converts. In a society sensitive to hierarchical relationships, the mission and the church could not be equal, not when most converts came from the margins of society and the missionaries stood in the top most rungs of that same social system.

Fourth, Kawilorot succeeded in delaying the development of a Christian community for a decade even as he succeeded in destroying the attractiveness of the new faith for those with a stake in society. This decade-long delay further changed the relationship between the mission and the church. The mission worked with churches that grew only slowly in a social situation that discouraged growth. Significant growth in numbers came only after the mission was well established.

An entirely different kind of church might have emerged in the North if Kawilorot had not moved against the church so quickly and decisively. Since the mission consisted of only two families and significant reinforcements were years away, the mission would have had to rely much more heavily on indigenous leadership. Indeed, it was preparing to do so. It could not have dominated the churches as it later did. Nor would there have been the time to create a system of church life and government so dependent on the mission itself. It is likely that instead of the mission-focused church that actually came into being the Christian movement might have became a church-focused one.

In conclusion, then, we are struck by a number of observations. Kawilorot in fact, took decisive and effective action to secure his power in the face of the threat of the new religion. He stopped the spread of Christianity, killed some of its best leaders, and destroyed the attractiveness of the alternative faith. He did all of this before the church grew large enough to embrace martyrdom as a means of strengthening the faith. The martyrs did not become the seed of the church.

On the other hand, Christianity before September 1869 had the potential to expand rapidly in northern Siam. It became a sufficiently potent threat to drive Kawilorot to quash it. Something in the unpretentious presentation of the new religion by the mission in its first years caused a growing number of people to withdraw from traditional religion and identify with the new faith.
Finally, then, we must observe that Kawilorot brought a serious change to the course of northern Thai church history. It was an unmitigated disaster for the church, which it has not recovered from to this day. The events of September and November 1869 have shaped the modern church in the North more than any other events because they literally changed the way the church began.

And one of the reasons that Kawilorot's action against the emerging church proved to be so effective was because the repression of the church in Chiang Mai and other parts of the North did not end with his death.

Chapter 2
The Hard Years (1870-1889)

The two decades from 1870 to 1889 marked a new era for the Laos Mission in which the mission found itself facing an entirely changed situation. The mission did not just have to start over. It had to start over in a much more hostile environment. Whatever attraction Christianity had in-and-of-itself as an alternative faith was considerably muted not only by Kawilorot's decisive act of repression but also by the increasingly clear alliance between the missionaries and other forces for modernization and "centralization" (of Bangkok's power) in the North. The struggle of the church to find a place in the traditional northern society was linked to the larger processes of modernization and centralization. Traditional society resisted the church just as it tried to resist other agents of modernization since they meant an end to the fully integrated way of life of traditional society.

Indeed, the spread of a system of faith alternative to that of the traditional society threatened the very heart of a society in which all facets of life inseparably integrated themselves with the religious faith of society. Traditional society allowed for only one system of faith, one so intimately connected to the rest of life that it functioned as the unquestioned ground for society and culture. One could not participate in the society fully or meaningfully without being rooted in that ground. An alternative system of faith immediately threatened all facets of social and political life including the systems of allegiance and power. Kawilorot understood the nature of the threat Christianity posed, and in the years after 1869 political and religious leaders as well as the people in a number of localities continued to resist Christianity, often quite openly and on a few occasions violently. Their resistance formed part of the larger struggle to maintain traditional structures, habits, and patterns in the face of modernization and centralization. (1)

Aftermath 1870-1875

In one sense, very little actually happened in the years immediately after Kawilorot's persecution of the Christian community. The Laos Mission spent its time simply trying to regain its balance. However, on a deeper level these six years were important just because the mission did begin to regain its balance. Patterns of administration and activity emerged, developing quietly into quasi-traditions that greatly influenced the whole shape and direction of the Laos Mission and her churches.

The small congregation created before September 1869 ceased to exist in any meaningful way in this period. Of the five Christians still living, only Nan Inta and Saen Ya Wichai associated with the missionaries, but Saen Ya Wichai lived near Chiang Rai and seldom saw them. In April 1872, Nan Ta (not to be confused with the clergyman of a decade later) converted and was baptized. In December 1872, another three men received baptism even though they did not especially please Wilson with the level of their understanding of Christianity. (2) However, two soon died, and by the end of 1873 there were only four Christians, all male. This situation continued through the end of 1875. (3)

In the absence of a meaningful Christian community, the mission carried on with its work. There were seven aspects of that work that I will comment on briefly here in the context of this period. Each aspect is
important because it marked the emergence of a formative pattern of attitude or activity in the life of the northern Thai church

First, the mission believed that the animist/Buddhist faith of traditional society was "idolatrous" and therefore an affront to the holiness and majesty of God. (4) Since traditional faith sat at the core of all social life, this attitude meant that the missionaries felt alienated from northern Thai society and sought to alienate their converts from that society as well.

Second, the handful of converts themselves experienced continuing difficulties in their social relationships, especially within their families, because they did become alienated from their society when they converted. Family tensions became particularly acute in times of crisis. In 1873 Nan Ta and Lung (Uncle) Doong, two of the six remaining converts, both fell ill. Their families put great pressure on each of them to renounce their religion and seek healing from the spirits. Nan Ta gave in while Lung Doong refused. Both died. The following year one of the four remaining Christians suffered suspension from worship because he too participated in spirit propitiation. (5) These first converts found themselves in a particularly difficult position because they had no larger Christian community to help them adjust to their social isolation.

Third, we know surprisingly little about the daily relationships between the converts and the missionaries in this period, but what little we do know reveals evidence of another pattern. Nan Inta, the leading member of the few remaining converts, effectively shifted his client status from a traditional patron to the missionaries by becoming employed by them and by being under their instruction. He worked for the mission as a language teacher and a translator, in 1874 he traveled to Bangkok where the Siam Presbytery took him "under care" in preparation for ordination into the ministry. He never attained that status, but on 10 April 1875 the Chiang Mai Church elected him as the first northern Thai elder. (6) The pattern of the mission employing the best leadership of the church as mission assistants was, thus, anticipated in the early 1870s.

Fourth, the Laos Mission began to create the northern Thai church in the image of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. with all of the organizational and theological implications that meant. The mission emphasized legal forms, procedures, and concerns by which the various governing bodies of the church functioned as "courts." This system of Presbyterian polity expected church members to adhere to certain standards of conduct. When they failed to do so, the ruling body of the local church, the Session, called them before it to present their case and be judged. (7)

Fifth, the Laos Mission perceived the church as an evangelistic agency for the conversion of northern Siam. (8) This untested assumption about what the church should be affected the structure of leadership and the focus of activity of the church in later years. At heart, the mission assumed that the northern Thai church should take as its model the mission itself.

Sixth, certain organizational weaknesses hampered the mission's ability to work effectively with the church. The first reinforcement for the tiny mission, Dr. Charles W. Vrooman, arrived in 1872, but he stayed only for a short time before resigning in discouragement. The McGilvarys left for their first furlough in early 1873 and did not return until February 1875. The Wilsons were both ill, and Wilson himself had to give much of his time to overseeing mission construction work. (9) Discouragement, furloughs, illness, and property and financial concerns limited the time the mission had for work with the churches. One of the most serious weaknesses of the mission was its lack of organizational continuity.

Finally, this period saw the first missionary tour of exploration. In April 1872, McGilvary and Vrooman toured Chiang Rai, Luang Prabang, Nan, and Phrae to survey the extent of their "Laos" field. (10) These trips established yet another pattern by which the expansionist ideology of the Laos Mission actually determined the geographical situation of the northern Thai churches, not only where they were placed but also how scattered they were.
In trying to understand the birth and development of the northern Thai church, the significance of the structures and activities of the Laos Mission itself cannot be overlooked. Nor can the fact that those patterns of structure and activity did not develop out of a stated plan be forgotten. The mission and, consequently, the churches did not emerge as a rational organization but rather came into being willy-nilly is a complex of ill-defined, contradictory attempt to deal haphazardly with problems as they arose.

Rebirth

Although the church in the North never actually recovered from the hammer blow dealt to it in 1869, it did begin to revive after 1875. Gradually, the nearly hopeless situation of the tiny group of Christians shifted as in ones, two, and threes new converts joined them. Thus, the five years from 1876 through 1880 marked the rebirth of an active Christian community.

A significant moment in this gradual rebirth came in January 1876 when Pa (Aunt) Kammol, wife of Noi Sunya, and Mae (Mother) Noo, a former mission employee, joined the church. (11) Until this time, all of the converts had been men. In September 1876, another three women including one girl of seventeen also joined, as did Nan Inta's daughter in November. At the end of the year, another four men received baptism, and the church then numbered fourteen members. Among the ten new members was Noi Aliya, the first convert living inside the city walls of Chiang Mai. Nearly all of these new converts had been patients in Dr. Marion Cheek's small, makeshift hospital, which he started after his arrival in 1875. Most of them, including the women, learned to read Siamese at the hospital in order to read the Siamese Christian literature there, since the mission had nothing prepared in northern Thai. Thus, by the end of 1876 a Christian community began to take form, one that included both sexes and families.

Yet, the gravitational pull of the vastly larger traditional society still weighed heavily on the community. The missionaries sitting with Nan Inta as the Session of the Chiang Mal Church finally reinstated Noi Chai, convicted of "complicity with spirit worship" to full membership after two years. In early December 1876, Ma Noo suffered suspension from communion for the same charge of "complicity with spirit worship". McGilvary felt that in spite of extenuating circumstances in her case he had to make an example of her for the sake of the other members of the church. (12)

None suffered for her conversion more than Pa Kammol. Her brother, head of her extended family, demanded that she make offerings to the family spirits. She refused. The brother then called a family conference and in a violent, forceful manner threatened to take Pa Kammol's "case" to the Chao Muang. She still refused to make an offering, but she did seek a compromise with the brother whereby she would pay the family one lump sum of money to free herself from any obligations to pay the spirit fees. (13) In effect, conversion to Christianity forced Pa Kammol into having to try to buy her way out of the traditional social system.
As the church grew, the Laos Mission had to begin creating a church program and a set of activities for its life. In the absence of a methodological approach to "church planting" in non-Western cultures, the mission tried to recreate a fundamentally American-style church in the North. That is, the mission simply tried to transplant to northern Siam the church institutions of the missionaries' own childhood and culture.

The first activity the mission engaged in after the beginning of the rebirth in early 1876 was the building of a small, temporary chapel on a corner of the mission compound. This chapel, however, did not satisfy McGilvary. He wrote the Board in New York that the mission needed a substantial brick building planned by an architect and seating 300-350 people. In later years, the mission used church buildings as a means of demonstrating that the church was "here to stay" and had a "substantial" presence, (see Chapter 7) Even at this time, McGilvary linked the need for a solid, permanent building to the fact that the church lacked stability. (14)

In November 1876, the mission started the first Sunday school for the church. It taught Siamese literacy and the Shorter Catechism, which is the traditional Presbyterian compendium of basic Christian doctrines. Literacy, particularly Siamese literacy, developed into an unofficial litmus test of the desirability of converts seeking admission into the church. Those who could already read northern Thai and/or showed a willingness to learn Siamese were deemed more acceptable as members. The missionaries assumed that these individuals had more intelligence and showed more initiative, traits valued for church membership by the mission. (15)

The emergence of Christian families led to the first infant baptisms on 7 January 1877 when Ootta. Kan Kao, and Kam Ai-children of Noi Wong and grandchildren of Nan Inta-received the sacrament. That same Sunday marked the beginning of the first "Week of Prayer' in the history of the northern Thai church. (16) Slowly, then, patterns of the future took shape in the development of church life in 1876-1877.

The situation of the church at this time was much like that of a small satellite launched at great expense from its parent body. The satellite orbited around the parent body in a precarious balance between its own inertia and the gravitational pull of the planet. Its tendency to fall back down into the gravitational well of the planet had to be resisted by counter-balancing force. Northern Thai society acted like a huge Jupiter-sized planet to the tiny Christian satellite, always the "problem" the church had to face, the point of reference for its life, and the gravitational well into which disinterested, disaffected, or disinclined members and potential members might fall.

Like other converts, Lung Tooi felt the gravitational pull of the larger society with particular force. In April 1877, a Chiang Mai chao ordered Lung Tooi to go into the fields and help build a small shanty on a Sunday. The chao warned him in advance that if he did not show up on that day he would go to jail. Lung Tool waited until Sunday afternoon and went at the last possible moment he could and still avoid jail. That way he had also been able to attend worship. Nevertheless, the Session of the church called him to task for having violated the Sabbath as well as on charges of having participated in spirit worship in his home. Lung Tool denied the latter charges, arguing that his family had held spirit services in his home, that he had tried unsuccessfully to prevent the services, and that he had left the house when they took place. The Session dismissed that charge. However, on the previous charge of violating the Sabbath, Lung Tool admitted what he had done and explained his predicament. The Session pointed out to him that he had violated divine law by breaking the Sabbath and that he should fear breaking that law much more than breaking merely human civil laws. Visibly shaken at the prospect of being suspended from the church, Lung Tool seemed deeply repentant, and the Session decided to be lenient in his case. It took no action against him. (17) It required no small amount of skill for men like Lung Tool, an illiterate farmer, and Pa Kammol, a widow, to conform to the regulations and expectations of the new religion while avoiding tension with and persecution by the traditional structures of society.
Suspicion of the missionaries and their motives was so general in Chiang Mai that the mission did not even reveal to the converts that it kept minutes of the Session's meetings. Most people believed that the mission sent the names of its converts to Bangkok and the United States "to make servants and slaves of them." That impression would only be confirmed, the mission felt, if people knew they kept a record of Session meetings. (18) The populace associated the mission with alien powers and believed that it tried to create a new pattern of patron-client relationships in which it rather than the traditional rulers was lord. The northern Thai Christians were caught in the middle.

The "Edict of Toleration"

Looking back across some forty years of northern Thai church history, McGilvary pointed to the proclamation of the "Edict of Toleration" as an important turning point for the church. It opened up a new era in which the struggle for mere survival ended. (19) Within a few years of the Edict itself, a fundamental misapprehension, a "myth" if you will, grew up in which it was alleged that King Chulalongkorn himself issued the Edict and applied it to the entire nation. People believed it secured the fundamental rights of Christians to freedom of religion. (20) An examination of events puts the matter into a more modest light.

Those events began when a Christian young couple decided to get married and hold the first Christian marriage in northern Siam. They made their plans along with their parents and the missionaries, but when the day came and the wedding guests arrived a serious problem arose. The head of the bride's family refused to give permission for the marriage unless they paid a modest "spirit" fee, the traditional way to legalize a rearrangement.

The missionaries appealed to the Siamese Commissioner, but he could only refer them to the Chao Uparat, the "second king" and real power in Chiang Mai. Strongly anti-Christian, he found the whole situation amusing as well as hopeful since Christianity could hardly survive if its young people could not marry. Finally, McGilvary appealed the entire matter to the King in Bangkok.

King Chulalongkorn referred the matter back to the Commissioner in Chiang Mai and gave him the authority to issue an edict using whatever language he might choose. The Commissioner issued his edict on 8 October 1878, and the wording of the Edict was very strong. It addressed the leaders and people of the Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang states saying that a person may choose any religion he or she desires. It specifically affirmed that individuals may become a Christian without hindrance and that Christians had the right to observe the Sabbath. Finally, the Edict stated that no one could prevent American citizens from employing whatever help they wanted to hire. (21)

Contrary to what is generally believed, the King did not issue this Edict but only gave his permission for it. He left the actual wording and its strength or weakness, up to the Commissioner. The Edict did not apply even to all of the North, and it is questionable that the Edict in-and-of-itself secured the actual freedom of religion of Christians in the North.

McGilvary argued that the Edict had two main benefits for the church: first of all, it marked the effective end of supreme authority for the Chao Muang of Chiang Mai and the transfer of effective authority to the Siamese officials in Chiang Mai. Secondly, it lifted the morale of the Christian community, which resulted in new growth, particularly in two villages where churches were to be founded in 1880. (22) As these two points suggest, the Edict affected the church more tangentially than directly. It may have helped create an atmosphere ultimately beneficial to the church and given the tiny church a temporary "shot in the arm" in 1876-1879, but one must treat the idea that the Edict secured the basic rights of the Christians and ushered in a new era more critically.

Contemporary records present a different picture. In July 1880, Wilson commented on two cases of persecution, one in a village and one in which a Chiang Mai chao whipped a slave for attending Christian worship. He concluded that while the Edict was a great event it did not solve every problem. In that same year,
another chao threatened a potential convert with a whipping if he converted. (23) In late 1882, only four years after the Edict, the Chao Uparat of Chiang Mai took overt steps towards isolating the missionaries and preventing further conversions. Wilson understood that Bangkok agreed to leave the cases of new converts (for their punishment) entirely in the hands of the Chao Uparat. (24)

The widespread social and political harassment of the Christian community continued for years after the Edict. As late as 1894, the chaos of Lamphun, to which the Edict had been addressed, refused to acknowledge that it bound them in any way. (25) Long before that, the small Christian community in Lampang underwent a period of repression. Indeed, mission records document many instances of repression well into the twentieth century, including a major case in 1889 when the source of the repression was the Siamese Commissioner in Chiang Mai. Although instances did occur in which the Edict effectively ended a persecution of Christians, (26) those instances are not significant in comparison to the widespread harassment that took place throughout the region. The Edict did not bring about a fundamental change in the relationship between the church and the local political structures and society. Indeed, so much attention has been focused on the Edict, a paperish event, that it has been forgotten that the death of the Chao Uparat, the last anti-Christian northern Thai figure of political consequence in Chiang Mai, was what actually brought relief to the Chiang Mai Christians. In and of itself, the Edict amounted to just one more event in the contest of wills between Bangkok and Chiang Mai and one more moment in the development of a larger and more stable Christian community.

Expansion

Throughout 1877, 1878, and into 1879, the small church grew at a modest rate. In the year ending September 1879, it baptized seventeen adults and eleven children. Among those who now joined the growing band of Christians, was a man who had decided in 1869 become a Christian but fled the persecution by Chao Kawilorot and wandered for a decade. Nan Ta was originally a monk in a royal monastery with close connections to Kawilorot when he became interested in Christianity. In January 1879, he returned to the city and came under instruction. (27) In the years to come, Nan Ta would become the first ordained northern Thai cleric and the most important northern Thai church leader, an inheritance from the golden days before September 1869.

At some point either in 1877 or 1878, Sophia McGilvary tried to start a small school for girls. In fact, this small band of "scholars" was more of a class than a school until April 1879 when Mary Campbell and Edna S. Cole arrived and took charge. By October 1879, the two young missionaries had 25 students including ten Christians, and by December they had thirty students and an additional eight or nine boys studying with them. (28) This small girls' school limped along and suffered from a number of changes in missionary administration.

The number of adult baptisms rose from seventeen in 1879 to 39 in 1880, and by the end of the mission year in September 1880 the Laos Mission counted 83 total members in its churches. (29) Before the end of the year, the mission established three congregations: Bethlehem Church (in July), Lampang Church (October), and Mae Dok Daeng Church (on 25 December).

Bethlehem Church

This congregation, named after Wilson's hometown in Pennsylvania, grew out of the work of Nan Inta in his own and surrounding villages. The congregation began with seventeen members drawn from two extended families, and it faced serious opposition in the community even prior to its founding. Local political leaders, including one official in particular, and neighbors opposed the establishment of a church in their village. After a number of people in the village converted in May 1880, the local people reported their situation to the Chao Muang of Lamphun. He feared that these converts merely sought to escape having to render service to him, and so he ordered them into the jungle on a Sunday to clear land for planting rice. The Christians tried to satisfy both church and state by hiring replacements to report for work on the following
Monday. Immediately thereafter, missionaries visited the Chao Muang. Either their presence helped defuse the situation, or it had not been as bad as the Christians thought in the first place. Still, the Christians felt they had been singled out for unusual work only because of their religion. (30)

The congregation elected Man Inta elder of the church, and he served as virtually the pastor of the congregation. The Bethlehem Church remained a weak, small congregation until after the turn of the century.

**Lampang Church**

The founding and first years of the Lampang Church were tied to the life of a high court official in Lampang, Chao Phya Sihanot. Some twenty years previously (about 1860), the Chao Phya visited Bangkok on official business and met Dr. Bradley. Bradley gave him some books, and he found that he largely accepted the contents of those books. After Chao Phya Sihanot became an important official, he became embroiled in serious legal and financial difficulties, which drove him to Chiang Mai to see the Chao Uparat for advice and assistance. Chao Phya Sihanot encountered McGilvary during this visit, and after about two months, he received baptism on 8 May 1878. In the meantime, the Chao Uparat refused to help Sihanot when he learned of his interest in Christianity. Sihanot was ordered to return to Lampang where he soon lost both his position and his wealth, but he gathered around him a small number of people who accepted the new religion.

In 1880, McGilvary spent about six months in Tak, and on his return trip, he visited Lampang in October, at which time he baptized five more converts and officially established a small congregation. Chao Phya Sihanot not surprisingly, was elected elder of the church. However, this small congregation soon suffered serious problems for in the following October the Chao Phya was jailed. Ostensibly, he still owed heavy debts, but the Christians believed that he was put in jail because of his religion. He was finally released in 1883, but by that time the small congregation had ceased to exist; and when the mission established its Lampang Station in 1885 the only Christians left were Chao Phya Sihanot, his wife, and one servant. (31)

To a degree, the Lampang Church's early experience proved to be quite similar to that of Chiang Mai. Initial interest in Christianity started with a person who already had a stake in society and whose contact with the missionaries pre-dated September 1869. When that person became a Christian, he had to try to establish a new relationship with a society that found his religion unacceptable. In the end, he suffered repression and the church disbanded.

**Mae Dok Daeng Church**

The roots of this church go back to Nan Pannya, who converted just before his death, and his son Nan Suwan who was baptized on 3 June 1877. Over the next year, Nan Suwan convinced members of his own family and a neighboring family to convert. Pa Ruen Kam, his wife and a daughter of the village headman, joined the church in January 1878. The community received further impetus from the interest and support of another important political figure in the area, Saen Kam, overseer of irrigation in the Doi Saket area. Like most converts of the time, Saen Kam received medical treatment from Dr. Cheek along with instruction in the Christian religion. Although he and his family did not immediately convert, they became most sympathetic to the Christian cause in Mae Dok Daeng. (32)
Nan Suwan gathered the community at Mae Dok Daeng, but he did not participate in its founding as a church because he was among those ordered by the government to resettle the long depopulated Chiang Saen region to the north. The events leading to the founding of the church, then, began with another resident of the village who was accused of witchcraft. He fled to the missionaries, and they agreed to help him keep his house from being seized by the local authorities. At the same time, the man himself moved into a forest area, cleared some land, and eventually he and several members of his family received baptism in September 1880. The mission then founded a church on Christmas Day 1880 with six members; ten more joined the following day. The congregation established itself as the strongest of the new churches, and for many years it retained the title of being the “gem” of the northern churches. (33)

A striking fact about the increased rate of church growth in this period is that the Laos Mission itself played little role in the founding of the Christian communities that grew into churches. McGilvary noted that all of this growth resulted from northern Thai work rather than mission evangelism. (34) Furthermore, each of these three churches formed around the leadership of one strong, dedicated leader. The Rev. W. C. Dodd commented a decade later that precisely this pattern occurred in nearly every Christian community in northern Siam, that is they were founded through and sustained by the initiative of key individuals (35).

Yet another pattern in the life of the churches emerged from the founding of the Mae Dok Daeng Church, the pattern of gaining conversions by assisting those accused of witchcraft/demon possession (phi ka). McGilvary dates the beginning of the mission's involvement with people accused of witchcraft as August 1878, when a chao requested that McGilvary take in a family accused of being phi ka that the chao could not protect himself. In later years, numerous people fled to Christianity to escape the persecution suffered by those believed to be under the power of evil spirits. Popular opinion held that the Christians had power over these spirits and freedom from them. (36)

The first period of sustained growth in the history of the church (1876-1880) came to an end in 1881, and the two years 1881-1882 proved discouraging. In March 1881, McGilvary left for his second furlough, and shortly thereafter, the tragic and disheartening news arrived that Mary Campbell, the lively young missionary teacher who had gone down to Bangkok, had drowned. Wilson, the leader of the small group of remaining missionaries, was generally distracted from church work by the burden of supervising the construction of a number of mission buildings, which remained his chief work throughout these two years. (37)

The year 1882 proved to be even more difficult. Chao Phya Sihanot remained in chains in Lampang, and the tiny church there disbanded. Nan Inta, ill for some time, died on 27 August 1882. (38) The churches lost their most important leader. Wilson reached the depths of discouragement during this year, particularly because the churches seemed to be so weak, so ignorant, and so faithless. During the period of McGilvary's absence, a number of the Chiang Mai members quietly drifted away from the church. (39) Finally, there came a time oppression in the latter part of the year, when the Chao Upharat plotted against the Christians.

Thus, the mission and the churches still depended a great deal upon McGilvary as the leader of both. Even in his failures, he set the tone for the present end the future work of the Laos Mission.
When McGilvary returned from his furlough along with new recruits in early 1883, the Laos Mission entered a new phase in which it expanded geographically and institutionally. While on furlough, McGilvary had busily scouted out an impressive group of immediate and near-future reinforcements for the mission. The future of the mission looked bright once again.

However, nearly all of the reinforcements brought out by McGilvary became ill with three of the four withdrawing from the mission after only brief stays. (40) The Laos Mission remained very weak throughout the 1880s, although the situation did improve slightly in 1887 when another group of "second generation" missionaries arrived. Nevertheless, the situation in late 1885 was typical of the period: of the twelve missionaries on the field, two had withdrawn to engage in private business, two left the field because of illness, and two more were too ill to work. Of the remaining six, the four women engaged in educational or translation work. Only McGilvary and Dr. S.C. Peoples, newly arrived, were both healthy and able to work with the churches, but Peoples spent nearly all of his time supervising mission construction. That left McGilvary. (41)

In effect, the churches faced a permanent leadership crisis throughout the decade as the mission barely managed to hold itself together. While mission forces remained inadequate to provide leadership for the growing Christian community, the community itself lacked trained leadership since the mission failed to provide training. Throughout the years 1883-1889, members of the mission voiced deep concern about the pressing need for trained church leadership, but the only concrete step the mission took to correct the situation was to ordain Nan Ta in 1889. (42)

Even in this depleted state, the Laos Mission turned its attention to geographical expansion. As early as 1880, McGilvary seriously considered the possibility of establishing a new station at Tak, but the Board of Foreign Mission refused to sanction such a move. (43) Now, his thinking turned to Lampang, and in late 1883, he visited Lampang both to try to free Chao Phya Sihanot from jail and to acquire land for a station.

Although he failed to obtain land on that trip, a new and more favorable opportunity arose in the person of the brother of the King, Prince Phichit Prichakon. The Prince took up residence in Chiang Mai in May 1884, and he brought with him a letter from the King that ordered the Prince to help the Laos Mission acquire land in Lampang and also forbid persecution of Christians. (The fact that the King felt he had to write specifically forbidding persecution of Christians further indicates how little attention the "Edict of Toleration" received and how little weight it carried). The King had long urged the mission to open a station in Lampang as a "civilizing agency." The Prince soon acquired very good land for the mission and even provided elephants and other assistance when McGilvary and Dr. and Mrs. Peoples took a survey trip to Lampang in early 1885. The King also sent a large gift of money to assist the mission in starting its Lampang work, and as a result, the Laos Mission appointed the Peoples to open a station there. (44)

When the Peoples' arrived in Lampang in September 1885, they found only the three members of the church still there. Over the next several years, they made very little progress in Lampang even after relations with the local chaos improved. As was generally the case in opening a new station, they had to give much of their time to buildings and property leaving little time for work with the church; arid even when Wilson and Kate Fleeson were assigned to Lampang in 1888, the situation remained largely static. At the end of 1889, the tiny church there still met in Chao Phya Sihanot's house and had only nine members. (45)

Although the congregation in Lampang made little progress, closer to Chiang Mai the northern Thai church underwent in 1885 another period of rapid growth into new areas. A Karen living in Thung Phaeng, south of Chiang Mai, learned about Christianity while traveling in Burma, and when he returned to the North, he sought out the missionaries and was baptized. He interested some of his neighbors in the new religion, and soon large groups of men visited Chiang Mai to attend worship services. Eventually, a group of prospective
converts built a simple chapel at Long Koom village, and Nan Ta spent two weeks with them teaching them Christianity.

Soon, another group of "inquirers" built a chapel at Chang Kam under the leadership of a local man, Nan Chai. Two other villages in the nearby region of Lamphun also began to show signs of interest in Christianity. (46) McGilvary had an unfortunate experience in one of the villages, Mae Khum Wan, where a group of inquirers built yet another little bamboo chapel. When McGilvary arrived to dedicate the chapel, he discovered that the man who organized its building did so because he thought the missionaries paid all who helped build chapels McGilvary firmly corrected this misunderstanding and left an elder with the people to teach them.

In this same year of 1885, a number of groups of individuals living east of Chiang Mai in the San Kamphaeng area also began to show interest in Christianity, particularly in the villages around Mae Pu Kha, the area the two Martyrs came from. The mission baptized a number of people and made plans to start a church in the district. (47)

Thus, 1885 proved to be an important year in the expansion of the northern Thai church. The geographical extent of the church more than doubled while church membership grew from 151 to 241 (nearly 60%). On the basis of this growth, the mission established on 17 June 1885 the "Presbytery of North Laos," organized by and under the authority of the Synod of New York of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. Theoretically, the northern Thai church now had its own structure for ordaining pastors, organizing churches, and developing its own identity. In the Presbyterian system of church government, the presbytery was the only body to have direct authority over the churches in its given geographical area. Yet, there seemed to be a nagging doubt about the spiritual strength of the churches. The 1885 annual report noted that "...many of our church members have not grown in grace as we would desire... " (48)

Ever since his first trip to the region in 1872, McGilvary showed particular interest in expanding mission work into Chiang Rai. The mission's first opportunity to do so came in 1880 when Nan Suwan of Mae Dok Daeng received orders from the government to immigrate to Chiang Saen. Although Nan Suwan considered paying someone to go in his place, McGilvary convinced him he should go in order to spread Christianity there. Eventually, he moved his family to Chiang Saen and began to quietly work among his neighbors spreading his faith. By 1884, he had gained some interest. (49)

In 1886, the Rev. Chalmers Martin made a trip northward to Chiang Rai early in the year. Soon thereafter, Nan Ta also went to the Chiang Rai area and brought back a very hopeful report of conditions there and of interest in Christianity. Finally, McGilvary himself traveled to the region and initiated sustained work there by the mission. The result of this tour was that a large number of Christians received baptism at Mae Kon, near Chiang Rai, and more were baptized at Chiang Saen where Nan Suwan's evangelistic efforts gained an increasing number of converts. (50)

The communities at Chiang Saen and Mae Kon grew rapidly enough during 1887 that presbytery "sent" missionaries in early 1888 to organize churches there. They founded a church at Chiang Saen with 23 members in about April 1886, but the leadership situation at Mac Kon proved too unstable to establish a church. Two years later on 13 April 1890 the "Chiang Rai Church" was organized at Mae Kon. (51) In future years, some of the most stable and independent-minded churches in the North developed in the Chiang Rai region. The Chiang Saen Church in particular established itself as one of the region's strongest, most active congregations, a church with capable lay leadership.

Meanwhile, sometime during 1888 a delegation arrived from Chiang Dao, also to the north of Chiang Mai, asking that someone be sent to them. Nan Ta made a short visit, and early in 1889, Noi Sali went up to spend a month with the Chiang Dao inquirers. When he returned to Chiang Mai in February, he was seized by the Siamese Commissioner and thrown into jail on the charge of treason. A local official in Chiang Dao reported that Noi Sali taught the people they did not have to perform corvée labor once they converted. The
mission produced a number of witnesses proving the charges were false, but the Commissioner held Noi Sali for another eight months, long after his innocence had been established. Mission attempts to intervene only made matters worse until it finally appealed through the U.S. Consul to the government for help. Momentarily, at least, this event reduced mission confidence in the Siamese government and caused some younger missionaries to become more pro-northern Siam. (52)

The Foundation of Mission Education

As early as 1870, McGilvary wanted to establish a mission school on the premise that a strong church required a strong school system. (53) Opened in 1879, the Girls' School suffered through a decade of frequent changes in teachers and numerous closures due to missionary illness. In August 1888, the Girls' School moved into its own building, and under direction of Ellza Westervalt it began to make rapid progress. All but twelve of its 61 students were boarders. (54) Meanwhile, the Rev. D.G. Collins, who arrived in 1887, started the Boys' School in March 1888 with sixty students of whom thirty were boarders. Nearly all of the students in both of the schools were Christians. (55)

The first mission school founded outside of Chiang Mai started in Lamphun where in 1888 Nan Siti, a former Buddhist abbot, took charge of a small school that used traditional instructional methods. (56) Two year later Kate Fleeson and Dora Belle Taylor opened the Boy's School in Lampang, and in 1891 Fleeson started the Girls' School in that same station. (57) With the founding of these new schools in Chiang Mai, Lamphun, and Lampang, the mission established a new pattern for its work, one in which mission institutions began to compete with the churches for the attention and resources of the mission.

Conclusion

When the two decades beginning in 1870 opened, the Laos Mission was under attack with only two couples on the field and only two converts holding to the faith. Two decades later the mission counted sixteen missionaries, five congregations, and 722 members. It had three established schools, prospects for two more, and a training school for evangelists (see Chapter 5). It had also made impressive geographical gains. On the other hand, Christians still comprised only a minute part of the population. It would take the 1890s, the decade of expansion par excellence, to establish the church on a truly firm foundation.

Chapter 3
Expansion (1890-1900)

From the time the McGilvarys arrived in Chiang Mai, the central dynamic of the Laos Mission's presence was geographical expansion. The ideology of expansion called the missionaries to the borders. The necessity of expansion worked on their consciences. They exhibited the traits of their cultural heritage as Americans with that nation's strong, consistent urge to move westward, to expand, and to bring the "benefits" of "civilization" to 'uncivilized' regions. The Laos Mission went through three phases of geographical expansion. Chapter 2 described the first phase, one that began in 1872 with McGilvary's first trip of exploration and ended in roughly 1890. The second phase opened a period when the mission's expansionist ideology became more articulate and aggressive but still concentrated on expansion within Siamese territory. In the final phase, the Laos Mission began to push expansion beyond Siamese boundaries into French Indochina, British Burma, and China. We will deal with the third phase In Chapter 7.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Laos Mission territorial and institutional expansion in its second phase with special emphasis on territorial expansion.
The Ideology of Expansion

In 1854, more than a decade before the founding of the Laos Mission Dr. Samuel House of the Siam Mission expressed the rationale for missionary expansion into northern Siam. He urged that the accession of King Mongkut to the Siamese throne provided an excellent opportunity for the Presbyterian Church to expand into the North. He wrote that, "...it will be a reproach on the enterprise of the Christian Church if she leaves the moral darkness of the region ...much longer uncheered by a single taper of divine truth." (1) This was only the first in a long line of trumpet calls to expand the frontiers of Presbyterian missions into and beyond the North.

According to the mission, the northern states were not only land of darkness but also a land ruled by Satan. The religion of the people was held to be a counterfeit religion, which could not save. Indeed, the missionaries saw traditional religion (Buddhist and animist) as part of the surreal gloom haunting the land. (2) Although this attitude made the missionaries most uncomfortable with traditional religion, their deepest concern was that the people of the region were "perishing" in their darkness. They believed that the northern Thai, then, stood in desperate need of the light. (3)

Since the missionaries believed that Satan ruled northern Siam, they felt that their Christian duty demanded they invade the land, occupy it, and defeat the forces of evil currently in control. Mission literature contains a wealth of military allusions and parallels: seize the land! conquer the land! take the land! In short, the Laos Mission believed that it was conducting a military-like campaign against the forces of the devil in his own territory. Thus...

- the church was called God's militia or soldiers in the war with Satan...
- the missionaries represented the generals leading the troops...
- the missionaries and their assistants who went off to open a new station represented a small army going to war against darkness...
- winning converts in a new village meant that the village had been invaded, the mission had gained a hold, but it also meant fighting for every inch of ground...
- the training of converts won in a period of rapid growth paralleled consolidating the church's lines...
- tours of exploration spied out the land...
- those who reverted to Buddhism had been recaptured by Satan...
- and Buddhist revivals meant that Satan was marshalling his forces while an anti-Christian monk stood as a rallying point for the forces of the Devil. (4)

The signs of darkness and the Devil in northern Thailand took physical shape. Missionaries saw these evil forces and signs in the temples, the priests, and in the festivals of traditional religion. More generally, the society itself manifested evil because it clung to an "idolatrous religion" and because it persecuted the church. When they went into a new village, missionaries could feel that the people displayed a cold hostility to them. From the beginning, the political structures of the region generally resisted them and made life difficult for the converts. Even geography and climate reminded the missionaries that northern Siam was a hostile land: heat, disease, and the distance from "civilization" were problems severe enough to even cause death in some cases. (5)

As House stated in 1854, the Laos Mission felt that it had a moral obligation to expand as rapidly as possible into all parts of the region and beyond. The missionaries believed that only Christ could save the northern Thai from eternal damnation, and that God called on the mission to "rescue" as many "sinners" as possible. A deep sense of duty lay at the heart of the expansionist ideology by which the mission believed itself called to bring light to the region. Stated another way, the missionaries sometimes thought of themselves as being like Paul hearing the call to come over, come over to Macedonia. Only "cowards" ignored such a call! This sense of duty bred the mission to a battlefield mentality in which it refused to compromise with any obstacles, physical, cultural, or bureaucratic. In the war with Satan, there could be no compromise. (6)
Enter the Rev. William Clifton Dodd. Dodd arrived in 1887 and established himself as the chief proponent and apologist for mission expansion. A letter he wrote to the Board in January 1891 stands at the gateway of the second phase of mission expansion and provides a ringing rationale for the events of the next decade. In that letter, he argued that the Presbyterian missions in Siam must expand and to do otherwise would be both sinful and cowardly. His watchword was trust in God, and he cited the example of McGilvary, "Our Missionary Father," as the model to follow. (7) Dodd himself pursued the dream of distant shores through some thirty years of mission work and participated in the opening of new stations at Lamphun, Chiang Rai, Kengtung, and Chiang Rung.

This expansionist ideology was not simply a cherished ideal. It had power... power to shape the activities of the Laos Mission in a radical way; and as the dominant theme of missionary activity in the 1890s, it also strongly influenced the northern Thai church. In the end, missionary expansionism became a problem for the church as it scattered Christian churches extensively throughout the North in little pockets and as it drew mission attention and resources away from the needs of the churches already created.

Even more fundamentally, the militant/militaristic perspective of mission expansion and its battlefield mentality placed a particular burden on the churches. It threw down a rigid battle line across northern Thai culture and society demanding that each convert "cross over" into the culture of the "faithful." Effectively, the church could not witness in society or locate itself in the world. The mission demanded that it totally remove itself from the world.

This was a strangely monastic "tactic" considering the aggressive evangelistic emphasis of the mission. The expansionist-militarist ideology of the Laos Mission tried to cut off the church from its cultural and social roots.

New Stations — New Churches

Lamphun Station

Nowhere were the limitations of the expansionist ideology more clearly obvious than in the drive to open and maintain a mission station in Lamphun, just a few miles distance from Chiang Mai. In the days when Dodd and others pushed for its establishment, they billed the Lamphun Station as absolutely necessary to the growth of the church. But, within a few years most of the mission even doubted if it needed a sub-station at Lamphun.

Evidently, the first family baptized in the Lamphun region was that of Nan Chaiwan who lived at Ban Paen. The family had been accused of witchcraft and fled, but when some of the family converted in 1885 they
were able to return to their home. From this beginning, a Christian community developed that eventually became the Bethel Church. Work in the city of Lamphun itself began in 1888 when the Laos Mission received land from the Chao Muang of Lamphun. As we have already seen, the mission opened a small school there in that year (see Chapter 2), and by 1890 the mission had a growing number of Christians in the area with an number of good local lay leaders among them. (8)

In the letter of January 1891 mentioned above, Dodd, now interested in Lamphun, urged the opening of a mission station there. He claimed that the situation was just right and that the time had come. It was urgent to go into Lamphun immediately or the opportune moment would be lost. Within a few months the mission did, indeed, begin to make plans for a Lamphun Station, and the Lampang Station transferred $2,400 to help get things going. Naturally, the mission appointed the Dodds to the new station along with Elder Noi Lin as assistant. The station opened in September 1891. (9)

The Christian community in the Lamphun hinterland began to expand quite rapidly, and on 25 December 1891 the presbytery formally established its seventh congregation, the Lamphun Church, with 121 members living in eighteen villages. Although the work continued to prosper numerically during 1892, by 1893 the new station entered into a period of uncertainty. In that year, the Dodds left on furlough and the Rev. Robert Irwin, a relatively new missionary, took their place. At the same time, various members of the mission realized that Lamphun was too small and too close to Chiang Mai to warrant a full station. Some doubted that it even needed a missionary. Nevertheless, the Lamphun Church continued to grow rapidly enough that two daughter churches, the Bethel Church (106 members) and the Wang Mun Church (101 members) split from her in 1895. (10) The uncertainty of missionary leadership over the Lamphun churches continued. In 1895, the mission transferred Irwin to Nan and appointed the Briggs' to Lamphun. More than ever, some in the mission questioned the need for a family at Lamphun, and in 1897 the mission reached a compromise whereby Lamphun became a sub-station of Chiang Mai Station. (11)

Lamphun marked the beginning of the new phase of expansion of the Laos Mission. It was the first station opened on the basis of expansionist concerns entirely, making it quite different from the Lampang Station where the mission followed the lead of the King and his brother, Although the Lamphun Station proved a failure the rationale for later expansion into other areas did not change nor did the motif of great hopes wilting into drab realities change either. Yet, within just a few months of the opening of Lamphun Station, the mission started bombarding the Board in New York with requests for permission for even more rapid expansion. It wanted to open stations at Tak, Chiang Rai, and Phrae, with Tak being the priority. At its 1892 annual meeting, the question of expansion dominated the entire set of meetings; and as a consequence the mission again pressed the Board for permission to open the three new stations. (12)

It did not get permission for three stations, but it did for one...

**Phrae Station**

The first convert in the Phrae region was a blind man, Noi Wong, who visited the mission hospital at Lampang to see if the mission doctor could restore his sight. Even though his eyes were beyond treatment, he returned to Phrae a believer in the new faith, and on 16 February 1890 McGilvary baptized him in Phrae. (13)

In 1893, the entire region around both Lampang and Phrae suffered from a severe famine. Peoples from Lampang spent a month in Phrae during the earlier part of the year distributing food and carrying out relief work. He observed a new receptivity to Christianity there and took it upon himself to initiate plans for a station. Yet again, mission letters echo with the demanding, pleading requests to the Board for permission to open a new station: it is urgent! the time is now! the moment will be lost! (14)

Dr. William Briggs, a young missionary doctor, spent the months of May and June 1893 in Phrae making further preparations for a station even though permission had not yet come from the Board. Briggs
found about twelve Christians around Phrae, all of whom had heard about Christianity in Lampang, and another two dozen or so inquirers. Permission for the new station finally came in July 1893, and the mission appointed Briggs to open the station. (15)

The Phrae Church was started with twelve members on 22 March 1894, and by August the new congregation numbered 27 members and had elected its first two elders, both employed by the station as full-time evangelists. Education work began in about July 1894 when Anabelle Briggs started a literacy class for women and girls. Soon thereafter Lillian Shields, another new missionary, started a class for small children.

The small Christian community in Phrae experienced repression from the beginning. Government officials in the city moved to prevent conversions and attempted to punish converts by unfairly calling them to do corvee labor. The Chao Muang tried to force two young Christian girls, both servants of the Briggs' into concubinage. In this case, Briggs, a Canadian, threatened to turn the matter into an international incident by asserting his treaty rights as a British subject. The situation quieted down. However, more generally repression continued into 1895, and Briggs gave so much time towards securing Christians' rights that Speer, Secretary of the Board, expressed his concern about the "native Christians" getting too much political help from missionaries. (16)

Buildings and property proved to be another important distraction as the small two-family station sought to establish itself. As in the case of Lamphun, in the critical years of creating a new congregation the Phrae Station had trouble giving the church the leadership necessary for encouraging the new community. At the same time, it did not have time to prepare leaders for the church itself, nor did it encourage the emergence of lay leadership. The Phrae Church was further weakened by a number of discipline cases; by the transfer of the Briggs' to Lamphun in early 1896; and by a severe reduction in the station's budget in 1897. (17) One bright spot at Phrae in this period was the work of Julia Hatch. She engaged in women's work in the villages and emphasized practical matters of hygiene and home economics. She promoted the economic growth of Christian families in order to encourage self-reliance among village women. She also seems to have been the first missionary to dress in northern Thai style in order to identify with and be close to the people. (18)

The Phrae Church was a poor congregation plagued with dissension and discipline problems. In spite of the hoopla raised to convince the Board to open this station, the people in the region showed very little interest in Christianity. Thus, the poverty of the Christian community coupled with its social isolation and unpopularity resulted in a congregation that by 1898 displayed increasing dependence on the station. In fact, Christians from outside of the city started, in some cases, to move into Phrae in order to be closer to the source of their economic livelihood. The missionaries in Phrae felt frustrated with the church because it showed almost no interest in regular study or in education for Christian children. (19)

Both the church and the station in Phrae remained small and their situation difficult. At various times, dissension between mission families further weakened the work. The church did grow slowly in numbers, but the station just barely held on so that by 1900 only one missionary still resided in Phrae. (20)

**Nan Station**

From his first visit to Nan in 1872, McGilvary showed a special fondness for Nan and long hoped to open a station there. However, the move to establish a mission station in Nan did not begin until 1893. In that period of international tension, the mission feared an imminent takeover of Nan by the French, which would close the area to the Presbyterians and pave the way for a Catholic "occupation" of Nan. The mission appointed Dr. Peoples to visit Nan, which he did in 1894. Unwilling to allow the Laos Mission to over extend itself, the Board refused permission for a permanent station in Nan. However, at its 1894 annual meeting the mission decided to risk Nan anyway, hoping for its eventual permission. Work began in Nan in 1895 under the Peoples', and the station developed a reputation as the most distant, difficult, and unhealthy station of the Laos Mission, one in which disease and isolation sapped the strength of those assigned to it. (21)
The Nan Church was officially established in September 1896 with sixteen members. Again, we see the pattern in which frequent changes in personnel due to ill health, furloughs, and absences for meetings resulted in a situation of unstable station leadership. The development of the newly formed church received insufficient attention. (22) Yet, the style of leadership that the church received in its early years differed from that of the other station churches. As "moderator" of the Nan Church, Robert Irwin emphasized self-government and self-support, and he tried to gear all of the church's activities to those ends. He involved church members in decision-making and left it to the Session of the church to solve congregational problems. In one startling departure, he put the little Nan school entirely in the hands of the church and purposely left it small so that by running and funding the school the church might learn something about self-government and self-support. (23)

Irwin also attempted to introduce an evangelistic scheme that provided immediate leadership for newly emerging Christian communities and reduced the role of the missionary. He wanted to place Christian families in eleven sub-regional centers around Nan. These families would then be responsible for developing churches in each center; Irwin initiated the program by sending Kru Wong to Muang Thoeng and Nan Moon to Chiang Kham with one supported by the church and one by Irwin personally. They received money to buy homes and land, and the station expected that after the first year they would support themselves. Irwin's plan worked particularly well at Muang Thoeng until the mission unexpectedly transferred that community to the closer Chiang Rai Station in 1898. (24)

In 1899, the mission also transferred Chiang Kham to the Chiang Rai Station. Amid the shambles of his dream for evangelistic growth based in Nan, Irwin reported that the Nan Church felt angry and upset with the mission for transferring both places to Chiang Rai. Two factions emerged in the small Christian community at M. Thoeng. Kru Wong, founder of the community, led the pro-Nan faction. Chiang Rai Station sent its own elders to M. Thoeng to settle matters, but the hostility between the two groups grew so intense that one member of the pro-Nan faction murdered another Christian. Briggs, now at Chiang Rai, said that Kru Wong had fallen in with a group of criminals. (25)

Nan Station repeated the pattern of Lamphun and Phrae: the mission started a small station with insufficient personnel to set up the station and concentrate on church work. The Nan Church may have been initially more active and self-reliant than other stations' churches, but in the long run it developed only slowly. It remained a conglomerate of separate Christian individuals, families, and groups scattered across Nan Province.

**Chiang Rai Station**

In one sense, the founding of Chiang Rai Station broke the pattern of the three previous stations. Whereas none of those stations had churches before the founding of the station and only Lamphun showed any serious potential for growth, the Chiang Rai Station opened well after the first churches securely based themselves in the region. Those three churches - Chiang Saen (1888), Chiang Rai (1890), and Wiang Pa Pao (1892) - were all in good condition in spite of persecution at Wiang Pa Pao and had 234 members, all gained entirely through the efforts of the churches themselves. (26)

The initial discussions regarding a Chiang Rai station started in 1892, but the Laos Mission literally ran out of people to open yet another station. The man eventually chosen to go, the Rev. Stanley K. Phraner, fell ill and died, and the mission could not make concrete plans for Chiang Rai until 1896. Finally, in early 1897, the Dodds and the Denmans arrived in Chiang Rai and began setting up the station. They spent much of their first months in building and property matters, but they did report that the churches seemed more active after they arrived. (27)

The Chiang Rai area churches had a more independent spirit than other Laos Mission congregations. The Chiang Saen Church was well known for its active program and competent leadership. The Chiang Rai Church, still centered on Mae Kon, demonstrated its independence by resisting Denman's attempts to
"reorganize" its life and by holding an election in 1899 for new church officers without obtaining the prior consent of the station. In a step without precedence, this church in that same year elected women to three of the four offices in the local Christian Endeavor Society. (28)

Although a small station, the Chiang Rai churches under it exhibited considerably more strength than those in Phrae or Nan, and they continued to expand more rapidly both in numbers and geographically. The opening of the Chiang Rat Station brought to a close the second phase of mission expansion; however, some expansion had also taken place in the older stations, and we need to scan that expansion as well.

**The Older Stations**

Chiang Mai Station, heart of the Laos Mission, fully shared in the expansionist dynamic that drove the mission into new regions and opened up her own new area in the Chiang Dao-Muang Phrao region. Interest in Christianity first emerged in Chiang Dao in 1888 and led to the persecution of Noi Sali in 1889 (see Chapter 2). The Rev. D.G. Collins made the first missionary visit to Chiang Dao in 1890, and Christianity spread quickly enough so that the North Laos Presbytery established a church there on 5 November 1893. Like many churches of the time, this congregation was scattered over a considerable area with some members living as far away as Muang Phrao.

After this initial success, problems arose in Chiang Dao, and the congregation lost a significant number of families who reverted to traditional religious practices. Missionaries seldom visited these Christians, and not until 1899 did the mission, in the person of McGilvary, make an effort to recover the situation. McGilvary visited the church and took action to reclaim some who had drifted away and clean the church rolls of the rest. At the same time, he made plans for a separate congregation at Muang Phrao where the Christian community had remained stable and grown quietly under the gentle leadership of Kru Chai Ma, a semi-retired clergyman. (29)

A year after the founding of the Chiang Dao Church in 1893, the Chiang Mai station organized two more congregations: the first at San Sai (21 March 1894) and the other at Mae Pu Kha (1 July 1894). (30) Throughout the period, the under-staffed Lampang Station showed relatively little growth, and the only significant community that developed there in the 1890s grew up at Chae Hom, where in 1891 a Christian girl with some training at the Chiang Mai Girls' School began teaching her neighbors about Christ. By 1894, over forty Christians lived in several villages scattered about the neighborhood. (31)

Ten years made a remarkable difference, at least statistically, when one looks back to 1889 from the perspective of 1899. At the end of 1899, the Laos Mission had fifteen churches (from Chiang Mai with 821 members to Wiang Pa Pao with 45 members) and 2,257 communicant members. In that year alone, it received 210 new members on confession. The churches had one hundred elected elders and nearly 1300 students in Sunday schools from all of the congregations. (32)

**Tribal Expansion**

In the late 1890s and early 1900s, the Laos Mission articulated a doctrine of expansion that theoretically focused upon ethnic rather than geographical concerns. As the mission became embroiled in attempts to expand its work beyond the borders of Siam, it asserted a claim over the "Tai" peoples wherever they might be found. (33) Nevertheless, within the boundaries of northern Siam the mission felt called to work with all peoples. Therefore, its concern to spread the Gospel into every corner of northern Thailand involved it with ethnic minorities as a matter of course.
The Lahu

As early as 1886, the mission had some contact with the Lahu peoples of the Chiang Rai region, and in 1891 McGilvary and Phraner met with Akha, another tribal group, and even took one boy along with them to teach him reading. (34) The following year, 1892, McGilvary returned to the area with Dr. James W. McKeen, at which time the mission developed its first sustained contact with the Lahu A significant group of Lahu showed interest in Christianity, and by the end of their stay the two missionaries had baptized thirteen La h us. The following year two more families received baptism. At this time, the Christian Lahu groups lived only about four miles from Mae Kon, and they became members of the Chiang Rai Church and participated in some of its activities. By 1899, yet another four Lahu families became Christians, and the leader of the Lahu Christian community was reputed to be a man of some influence in Lahu circles. (35)

In 1904, the Laos Mission started to spread Christianity among the Lahu on the French side of the Mekong River. In 1905, missionaries spent three weeks each with groups on both sides of the river, and the work on the French side seemed to be especially promising. Lahu on the Siamese side suffered from opium addiction and showed much less interest in Christianity because of the mission's insistence that they give up the drug. (36) In 1910, Lahu church membership was transferred from the Chiang Rai Church to the Nang Lae Church. Contacts continued right up to 1920: in 1915, the mission started a school for the Lahu and had two Lahu boys studying in Chiang Rai. One reason for the school was to try to keep the Lahu young people from losing interest in Christianity, a thing they were prone to do. In 1917, the mission included over fifty Lahu Christians. By that year, they had again transferred membership, this time to the Muang Phan Church. (37)

The Kamu

Kamu work did not begin until a few years after the Lahu, but at one time it looked as though it would become a major concern of the Laos Mission. As one might expect, McGilvary again made the first contact, this time in French territory in 1897. The prospects among the Kamu so excited him that he returned in 1898 to spend several months with the people, and things came to the point where McGilvary expected a mass movement to begin at any moment. Ten villages showed a serious interest in Christianity. In one of those, the headman converted while in the others headmen were near conversion. But, the Chao Muang of Luang Prabang, subject to the French, complained to the French authorities about American missionary work from across the border. He feared unrest among the Kamu, and the French immediately ordered McGilvary to cease his work with the Kamu. (38)

The mission refused to give up such promising work and decided to make the Kamu into a major mission project for the northern Thai churches. If missionaries could not go into French territory... then send "native" evangelists! The mission also sought to involve the churches in financial support of the Kamu work. In 1899, elders went over to work with the Kamu, and things went so well that when they left 87 Kamu were ready to receive baptism. The Lampang Church became interested in the Kamu and proved to be a good source of funding for that work. (39)

The mission decided to send one of its clergymen, Kru Chai Ma (not the same person as the pastor at Muang Phrao) and two elders into French territory. These men left in early 1900 and soon baptized 41 more converts. Four more villages announced their intentions to join the new faith. But, just when things seemed to be going well again, the mission had to recall its three men in Kamu territory for (unspecified) serious errors. A mission investigation of the behavior of Kru Chai Ma and the elders revealed that they had been in the wrong and that the Kamu Christiana remained "faithful." (40)

The mission tried to maintain some contact with the nearly one hundred baptized Kamu, but when two American missionaries again crossed over into French territory in 1903 the French immediately ordered them out of the country. In later years, the mission did sustain brief contacts with the Kamu Christian community and also worked with Kamu groups near Nan (1908) and Lampang (1914). At one stage, the mission sent money (in
1904) to support a group of French Protestant missionaries who came out to work with the Kamu. In yet another attempt to reach the Kamu, the mission planned to train four Kamu Christians, who worked and studied with the Chiang Rai Station, as missionaries to their own people. The Kamu Christian community, in any event, sustained its life and even showed signs of growth even though it had almost no outside assistance. In 1916, Mrs. Crooks at Lampang translated the Epistles of Peter into Kamu using the northern Thai script as a further attempt to assist the Kamu Christian community. (41)

The Laos Mission had brief contact with other tribal groups, such as the Yao in the Chiang Rai area, but virtually nothing came of these contacts. The mission faced a number of fundamental problems in its attempt to establish tribal missions: it lacked both the personnel and the funds to sustain any kind of continuous work. The missionaries involved in tribal outreach had other regularly assigned duties that kept them from spending more than a very few weeks per year with tribal peoples. Furthermore, the tribal peoples lived in places difficult to get to and spoke languages very different from northern Thai. Thus, the Laos Mission had to "reach" across the gulf of administrative, geographical, and linguistic distance to tribal peoples when it did not even have resources to adequately cope with its primary responsibility, the lowland northern Thai.

Expansion of the Mission's Institutional Base

Mission work in northern Siam divided into two general categories: church-evangelistic work and institutional work. Theoretically, the institutions began and developed as mechanisms for supporting church and evangelistic work, but they actually developed quite apart from the church.

Schools and Hospitals.

In 1899, the sum total of mission institutions amounted to the two schools in Chiang Mai, one small school in Lamphun, and the only recently reorganized mission hospital in Chiang Mai. Over the next ten years, the situation changed dramatically, and institutional expansion became yet another expression of the Laos Mission's fundamental drive to expand.

By the end of the nineteenth century, both Chiang Mai and Lampang had the full set of mission institutions, that is, two schools, a hospital, and a medical dispensary. The Lampang set was established after 1890. Of the remaining three stations, Chiang Rai attained greater institutional growth than either Phrae or Nan. It had a day school, a small hospital, and a dispensary. Phrae had a small school and an equally small hospital. Finally, distant Nan ran a very small day school and carried out medical work although it seems not to have had a hospital or dispensary as such.

In short, during the decade of the 1890s the Laos Mission began to seriously establish its institutional base of schools and hospitals. In order to maintain this growing institutional establishment, the mission invested nine of its members in medical (4 individuals) and educational (5 individuals) work another four members took the mission press or translation and literary work as their primary activity. In comparison to these thirteen, nine members of the mission engaged primarily in evangelistic and church work. (42) Clearly, the Laos Mission began to make a major investment in its institutions during the 1890s.

The Mission Press.

The most important single departure in institutional development during the 1890s was the founding of the Chiang Mai Mission Press in 1892. Even before their arrival in the 1860s, McGilvary and Wilson wanted a press. However, their numerous attempts to obtain one were thwarted until Dr. Peoples finally secured a northern Thai font of type in 1890. The press opened in early 1892 under the capable direction of the Collins' with its primary purpose being to produce evangelistic literature in northern Thai. The press also made possible the publication of the Bible in northern Thai.
From the beginning, the Mission Press faced two serious problems that limited its effectiveness as a mission institution: first, only a very few missionaries could give time to writing and translation, which meant that it produced relatively little Christian literature for publication. Second, since the press had to support itself, it emphasized commercial printing. The bulk of its business came from the Siamese government. (43)

Nevertheless, the Mission Press did print material useful to the churches. Although the range of biblical materials translated in the 1890s was limited mostly to some books of the New Testament, the press produced large numbers of scripture portions as well as Wilson's northern Thai hymnal, first published in 1894. McGilvary claimed that Wilson's hymnals provided the best Christian education instruction that many converts would ever receive. (44) The Mission Press also printed Sunday School/Christian Endeavor lessons (beginning in 1898), which were widely used among the churches. These printed lessons eventually developed into a monthly newspaper, nangsu sirikitisap (literally, “The Good News Book”), which began publication in northern That In 1903 and long remained the only news publication in the North. It contained national, inter-national, and church new as well as Sunday school lessons. (45)

The Mission Press produced only a very modest body of Christian literature, and I have argued elsewhere (46) that the press had a much greater impact on the processes of change in northern Siam than in either evangelism or church work. From the perspective of modernization, the Mission Press played an impressive role in introducing new ideas throughout northern Siam. From the perspective of this study, the church, it played a much more modest role.

**Christian Endeavor**

The most important programmatic change during the 1890s as far as the church itself was concerned was the introduction of Christian Endeavor Societies into the local churches. The mission's experience with Christian Endeavor indicates the problems the mission and the churches faced in developing vital congregational life in the churches.

Young missionaries fresh from the United States, where the "C.E." movement was sweeping the nation, first introduced Christian Endeavor in 1894, and it eventually became an important part of the mission's total Christian education program. Robert Irwin organized the first local C. E. society in the Lamphun Church early the next year and also set up C.E. societies at Chiang Rai, Mae Kon, Nang Lae, and Chiang Saen in 1895. The mission then sponsored the first Christian Endeavor convention to be held in the North in December 1895. The next year the movement spread to the other stations, and eventually many church and a number of local Christian communities had their own societies. (47)

The Christian Endeavor societies were established as part of the life of the local congregations and carried out quite varied activities including Bible study, prayer meetings, and evangelism. The missionaries generally tried to use C.E. as a training ground for developing leadership and congregational self-government. They also tried to have local church members take charge although missionaries often had effective responsibility for the local C.E. societies themselves. The Chiang Mai Church developed the strongest of the C.E. societies. (48)

After the Initial enthusiasm for Christian Endeavor subsided, the movement began to quietly disappear. The situation in Lampang in 1901 seems to have been typical: less interest, dwindling attendance. C.E. did linger on for a few years. Nan Church still had a prayer group in 1904 that had grown out of earlier C.E. work, and Chiang Mai had two C.E. societies as late as 1905. (49) We may assume that C.E. died away for at least two reasons: in the first place, there was no compelling need for these societies as their membership simply duplicated the active membership of a church. C.E. meetings and educational activities also duplicated the form of usual church activities. Second, local C.E. societies did not arise out of perceived local needs and depended largely on the mission for program ideas and even for leadership. Therefore, C.E. societies could be sustained
only as long as the mission could promote them, and the decade after 1900 proved to be a particularly difficult period for the mission with considerable health and personnel problems.

**Conclusion**

From the perspective of mission history or from the perspective of the mission's involvement in modernization, the decade of the 1890s was nothing short of remarkable. This handful of men and women, foreigners facing grave climatic limitations in a land not noted for its transportation facilities, opened four new Stations and laid the foundations for numerous institutions. Never numbering more than fifty, they virtually initiated the movement towards "modern" education, medicine, and printing in northern Siam. As they opened each new station, they introduced new technologies into new areas and supported the modernizing efforts of the Siamese government in those regions. (50)

Yet, from the perspective of the churches, it is more difficult to be as enthusiastic about the results of mission expansionism. While that ideology of expansion drove the Laos Mission to extreme efforts in scattering the seeds of its religious faith and developing institutions that it believed would strengthen the Christian presence in the North, that same ideology left the church with a difficult historical and geographical heritage. For, the Laos Mission constantly reached beyond the churches to expand numbers, territory, and institutions. It did not give sufficient concern to the nurture of the churches that already existed because of its incessant need/urge to keep moving on into new territory and new activities. The situation might not have been so serious if the Laos Mission had cultivated or even allowed the emergence of strong local church leadership, but it did not cultivate that leadership. Thus, the churches already established languished for want of leadership and attention while the mission continued to chase the frontiers of its calling.

The geographical heritage of the northern Thai church is indicative of the historical issues at stake. By constantly emphasizing territorial expansion, the Laos Mission created a widely scattered set of small church groups only loosely attached to organized congregations. These groups were generally separated from each other by great distances and were left in social isolation. Thus, many Christians in the 1890s suffered a dual isolation: from other Christians and from the larger society around them.

In effect, the Christian church in northern Siam resembled a balloon, large territorially but without the solidity or substance that a less widespread, more integrated Christian community would have had. In the next three chapters, I will explore the weaknesses of the mission's relationship with its churches in more depth. The point I want to emphasize here as an introduction to those chapters is that the expansionist ideology of the Laos Mission lies at the heart of the communal weakness of the northern Thai church in the 1890s and beyond. It was that ideology, which distracted it from nurturing the churches that it established.
Part II – Lords of the Harvest

The Indian Church today is the result of the preaching of the early missionaries interpreted in the light of the organizations which they set up. In the Christian mission, the first thing which the Indian observed was the Christian missionary.

Though the influence of the mission pattern is to be seen in the whole life of the Indian Churches, yet there is a special sense in which the Indian ministry has been influenced by it and which illustrates its limitations.

This attempt to develop the Church without at the same time developing the ministry has deformed the conception of the Church, of the Sacraments, and of the ministry itself.

Michael Hollis

*Paternalism and the Church*, pp. 40, 51

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Chapter 4
Models for Ministry

Discussing the importance of leadership for human communities is something akin to trying to discuss the significance of air for life. It is so fundamental, so commonplace, and so elemental that we naturally lose sight of its significance on a day-to-day basis. Yet, the role of the leader is so necessary to us that it is literally a part of our biological make-up. The very idea of a "leaderless" human community is impossible. What could such a thing be? The viability of any human organization depends on its leaders. Those groups with a tradition of good leadership are the ones most likely to have a viable social, institutional, and organizational life.

The purpose of this chapter and the two that follow is to examine in detail the church leadership relations, strategies, and philosophy of the Laos Mission. The Laos Mission itself assigned great importance to developing church leadership as a key to strengthening the churches. Issues of church leadership were inexorably entwined with the sociocultural attitudes of the mission, the nature of northern Thai social structures, and the late nineteenth century missionary movement ideal of establishing self-propagating, self-supporting, and self-governing "native" churches. Ultimately, the issue of church leadership in the northern Thai church had to do with power - who had it and how they exercised it. (1)

When we examine how an organization or an institution makes its decisions, maintains authority, and structures power relationships, we have reached its nuts-and-bolts center. The facade of organizational philosophy and public relations statements dissolves into the reality of how human relationships are actually structured.

**Mission Church Leadership: Its Form**

Throughout the history of the Laos Mission, "church leadership" meant mission leadership of the church. Since leadership is a social role, it is important to begin here with the form, the structure of mission
leadership of the churches. In later sections, we will look at the mission's understanding of the northern Thai church and then at how the mission actually exercised its leadership.

The most striking single characteristic regarding the mission's exercising leadership responsibility over the northern Thai churches was that its leadership existed prior to and outside of the community it created. In normal situations, societies and communities and their leaders exist together: leaders arise out of the community and have their existence for the sake of the larger community. Leaders are members of the community. They express the cultural milieu of their community. They, normally, share the values, the language, the habits, the prejudices, and the general world-view of the people they lead.

However, the northern Thai church did not even exist when the Laos Mission began in 1867. The mission, rather, "called" into existence the church. Instead of the society raising up leaders for its needs, the situation was reversed: the leaders raised up a church to meet a set of needs defined by the leaders. Furthermore, the leadership, in effect, decided \textit{a priori} how the community should take shape, what its values should be, what activities it should engage in, and what should be the qualifications for membership in the community. (2)

The result was an abnormal and unnatural relationship between leaders and followers. In a more normal situation, mutual dependency binds leaders and followers together so that the leader cannot move too far away from the needs and wants of the followers. In this case, the leaders could and did exist entirely apart from the followership and derived no power from association with it. That is, leadership in the northern Thai church did not depend upon the church for its training, for its status, or for its livelihood. Quite the opposite. While the leaders were quite independent of those who followed, the followers through their membership in this new community depended on the leaders, the missionaries, for training, for status, and quite often for their livelihood. One-way dependency built itself into the very existence of the Christian community in northern Siam.

Likewise, the skills required for leadership in this unnatural situation did not arise from within the community led. The pre-community leaders brought those skills with them from outside the community and, thus, enhanced the unnatural one-way dependency structure of the community. Those who wanted to be leaders had to learn leadership skills from and become like those who already were leaders. Anything that had been previously learned in the society was likely to be useless, and those who accepted membership in the community, therefore, appeared inept and unskilled because they lacked the skills needed to advance in the community.

The structure of traditional northern Thai society contributed to the further development of a one-way dependency community because it \textit{seemed} to have a structure similar to that of the mission-church structure. Traditional northern Thai society based itself on patron-client relationships in which every individual in the society had a place in the hierarchy of relationships. (3) People very naturally thought in terms of \textit{phi-nong} (older-younger) relationships by which each individual had a place above or below those with whom he or she came into contact. Every member of society had a patron, a person socially superior to oneself to whom one owed respect and service.

The members of the Laos Mission scattered about in their stations fit into this social pattern very well. They became members of the patron class. (4) As late as 1914, William Clifton Dodd noted that most of the converts were former "serfs" who were only just beginning to see the missionaries in a less majestic light as simply leading influential members of the Christian community. (5) The mission owned large pieces of property upon which it built impressive buildings including massive (by northern Thai standards) homes. This highly visible ownership of land in-and-of-itself lent the missionaries considerable status. In northern Thai society, land meant power over others: power to hire, power to lend, power to be generous or to withhold generosity, power to make merit, and power to make one’s children powerful. People admired wealthy landowners for their great merit. (6)
The average missionary had a number of personal servants, and the mission employed significant numbers of Christians. It was only "natural" for northern Thai Christians to relate to the members of the mission as patrons. The "unnatural" birth and form of this community meant, however, that the missionaries did not necessarily have to accept the reciprocal obligations expected of natural northern Thai patrons. There was a fundamental lack of communication at a very basic level between the missionaries and their converts: while the converts looked to the missionaries as their patrons, an adult to adult relationship based on reciprocity, the missionaries looked upon the converts as children, a relationship based on one-way dependency.

The dependency of the converts on the mission was even further strengthened by the converts' relationship with the rest of society. Every year, missionary correspondence and reports documented persecution of Christians somewhere in the North. The churches were born in the midst of repression, and even where not overt the repression put social pressure on them. (7) Thus, the Christian community lived under pressure and needed powerful leadership to protect it. Because of their position in society in which they were accepted as powerful members of the patron class, the missionaries often exerted influence to the benefit of their oppressed converts. (8)

Finally, convert dependency also grew out of the social situation of the converts: most of them came from the lower classes. We might also add that, as noted in previous chapters, other significant groups of converts included those who were sick and those accused of witchcraft, people who sat at the edges of society. These people all had needs that the mission could fulfill. They were not about to bite the hand that fed them.

In sum, the social situation and historical origins of the Christian church in northern Siam encouraged in a remarkably coherent and consistent way church dependence. The fact that missionary leadership came prior to the church, that it took the form of patronage, and that it led an oppressed minority group of those on the fringes of society gave missionary leadership of the church a unique potency, one the converts could not rival.

Mission Church Leadership: Its Doctrine of the Church

The form mission church leadership took fostered in its churches an unnatural dependence on the mission. The mission's doctrine of the church, further encouraged that dependency relationship. Indeed, the mission's doctrine of the church, its ecclesiology, takes its rightful place next to the mission's ideology of expansion as a powerful source of motivation and action. That is, what the missionaries thought about the church in northern Siam strongly informed their relationship with it.

What was the church? As far as the Laos Mission could see, the church was essentially an agency for evangelism. Evangelism was not just one task of the church among others but rather the very reason for the church's existence. (9) Mission literature generally makes little distinction between evangelism and church activities in general. All church activities, including the visitation and oversight of church members, were taken to be just different forms of evangelism. In the years prior to 1900, mission reports almost always placed church activities under the heading of "evangelism". Mission work assignments assumed that the missionary evangelist worked with and oversaw local congregations in the course of doing evangelism. (10) In fact, the mission believed that evangelism and church nurture amounted to the same activity: The Nan Station went so far in 1914 as to appoint a "pastor-evangelist" (11); and the Chiang Mai Station report for 1910 summed the matter up this way: "The church and evangelistic work are necessarily so interrelated that they are practically identical." (12)

The mission believed that the northern Thai church should be primarily, essentially, and fundamentally an agency for converting the North. This meant that the mission did not, as a rule, look upon its churches as communities but rather as agencies, the "best" agencies, for completing the work of the mission itself. (13) The Laos Mission's model for the church, then, was the mission itself.
Leadership training usually meant preparing church leaders to be evangelists. Those "native" leaders judged to be most successful as church leaders were the ones who won substantial numbers of converts. The mission measured the spirituality of the congregations largely in terms of numerical growth and the strength of Christian communities not yet organized as churches by the numbers of new families and/or individuals joining the community. The ideal, successful, and faithful church was the one actively and successfully engaged in evangelism. The mission also assumed that if a church failed to grow numerically there was something wrong with it. Indeed, they believed the church that did not grow numerically soon began to whither both in numbers and spiritually. (14)

In trying to understand why the northern Thai church became what it was, it is disconcerting to encounter time-and-again a pattern of Laos Mission activity in which the mission's ideology consistently pulled its attention away from the churches. Just as its expansionist ideology pulled the mission constantly outward and away from the church so its ecclesiology focused its concerns outside of the life of its churches. With its heavy emphasis on evangelism, the mission tended to ignore Christian education, pastoral care, and congregational program within the churches. As we will see, it also drew northern Thai church leadership away from the churches.

According to mission thinking, the northern Thai church was a missionary society, and the best church leadership was that which successfully converted people to Christ. This ecclesiology demonstrated a remarkable confusion of biblical roles in the organization of the church as well as a seriously limited doctrine of the church itself. The mission put Paul rather than Andrew, the apostle-evangelist rather than the bishop-pastor, at the head of the church. It confused apostleship, the spreading of the Good News, with discipleship, the wider task of following Christ in all facets of life, and with the office of "presbyter", the one who governs the church. (15) The practical result of this confusion of church offices was that those who most closely followed the model of the missionaries, individuals committed to only one of a number of tasks in the church, advanced within the hierarchy of the church. More to the point, the mission and the "native" leadership it developed did not nurture and pastor the churches but rather continued to evangelize them even after conversion. Theoretically, at least, there could be no "shifting of gears" because worship, preaching, Christian education, and other church activities necessarily fell within the province of evangelism. In actual fact, the Laos Mission did continue to evangelize rather than nurture its churches and, paradoxically, it weakened the evangelistic potential of those churches because it failed to create in them strong communities for witness and service.

Interestingly enough, the Laos Mission would have readily agreed that it had to continue to evangelize the church after conversion. This brings us to the second important element in the mission's understanding of the northern Thai church. Just as it, first of all, looked upon that church as being essentially an evangelistic society so, secondly, it defined the church in northern Siam as "child-like". Since the mission regarded northern Thai society as heathen and consequently, uncivilized, it could not help but feel that its converts remained "tainted" with the heathenism of their culture. This, in turn, meant that they were not adults-in-Christ; they had not yet grown up into the Christian faith. Indeed, they were like children in mission eyes because of their supposedly easy-going manner, sloth, lack of hygiene, and propensity to laugh all the time. They were short, too. They lacked discipline. In general, the members of the mission looked upon their converts as child-like, and for them that usually meant "childish". (16)

The missionary view of the church as being child-like had a deep impact on the life of the church and on the leadership the church itself produced.

First of all, the Laos Mission took a strongly parental and proprietary attitude towards the churches. Missionary literature so endlessly repeats the litany of "our" elders, "our" natives, "our" Christians, "our" churches, "our" evangelists, "our" ministers, "our" helpers, and "our" assistants that one gives up trying to footnote the obvious. Whatever the theory of mission-church relations might be, the mission in practice acted as if the northern Thai church belonged to it as a child belongs to his or her parents. (17)
Secondly, the churches did not have an independent voice of their own. The Laos Mission largely took important actions and made major policy decisions without even considering consulting the churches. With one notable exception in 1895 (see Chapter 6), the mission dominated the deliberations of the North Laos Presbytery, theoretically the voice of the church, until well into the twentieth century. In fact, the mission continued to make major policy decisions about the life of the church without reference to presbytery throughout its history, for example, the decision it took in 1916 formulating a clearer policy on baptism. (18) At the local church level, the individual missionaries, appointed as "stated-supplies," completely dominated the life and program of the congregations. They looked upon the elected elders of the church as being "a board of advisors" composed of "native assistants." (19)

Thus, the church government developed by the Laos Mission did not function in a Presbyterian manner except at the most superficial and formal level. The mission did not adhere to the Calvinist precept that places responsibility for the ordering of church life at least partly in lay hands, in the hands of the churches themselves. (20) The northern Thai church was run on an episcopal form of church government in which the missionaries exercised (from outside of the church) absolute power over local congregations and virtually acted as self-appointed bishops over groups of congregations. Individual missionaries hired and paid elder-evangelists, assigned duties to elders, settled local disputes, established local schools, and appointed teachers. (21) The missionaries believed that they had to do these things for the churches because the churches were incapable of caring for themselves. The mission's understanding of the church in northern Siam as child-like carried more weight in its thinking and behavior than did its inherited doctrines of representative church government.

Thirdly, in actual point of fact, the relationship of the convert community of new Christians to the mission did take on the aspect of a parent-child relationship. Just as children depend upon their parents for sustenance and protection, so the "native" Christians tended to cluster around the mission stations and seek their means of livelihood there. The mission encouraged this dependency through its need for teachers, medical assistants, evangelists, personal servants, and skilled craftsmen. It hired Christians whenever possible, and at other times the mission employed potential converts in order to bring them into closer contact with the missionaries themselves.

Although there are no figures available, the mission records indicate that a large percentage of Christians depended entirely or in part on the mission for their income. Thus, situations like that at the Ban Tho Church (organized 1913) arose in which the Mission Press employed half of the men in the congregation. The leadership of the churches was particularly likely to be employed by the mission, as they were the ones who displayed talents the mission valued. In 1906, for example, 140 of the "pick of our Christians" enrolled in the mission's vaccinators' class, which class taught men how to give vaccinations from which, in turn, they received an income. (22)

This child-like financial dependency of the churches on the mission had a number of repercussions. Briggs expressed particular concern that the mission created a new set of values and appetites in which converts wanted to have a better life, one like the missionaries had. He feared that the mission could not begin to satisfy such appetites. (23) Furthermore, the dependency of the converts on the mission only served to enhance the already high status of the missionaries in convert eyes. It served to confirm the patron image. At the same time, the financial policies of the mission began to create a hierarchy of privilege and wealth within the church itself. Some "natives", especially household servants, received relatively large salaries from the mission while others did not benefit so greatly from the mission's largess. Finally, some converts developed an expectation that when they needed money the mission would oblige them. They could become resentful of the mission when this expectation was not lived up to. (24)

Fourthly, since it assumed that converts had a child-like nature, the mission showed little inclination to train them for church leadership. By-and-large, the highest office that the "native" could aspire to was that of missionary "assistant." I mention this point here in passing only to suggest the roots of an issue that we will examine more closely in the next chapter. That is, that the mission simply did not expect and could not believe
that these childish people made good leaders. One does not ask a child to lead. One does not expect a child to lead.

Finally, many members of the Laos Mission believed that their presence would be required for many years to come to care for the still immature church. In an official mission statement of 1912 made in response to questions sent by a visiting Board deputation, the mission stated:

The foreign missionary is necessary (and for two or three generations, will continue to be necessary) as leader, teacher, and counselor of the native church, which in the last analysis is the efficient agency for preaching the Gospel to every creature. Without an adequate number of foreign missionaries the growth of the native church will be slow and the evangelization of the entire field will be delayed. (25)

Once again, the fundamental view of the mission that the church was child-like and its equally fundamental view that the essential task of the church was evangelism meshed, the one supporting the other. The pattern of missionary thinking consistently placed themselves at the head of the church, denigrated the potential role of the "native" leader, and saw their own role, place, and position as being key to the life of the church.

Viewed from within, the mission's understanding of the church had a logical consistency. Yet, the fact that the view was logical does not mean that it reflected the actual potential of the church to create and sustain its own life. Missionary ecclesiology in northern Siam did not begin with the actual situation of northern Thai society and culture or with the real and potential abilities of its converts. It began, rather, with its own ideological perspective that the society was "heathen," "uncivilized". It began with the largely unacknowledged assumption that the indigenous traditional society did not have its own integrity that might contribute something to the creation of a northern Thai church. Given this assumption, the strong dynamic of the ideology of expansion, and the church's dependence on mission leadership, we have all the makings for extreme paternalism. The nature of traditional northern Thai society with its structures of patron-client relationships did not challenge missionary assumptions and attitudes and, superficially, seemed to the missionaries to only confirm what they already knew.

At the last, the mission's doctrine of the church in northern Siam only contributed to making the church more fully dependent on the mission.

Before closing this section, we need to look briefly at the way in which the mission physically organized its churches. The "necessity" of mission leadership for the churches plus the geographical distribution of the churches determined the organizational structure of the church.

The distinctive pattern of the northern Thai church throughout the history of the Laos Mission was what I have chosen to call (for want of a better term) the "regional church". The regional church was a widely scattered "church" in which small groups and individual members lived at greater or lesser distances from each other, distances too great for developing a community life. These widely scattered groups and individuals had little to do with each other and were held together as a "congregation" by an itinerant leadership based in one central station. Often these regional churches had several chapels and preaching points and employed a number of men to visit the various groups. Even the smaller churches, which at first glance might not seem to fit this model, had their membership distributed through a number of villages. The church building might not even be located in the community with the highest concentration of Christians. Nearly all northern Thai churches were regional rather than purely local congregations. This form of church structure put a great deal of emphasis on the center of each congregation since the other groups and individuals were often unable to maintain a viable identity of their own. The regional church, then, constantly looked to the top, to the center for leadership. (26)

Organizationally, in sum, the typical northern Thai "church" was an artificial construct that reflected the unnatural origins of the church by being little more than a conglomerate of scattered groups and persons.
Mission Church Leadership: Its Practice

Churches, like other human communities develop their own styles of leadership, styles that differ. Styles of church government vary by denomination, by culture, and from congregation to congregation. These styles of leadership do not, somehow, suddenly appear full-blown. They accrue through practices developed over the years, a recapitulation of the organization's problem-solving experience. In this section we will look at how missionaries led the northern Thai church and the leadership traditions they created for it.

The Laos Mission had to cope with two very serious limitations on its ability to lead the churches. First of all, there was the problem of health. Secondly, mission structures and procedures further limited the effectiveness of mission church leadership.

Health

Missionary health... a constant concern... an ever present source of strain, of care, of worry. The inescapable fact of missionary life was that physical and mental breakdowns occurred regularly and posed a constant threat to and limitation on the effectiveness of missionaries.

During the 1870s and 1880s, health problems were a key factor in weakening the mission. Statistics gathered in 1896 show that of the thirty-two times the members of the Laos Mission left on furlough up to that year, in 23 cases (72%) they left because of failing health. More often than not, health furloughs had to be taken before the a missionary finished his or her term. To the date of those statistics, seven missionaries retired because of ill health, five died on the field (one by drowning), and only four resigned for other reasons. In 1908, William Harris surveyed the years 1895 - 1908 and found that, of thirty missionaries assigned to the Laos Mission in the period, nineteen had already resigned, usually for reasons of health. Their average stay was less than six years including furlough time. Statistics collected by Freeman for the last six years of the Laos Mission, 1914- 1920, indicated that in those years 22 missionaries either died (six) or resigned from the mission (sixteen), that is, just over 40% of the total force. Health dominated the causes for resignation. (27)

A summary of the general state of mission health shows that in the period 1900 - 1910 the work of the mission suffered from a debilitating instability resulting from frequent health problems. In 1900 the mission doctor in Chiang Mai made about five hundred medical calls on station members, one of the worst years in a decade. Records show that the years 1902, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1909, and 1910 were all especially bad years. Even into the next decade, health remained a constant worry with years like 1915 and 1916 being unusually difficult. Smaller stations, such as Nan, were hardest hit and sometimes found it difficult to sustain any program at all. Rev. H. Vincent compiled another set of statistics showing a direct correlation between the ideology of expansion and mission health. From November 1905 to August 1908, the eighteen missionaries assigned to Chiang Mai Station all remained in the mission. But of the 38 assigned to other stations exactly half, nineteen, resigned. (28)

The mission tried to help its members escape the ravages of illness by giving furloughs, periodic visits home. Because numbers of mission personnel were constantly going back to the United States for reasons of health or to take their regular furlough, the mission found it necessary to transfer other members back-and-forth to cover for those absent. Thus, one of the chief characteristics of the Laos Mission was its frequent shifting of personnel. The Denmans, transferred from Chiang Rai to Nan in 1905, wrote of the serious problems facing those so moved: a great deal of time and money wasted in packing and shipping and unpacking; a loss of effectiveness as one's former work was dropped (and suffered or lapsed thereby) and a whole new situation had to be learned; and obstruction of the missionaries' relationships with the people.
In that same year of 1905, Irwin condemned the mission's habit of incessantly transferring its people. In fifteen years including furloughs, Irwin served in five stations. Each time he just began to know his new situation when the mission voted to move him on again. He strongly urged the mission to halt this practice. It didn't. The mission's habit of moving its personnel around caused Dr. Arthur J. Brown, Secretary of the Board, to complain in 1911 about the heavy expenses the mission incurred with all this moving about. He observed that of all of the Board's 26 missions the Laos Mission seemed the most prone to transferring personnel. (29)

Yet another related problem had to do with the psychological make-up of the missionaries themselves. For them, mission work involved a special calling. Many of them believed in their calling and had a deep commitment to it. They felt driven to expend themselves to fulfill their calling, and many of them gave their time, their energies, and their talents in a sacrificial way. They tended to take on more work than they could carry including a lot of peripheral mission business and administration work. The fact that they did not rely on their "native" assistants for many tasks further burdened them with responsibilities. The Rev. C.R. Callender, a veteran of the mission, wrote in 1911 that because of the fewness of workers and the many opportunities to serve, the Lampang Station members were "...kept pretty close to the danger line of breaking down." (30)

Finally, the mission's concern for the health of its members compelled it to engage in activities that consumed great amounts of time that might have otherwise been given to church work. The mission felt that it had to build large, comfortable homes for its missionaries as a preventive health measure. The building and maintaining of those homes took time, energy, and resources. The mission also believed it necessary for the mission to order large amounts of American and European supplies and foodstuffs from Bangkok and overseas to help its members survive the climate. (31) Rev. William Harris expressed deep concern about all of the administrative time these activities consumed. As the mission's treasurer for many years, he felt that the ordained clergymen of the mission not only lost valuable time that they could have been using for church work but also set a very poor example for the churches because they spent so much time on "secular" concerns. (32)

The limits of missionary health and related factors had a direct impact on the church because they limited the missionary's time and ability to work with the churches. In different periods, churches such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Dao,

Muang Phrao, Lamphun (all three churches), Chiang Rai (several churches), Mae Dok Daeng, Fang, Nan, Phrae, and Mae Pu Kha, for examples, suffered neglect by the missionary assigned to the church because of health and health-related reasons. Missionary health problems limited the effectiveness of the missionaries themselves in their work with the churches. In the frailty of missionary health, we begin to see some of the implications of the church's unnatural origins and condition. The structures of the church depended on a foreign, unhealthy leadership that often did not function effectively or responsibly because it lacked the physical capacity to do so.

Mission Structures

Even if missionary health had not been such an important limiting factor on the mission's ability to lead the churches, that ability would still have been greatly limited by a second factor: the administrative structure of its own organization. The Laos Mission began as a small, uncomplicated two-family organization with no need for elaborate structures. It developed only slowly and did not really begin to expand until after 1890. But, as we have seen, in the decade of the 1890s mission work expanded rapidly both institutionally and geographically. Mission churches grew more rapidly. By the mid-1890s, the administration of the mission became much more complex and required more attention, needed more coordination. (33)

Over the course of the years, the mission developed a number of organizational mechanisms to cope with its increased load of administration. These mechanisms included the annual mission meeting, the body with the most power, and annual meetings of the North Laos Presbytery, permanent and special committees,
and eventually a standing executive committee. The mission appointed from its number a secretary and a treasurer.

Taken in its entirety, this was a weak and cumbersome administrative mechanism. Although, for example, the annual mission meeting could and very occasionally did take effective action to change the basic direction of mission policy and activity, by-and-large it was a poor way to run a mission. First of all, the annual meetings consumed great amounts of time, time that might have been put to use in other ways. The meetings always lasted several weeks, usually about a month including travel time. A great deal of time went into the planning and preparation of the annual meeting, normally held in December. Thus, missionaries were gone from their stations or otherwise engaged in meetings for at least four weeks every year. Secondly, the annual meetings exhibited little continuity from year to year. Those attending changed every year because of furloughs or illness. Thus, policies introduced one year would be dropped, altered, or ignored the next. One group might have a majority or strong minority voice at one meeting and carry through a motion initiating certain policies, but then another group or issue would come up the next year. The previous year's work went ignored. Mission policy flitted from flower to flower, year to year. Thirdly, annual meetings could be as tedious as they were long, and during the 1890s some mission members developed a serious aversion to the annual meeting because every year something divided the mission into warring factions. Interpersonal tensions were commonplace. (34)

The network of mission committees did not work even as well as did the annual meeting, this in spite of the fact that the mission dealt with specific issues largely by appointing committees to deal with those issues. Many of the committees, standing or special, met only infrequently or not at all because committee members were busy and scattered among distant stations. Even when the committees did function they had little real authority. Although committees were supposed to oversee various aspects of church and mission work, the actual pattern of action was this: the stations took what actions, on property matters for example, they deemed necessary and only then, after the fact, informed the "proper" committee about their decision "requesting" committee consent. Even key committees found it difficult to find time to deal with mission problems. (35)

In effect, while the missionaries administered the church as strong executives ("bishops"), they left themselves with no effective executive body or individual to administer the mission. The executive officers, secretary and treasurer, had no real authority of their own. The executive committee was not strong either. (36) McGilvary chose not to impose his will or desires on the mission, especially after the mission began to grow in the 1890s. It is doubtful if he could have done so in any event, since even when he did offer advice (which often proved to be quite insightful) it was not always accepted by the mission. McGilvary served as more of a general model for what the mission held to be the "ideal missionary" rather than as an effective administrative leader. (37)

As a result of this administrative situation, the Laos Mission drifted with the currents: it had no strong policies, no unified course of action even when a consensus of opinion existed. Changes were fitful and often ineffective. (38)

In any given situation, the system allowed manipulation by strong individuals or groups who could force through decisions not widely popular. One of the most important examples of this phenomenon was the long battle Dodd and others waged to open and keep open a station at Kengtung in the Shan States. That battle-fought both within the mission and with the Board-wasted incredible amounts of time and energy and still, finally, proved to be futile. (39)

These structures encouraged individual missionaries to go their own ways, to think that they could do almost anything that they wanted to do, and to ignore or even work against stated mission policy. Different stations had different policies and procedures. There was even competition between institutions within the same station where individuals would actually try to undercut the work of colleagues. (40) The administrative situation of the Laos Mission was chaotic and, in a very real sense, law-less. In a report highly critical of the Laos Mission's weak structure and its members' propensity for going their own way, Dr. Robert Speer observed
that the members of the mission needed to develop "a different attitude toward all constitutional authority both toward the Board and toward the field." (41)

It was ironic that those very individuals who gave so much effort to "protecting" the churches from errors in doctrine, behavior, and administration should come in for criticism on the charge of lawlessness. In a larger sense, it was ironic that the ones who frequently looked on the "native" church as childish should themselves be so poorly organized, so poorly disciplined, and so inept. In the largest sense, it was tragic that those who suffered the most were the people in the churches.

Interpersonal relationships within the mission only compounded the administrative weaknesses of the mission because the mission tended to be politicized and factionalized. Serious personality conflicts existed with the mission and within the stations. Differences of vision erupted into open conflict. Petty problems assumed disproportionate significance. At some points, life in a station became almost unbearable, a cauldron of conflict and emotion. (42) All of this caused one young missionary to quote the veteran Dr. Mason, "The mission field is just like a great big family only without the family love." (43)

**Mission Church Leadership: The Missionary Model Revisited**

The model of local church leadership that grew out of mission ideology, ecclesiology, and practice emphasized distance between leadership and the ones who followed. **Physical distance:** the practical implication of the regional church system was that the leaders of the churches did not live with the churches and seldom even saw them. There is the instructive and not unusual example of the Chiang Rai missionary responsible for oversight of nine churches in fifty villages. In 1916 he spent 150 days touring his field of which he devoted about 100 days (including travel time) in church work. Even if we ignore travel time, that missionary spent just barely eleven days with each church that year, and the actual time he spent with each church must have been considerably less. In spite of this blatant absentee form of pastoral care, the report in which his labors are recorded argues that the northern Thai were still "children" in the matter of self-government. (44) **Social distance:** the missionaries moved and lived on a much higher plane than did the average church member and benefited from a conspicuously higher standard of living. **Cultural distance:** in the way they spoke, conducted themselves, ate, and traveled the missionaries stood apart from the language, behavior patterns, and traditions of both the general population and the people of the churches.

The experience of the churches with leadership was one of distance in which the powers-that-were stood far removed from the life of the average Christian and did not participate in their lives. The missionary church leader appeared to be a person of immense wealth who was not tied to the rhythms of plant-and-harvest, plant-and-harvest. (45) In a most profound way the missionary "pastor" functioned as an absentee pastor.

Based on the attitudes and practices of the Laos Mission in its relationship to its churches, the leadership model it provided for them may be summarized in this fashion: it did not respect the integrity nor the rights of the individual churches. It did not make decisions in consultation with the churches nor even see that it should do such a thing. It did not trust the churches. It did not share power. Yet, the Laos Mission did not recognize that it had responsibilities to those in authority above it. The members of the mission acted as a law unto themselves. In its relationships within the mission it often showed a lack of cooperation and mutual forbearance. It was an ill-disciplined form of leadership not likely to create strong churches.

Hans-Ruedi Weber succinctly summarized the situation facing the northern Thai church in his general description of the situation of the church living under mission leadership in the missionary era. He writes that the period of missionary guidance of the churches was deadening. It resulted in paternalism, clergy-dominated churches with inactive lay people, an emphasis on institutions, the concentration of power in missionary hands, and an emphasis on buildings. He goes on to say:
But this has happened at the expense of the most important level of church life, the life of the local congregation where most laymen and laywomen get their spiritual food and where they should be helped in their response of obedience to the demands of the gospel. The flock, in its unimportant village church, was left with the poorest quality of shepherds. (46)

Weber's critique carries this study now on to describe how the mission's model for church leadership actually worked. For, this model, based on distance, distrust, instability, lack of respect, irresponsibility, and ill health did become the style of leadership that the mission developed in the church.

Chapter 5
Training for Ministry

At the end of his career, Daniel McGilvary wrote,

"As I now look back over these years, it is plain to me that the great lack of the mission all the way through has been the lack of well-trained helpers; and for this lack the mission itself is largely to blame." (1)

One of the fundamental issues that every human community must solve is that of succession: who will follow those now in authority and how will future leaders prepare for leadership? This chapter describes how the Laos Mission dealt with these issues and how it prepared leaders for the church. The chapter follows on from Chapter 4, for the preparation of "native" church leadership depended upon the model for leadership exhibited by the mission itself. That model functioned as an example for performing church leadership and programmed the kind of leadership training provided by the mission. McGilvary's comment is important because it correctly described the failure of the mission to train church leadership while also stating correctly whose failure that was. His comment also contains the most common fallacy in mission thinking about leadership training, namely, that one can prepare leaders by training them to be "assistants".

April 1883. McGilvary had just returned from furlough, rested and restless with new ideas. In his absence, the mission hit a low point, and McGilvary, determined to strike off in new directions, chose as the forum for presenting his new ideas the organizational meeting of the "Chiang Mai Presbytery" (North Laos Presbytery). For some time previously, McGilvary had trained one elder, Noi Intachak, possibly from the Mae Dok Daeng Church, as an evangelist. Now, he wanted to expand his training work into a larger and more formally established program. The purpose of the new program was to train evangelists. McGilvary proposed that the mission hire about six elders at a rate of six rupees (about $2.00) per month to engage in full-time study of the Bible and in short, practice evangelistic trips. He expected the program to improve the mission's evangelism program and to produce a better corps of evangelists for the future. McGilvary's presentation received enthusiastic support from his three fellow missionaries in presbytery, and they began to make all manner of plans, establish committees, and prepare elaborate sets of rules for the training program. However, on one point they all disagreed with McGilvary: six rupees, they felt, was too high a rate to be paying evangelist-trainees. They cut the amount, over McGilvary's protests, to two rupees per student per month. Four students were selected.

Three of the four chosen, however, declined to take part because they could not support their families on just two rupees per month. They needed more support because they could not farm and attend classes as well. McGilvary was left with only Noi Intachak, his original student, and he died within a year. (2) The first training attempt failed.

Mission Schools and Church Leadership
In Chapters 2 and 3, I described in brief the beginnings and the development of the mission school system. From the very first mention of the need for schools in 1870, McGilvary justified them as essential to the church. He firmly believed that intelligence and Christianity were necessarily and inevitably associated. (3) McGilvary and his colleagues in the mission, therefore, easily saw a particular need for church schools in the North where traditional education took place entirely in the temples. They considered the education given in the temples schools to be poor in quality and obviously unacceptable for Christian children. Furthermore, those schools did not educate women, a key educational concern for the mission. Lillian Curtis reasoned that the Christian church needed its own schools in order to strengthen it so that it could fulfill its role as the hope of the "heathen" world. (4) The mission built its educational policy on its perception of northern Thai society as "heathen," and proposed to free Christians from the bondage of traditional society by providing them with Christian schools. In a larger sense, the mission wanted to "civilize" northern Thai society by educating the church. (5)

The mission thought it faced one serious problem educationally: first generation Christian converts, the missionaries believed, clung in many ways to the old society they had been converted out of. The first generation retained too many of their old beliefs, ideas, and practices, as well as the forms of their old life, forms fixed too firmly and rooted too deeply to be given up. Therefore, the Christian school system sought to remove Christian children, the second generation, from the environment of their "heathen-like" parents. The mission built boarding schools where Christian children both learned their various subjects and lived in what the mission considered a more fully Christian environment. Since not all children could be placed in the large, centrally located boarding schools, the mission also established smaller village schools in many churches. From 1898 onwards, it was the official policy of the Laos Mission that its schools, boarding and village, were to be primarily for the education of the church. (6)

More specifically, leadership development (our concern here) served as another crucial justification for the mission's school system. The mission expected that the more capable students in its schools would become leaders of the church. Good church leaders needed the kinds of skills taught in and the level of education provided by the schools. The mission assumed that, very naturally, this better-than-average education would produce better-than-average leadership. (7) In other words, the mission school system formed the first step in the development of trained, capable church leaders. It provided the pool of talent out of which would surface the church's leadership.

Although the mission schools did produce some church leaders (8), the school system actually developed into an independent institution that competed with the church for funds and resources. It engaged considerable mission attention, again, competing with the churches for the time and concern of the mission. In 1895, when the mission's school system just began to expand, Briggs expressed concern over the direction of educational trends. He argued for a simpler educational system because the one then developing took too much time away from working with converts. He called on the mission to give more attention to "shepherding the flock." (9) In fact, the schools did not arise out of the life of the churches even though the mission founded them on the basis of what it perceived to be the needs of the churches. This competing institution quickly developed its own needs, one of the most pressing of which was for teachers to sustain and expand the system. The mission schools tended to siphon off the best students for teachers. (10) Thus, the strategy of using mission schools to prepare church leadership worked against itself from the beginning. Instead of putting the best potential leaders back into churches, the schools co-opted those individuals for its own purposes.

A second flaw in using a non-church institution to prepare church leadership was that as the years went by the schools more-and-more confused a general "secular" education with Christian education, especially in the "show case" station boarding schools. As the government's schools began competing with the church schools, the central concern of the church schools shifted towards high academic standards and improved physical plants. Religious education in the mission schools eventually formed only one part of a larger curriculum that included general and vocational components as well. The trend and pressure drifted towards improved academic program without a countervailing pressure to improve Christian education in the schools.
The pressure for curriculum development moved away from preparing individuals for church leadership and even away from general Christian education as the mission schools sought to maintain standards in order to attract the best Christian students as well as wealthy Buddhist students. (11)

A third weakness in using mission schools to prepare church leaders was that the whole idea grew out of a vague concept about the value of education rather than on a carefully thought out strategy for leadership training. It grew out of mission attitudes about "heathen" northern Thai society rather than perceptions about the actual situation and needs of the churches it established in that society. Therefore, when mission educational activities quietly shifted away from Christian education and church leadership training, those functions were lost in the shuffle. (12) Mission thinking proved itself too nebulous and undirected about the role of the schools in church leadership training to seriously provide coherent training for the churches.

A fourth drawback in relying on mission schools to provide the first step in church leadership training was that large numbers of Christian children never or seldom attended these schools. The Suan Dok community of the Muang Phrao Church had only twenty of its 135 children in school (15%), and that for only a very brief time. That was in 1916, and this was reported to be "typical" of the situation of nearly all Christian communities under the Chiang Mai Station. This was long after the growth of the mission school system began and in the most educationally advanced station of the mission. The situation in the cities appeared to be better. For example, in 1916 Lampang Church reported all but two of its boys were in school. Yet, even here the situation was less rosy than it appeared since average attendance figures for mission schools were frequently considerably lower than enrollment figures. Even where the children were "in" school, they often did not go very regularly. For many years, Christian parents saw little reason to send their children to school, and still another problem that faced many Christians was that they lived far away from the nearest school. (13) Overall figures are not available, but the weight of mission records indicates that the mission schools' pool out of which leaders emerged was actually quite shallow.

The "strategy" of training church leadership through the mission's schools had precisely the opposite effect of that intended. It did not put the church at the center. It deprived the church of badly needed attention and resources. It took the place of church-oriented Christian education without providing a good replacement at the local level. And the result? The Speer Deputation Team report of 1915 stated that church life was being generally ignored in the work of the Laos Mission. The congregations were poorly organized. They had very few activities. Many of the churches had little or no Christian education. There was almost no Bible study. The churches lost many young people because of this inattention. The report concluded: "If we were to be asked what is the greatest need in Siam, I think we should have to answer that it was the training and use of the church." (14) Dr. Charles Crooks, writing in 1919, confirmed that the schools failed to serve the church. He observed that the mission education system had no method for directing students towards theological education, church vocations, or even for assuring their continued membership in a church. Freeman suggested that Christian education through the schools actually caused "nominalism", that is, indifference among Christians. The schools simply accustomed children to Christian teaching without "...awakening a real heart religion." The schools only made nominal Christians all the more nominal and hard to reach. (15)

Up until its last year, then, the Laos Mission failed to train and use the church. It fixed so much of its hope upon the schools as the training ground for the church that when the schools failed to be such there was nothing left. In fact, the Laos Mission violated the integrity of its churches when it established a separate set of institutions to train church leadership. And, in sum, the first level of church leadership training, the mission schools, actually hindered the emergence of a competent church leadership.

Try Again: The Training School

The Laos Mission did not intend that the mission school system carry the burden for training church leadership. As we have already seen, McGilvary committed himself to creating a more formal program
specifically for the evangelistic training of church leaders. Even though his proposed program did not work out in 1883, the idea of a training school for elders did not die.

After the reinforcements of 1887 arrived, establishing a training school became possible, and in 1889 the North Laos Presbytery formally opened a training school and appointed the Rev. William Clifton Dodd to start the first class of that school. The first term of his first class began on 28 March 1889 and lasted two months with fourteen pupils meeting five days a week (Tuesday to Saturday noon) to study Genesis, Romans, theological principles, sermon preparation, and evangelism. The students were older men, elders in the churches. The only woman reported to have studied at the training school was Pa Wan, a Bible woman at the Chiang Mai Hospital who began studies in 1890. She wanted to improve her understanding of Christianity. The mission spent a total of one hundred rupees to support the students. The school proposed to train elders in evangelism, and the students devoted their weekends to evangelistic work. (16) The Training School's popularity grew quite suddenly when word began to spread among the churches that the mission paid students to attend it. The mission did not really want all of this kind of sudden interest, and it had to institute a new policy regarding stipends: only room and board would be paid. Even with the less liberal stipend policy, the number of students rose to 21 in 1890. (17) By 1891, the Training School taught classes for 25 weeks and had 35 students, many of whom planned to become ordained ministers. One of the most serious problems facing the school was that it lacked textbooks, and Dodd began to prepare course outlines in northern Thai for the students. Nan Ta, the only ordained northern Thai, assisted Dodd making him the first northern Thai theological educator. (18)

The purpose of the Training School as defined by Dodd was to train evangelistic assistants for the missionaries. Dodd felt that it would take a long time before the school could train enough evangelists to meet the needs of the mission. He also believed that it would be even longer before the mission could trust those evangelists on their own without mission supervision. He did admit that the students could make good evangelists as long as they remained under missionary supervision. (19)

After an auspicious beginning with large classes, the Training School suffered its first setback in 1891 when the Dodds moved to Lamphun to open a new station there. The school "moved" with them, but when it reopened it had only a handful of students. By July 1892, there were still only eighteen students, half the number that attended in Chiang Mai. Further problems developed as the Dodds began to prepare for their September 1893 furlough. To cover for Dodd, the mission appointed the Rev. Robert Irwin, a relatively new missionary stationed in Lampang, to the Training School. Irwin joined the Dodds in Lamphun in 1893 and took charge of the school when they left. (20)

Irwin had very different ideas about teaching. Although the purpose of the school remained evangelism training, Irwin used alternative methods for attaining that purpose: he put the advanced class of five students to teaching the less advanced class under the theory that these five men would make better evangelists if they had leadership training and experience. Unlike virtually any other member of the mission, Irwin believed that both the church and the society already had individuals capable of good leadership. In 1894, he introduced another new educational device: he set up a "mock presbytery" with the students playing all of the roles. His mock presbytery established three committees: Evangelism, Education, and Foreign Missions. The students so enthusiastically involved themselves that the Foreign Mission Committee actually, of its own accord, raised money for and sent two students to two distant cities to do evangelistic work. (21)

The Training School reached something of a pinnacle in 1894 under Irwin, but new problems came up when the mission transferred the school back to Chiang Mai in 1895. Even as the move disrupted the school, it also became embroiled in a controversy between the churches, graduates of the school, and the mission. The "Pastors' Revolt of 1895" will be dealt with in Chapter 6. It is sufficient to say that several ordained graduates of the Training School entered into a dispute with the missionaries at the North Laos Presbytery meeting of December 1895 regarding salaries. Out of the resentment and confusion of that event, the number of students at the Training School in 1896 dropped drastically.
In the meantime, Dodd returned in late 1895 and took over the school again. Although mission records are not entirely clear on the matter, it is more than likely that Irwin and his unorthodox methods came under fire in the mission for stirring up feelings in 1895. In any event, he was sent to Nan. And the school fell on hard times as the Dodds moved off to Chiang Rai in 1897 to open that station. (22) In its brief eight-year existence, the school moved twice, had to cope with two heads that had very different goals and methods, and suffered through the fires of divisive controversy. For most of its existence, it was located at Lamphun on the periphery of the mission. Thus, after 1896 the school ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. Whether it closed because there was no one to take Dodd's place or because the mission decided it wanted no more Training School for a while is not clear.

Nowhere is the effect of missionary ecclesiology on the life of the church more clearly seen than in the history of the Training School. The mission defined the church as an evangelistic agency, which meant that leadership training proposed to equip church leaders with evangelistic skills more useful outside of the church than in it. It taught its subjects with an eye to how those subjects might be used to win converts, as, for example, when the school taught geography because of its usefulness in "disproving" traditional cosmology. (23) The confusion of roles in which the apostle-evangelist took precedence over the presbyter-pastor meant that training for a competent church leadership did not take place.

And, indeed, as we have already seen, the Training School did not even intend to train leaders at all except in the period when Irwin took over from Dodd. Dodd, the permanent head of the school, did not believe that his students would ever make more than acceptable missionary assistants for many years to come. His belief was a result of the view that the northern Thai church was child-like and would have to depend on the mission for a long time. All of this represented a species of circular thinking: the church is childlike—it cannot lead itself—therefore, we cannot teach people to lead—therefore, we will train them to be assistants—see, they cannot lead—they are like children. Only Irwin questioned the premise of this circular thinking. In the Training School, at least, the students received his more trusting and positive approach with considerable enthusiasm, doing more than even he expected.

Give Up! The Interregnum

Although mission records continue to refer for some years to the "Training School", the permanent institution with regular teaching and a resident student body went out of existence in 1896. In 1897, the Rev. Howard Campbell, pastor of Chiang Mai Church, took over responsibility for conducting training classes. He held two short sessions with seven students the first session and 21 the second. In the years 1899 and 1900, he ran itinerating training classes with short sessions in a number of Christian villages. This program greatly increased the number of students attending while turning the "school" into more of a lay training institute. (24)

In the meantime, the Laos Mission reacted negatively to the whole idea of ordaining northern Thai pastors. The crisis years of 1895-1896 and their aftermath, left a sour taste as the mission observed what it thought to be the results of the work of those ordained. (see Chapter 6) An attitude of caution developed: Go Slow. Do not train northern Thai to be pastors as such training and status only goes to their heads, ruins them. This go slow attitude effectively suspended any thoughts of setting up a permanent training program. (25) Consequently, during the years following 1900 the "school" generally held sessions of only a few weeks under Chiang Mai Station and only for the Chiang Mai churches. In 1903, the numbers attending increased to sixty because a large number of men employed by the mission hospital as vaccinators were sent to the training classes. But as the years went on, the sessions tended to become shorter and shorter. This was largely because so many of the men who might attend the training classes were vaccinators who had to attend monthly training sessions any way. There was less need for the Campbell-run training sessions. By 1909, McGilvary held a single eight-day session. (26)

After a decade without any serious training program either for evangelism or church work, members of the Laos Mission changed their minds and more-and-more felt the need for a better training program for church
leaders. After 1906, changes in their thinking increased, and by 1910 pressure grew in the mission to start up a theological training school for training pastors. In 1912, the Rev. Henry White took up responsibility for developing such a school, and he held the last classes of the "old style" during which he and others taught a total of two hundred students for anywhere from ten days to two months. (27)

Try, Try Again: The Theological Training School

The Theological Training School grew out of two basic factors. One was the growing sense of urgency in the Laos Mission for theological training for northern Thai church leaders. The second was a gift in 1912 from Mr. H.L. Severance of the Presbyterian Church for $15,000 to the Board for aiding the development of theological education in northern Siam. (28)

Although officially begun when White took over responsibility for theological education in 1912, the newly established school really took shape in 1913. In a significant shift in mission thinking, the purpose of the new school differed considerably from that of the old Training School. Unlike the first school, this one had a dual purpose: to provide trained leadership, especially pastoral leadership, for the churches and to promote evangelism. White wrote in his school report for 1913 that the chief function of the school was to train an educated ministry. Evangelism was a secondary concern. (29) Thus, this school centered its attention on the church.

The Theological Training School faced some initial problems because it lacked facilities during the construction of the Severance Building. Nonetheless, it opened in 1913 with over fifty students in three grades (including six preparing for ordination) and a teaching staff of four-White, Roderick Gillies, Kru Semo, and Elder (soon to be Rev.) Kham Ai. In contrast to the original Training School, the new theological school drew its student body from across the whole church even from as far away as Nan. The school encountered further difficulties of a sort in the next two years. In 1914, White left for furlough and Gillies became ill. Nearly all of the teaching fell to the two northern Thai "assistants", and mission records indicate mild surprise that these two men did as well as they actually did. The formal administration of the school remained in mission hands until White returned in March 1916. Soon after he returned, the school moved into its new facilities. (30)

Actually, the most serious problem facing the school by 1917 was funding. In spite of assistance from the churches, the school found itself so short of funds that in 1917 it had to cut back the number of students attending to a mere eighteen. It tried to reach others through a "Christian Workers' Conference", something of a throwback to the old days before 1913, which had 25 church leaders in attendance and focused its attention on practical issues of local church life and organization. The school continued in this limited fashion for the next three years. It did attempt to expand its curriculum by involving other missionaries in the teaching of music, hygiene, and special courses from time to time. A new development that began about 1918 took place when a few students began to enter the theological school straight after their graduation from Prince Royal's College, the mission's most important boy's school. The Training School's three grade levels, advanced, middle, and junior, all emphasized biblical studies very heavily but their curriculum also included courses in theology and Christian education (mostly related to Sunday School). On weekends, the students worked with rural churches. Classes were in session in Chiang Mai for nine months of the year. (31)

In the period 1913 to 1920, then, the Laos Mission finally began to establish a church-oriented program of church leadership training. As of 1920, the prospects of that program appeared to be quite good: it had its own facilities; it had a growing staff that included capable northern Thai; it had students from every station; and it had a core of students preparing for the pastoral ministry. As the Theological Training School entered the 1920s, it began to grow in numbers again, and it provided a desirable institution for theological study for young men interested in becoming pastors of which there seemed to be a growing number. (32)

Even so, Gillies evaluated the school in this way in 1928: the school was still in evolution, the implications of which were uncertain. It had yet to become a Siamese institution. It had yet to solve its financial
problems. Gillies concluded that, "At the end of one hundred years since the Gospel first reached Siam, what confronts us with regard to theological training is not an achievement but rather a complicated problem." (33)

The reason theological education remained a "complicated problem" was that in the period after 1910 nothing changed in the mission's attitudes about its churches and theological students. Gillies touched on the heart of the problem when he noted that a way had to be found to make the school "Siamese". The Theological Training School did not belong to the churches. It did not emerge from their concerns and needs. It remained an expression of the paternalistic attitude of the Laos Mission.

The Locus of Instruction

Leadership training consists of more than developing institutional structures for education. It also includes content. It includes the "message" that those doing the training want to communicate to their students in order to prepare them for leadership. More specifically, it includes the opportunities the mission gave its churches for developing self-reliance in theology. In this section, I assume that the training of church leadership requires a solid, intelligible, and biblical theological base as the locus of instruction. If that base/locus does not exist, the church must fail to be the church.

The Case of Phra Intra

Unfortunately, the historical record is largely silent regarding the beliefs of northern Thai Christians excepting only notable instances where the converts expressed themselves in a manner pleasing to the missionaries. (34) Therefore, it is difficult to recover the actual theological concerns of the first generations of Christian converts. Existing studies and evidence suggests that their theological orientation and values differed from those of the mission. They remained concerned about the world of phi and winyan (spirits) and how to cope with these unseen but powerful beings. (35) In most cases, then, the missionaries did not refer to theological positions differing from their own, and it is difficult to measure closely mission impact on northern Thai theological development.

One intriguing exception to the general silence in mission records regarding indigenous theological ideas in the early northern Thai church is found in Wilson's annual mission report to the Board for 1880. There he mentions one recent convert who had many "fanciful" interpretations of the Bible. In one instance, this convert reportedly claimed that the Hindu god Phra Intra was actually the Angel Gabriel. Somewhat disturbed with this man's unusual ideas about Christian beliefs, Wilson wrote, "...they hardly seem right for him to be saying." Yet, Wilson also noted that the convert's heart was in the right place and that he was an apt learner. Wilson concluded with the thought that the new Christians still had so much to learn and that the mission needed more teachers for them. (36) In short, Wilson's response was one of mild discomfort, bemusement, and dismissal. He saw only a person with insufficient education in Christian faith (a child-like person) that represented a "problem". In this case and more generally, indigenous expressions of Christian faith were discouraged by the mission with the result that it forced the church to rely on the inadequate resources of the mission for its theological instruction and growth. In 1881, the year following Wilson's comments, both he and McGilvary expressed deep concern over the fact that the church did not receive proper instruction. (37) They assumed that both the content of instruction and the instruction itself had to come from the mission, as the church was ignorant, in their view, and could have no voice.

The Case of Evander McGilvary

The matter of developing a "correct" theological expression for the northern Thai church became more complicated when a missionary also showed a certain receptivity to traditional religion. The Rev. Evander B. McGilvary, son of the McGilvayrs, returned to Chiang Mai with his own family in late 1891 to join the mission in order to translate the Bible into northern Thai. He was well received in the mission not only because of his
parents but also for his own abilities. He soon became a useful member of the mission contributing capably as mission treasurer, sometimes pastor of Chiang Mai Church, and as the mission's Bible translator. (38)

Evander's understanding of the Bible, however, led to a crisis over his theological views. Just at the time he came to the field, the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. found itself embroiled in a deep controversy over the nature of Scriptures. On the one hand stood those who held to the inerrancy of the Bible while on the other were those who used higher criticism (historical methods) for studying the Bible. Matters came to a head in the General Assembly of 1893 where the Presbyterian Church again affirmed a previous declaration that the inerrancy of Scriptures was a necessary article of belief for Presbyterians. Evander McGilvary strongly disagreed with that position and submitted his resignation to the Board of Foreign Missions.

He believed that the Bible was not inerrant, not without textual error, and that higher criticism was a proper tool for the interpretation of the Bible. Furthermore, he believed that one did not have to be a Christian in order to be saved. In fact, Evander stated that his language teacher, a deeply committed follower of the Buddha, was saved. He resigned because he could no longer remain, to his own way of thinking, an ordained Presbyterian minister while holding views so opposed to those of the General Assembly.

The Laos Mission and its individual members felt torn about Evander's resignation. No one wanted him to resign. The mission wanted the Bible translated as rapidly as possible, and it needed his help in other tasks as well. Yet, the mission's members worried because Evander's views had become known in the U.S. Although about half of them stated their willingness to back him against any action by General Assembly to remove him from the field, a number feared that his presence might weaken support for the mission in the home churches. Others in the mission worried considerably about his influence over the northern Thai church. The churches supported him and even showed some inclination towards his viewpoint. Wilson feared Evander's influence most strongly and wrote that the churches could not decide such issues as Evander raised for them. It was, he wrote, "wicked" to push such issues on the "unsophisticated Laos." (39) After considerable correspondence, maneuvering, pleading, and confusion, Evander McGilvary and his family left the field in June 1894. (40)

Before the entire affair died down, five members of the Laos Mission signed a joint letter to the Board requesting that it send no more "liberals" to the field for the sake of mission unity. (41) Mission letters related to this case show that while most of the mission professed to respect Evander for his stand and sympathized with his concerns, no one agreed with his theological position. In the entire history of the mission, the only other member known to have held similar views also experienced theological difficulties in the mission. Dr. C. C. Hansen of the Lampang Station had a very positive regard for northern Thai culture and religion. Popular with the Christians in Lampang, his views were disapproved of in the mission, and it is likely that he was not reappointed in 1909 because of those views. (42) In effect, the Laos Mission sought to limit the theological perspectives available to the church to only those that fit under the general rubric of "conservative" and specifically discouraged theological positions that denied the sinfulness of northern Thai society and its traditional religion.

There are certain indications that the church itself felt less uncomfortable with Evander's theology than the missionaries. The correspondence cited above states that the churches supported him and all the Christians wanted him to stay. Nan Ta supported his continued presence on the field. Indeed, Wilson and others worried about the church's susceptibility to such views as Evander held. (43) We have already noted that the Lampang Christian community respected Hansen, for all of his "unacceptable" views. At the very least, it may be concluded that the churches of the 1890s and early 1900s accepted theological diversity and a more positive view of their own culture and its traditional religion more readily than the mission. While every missionary felt torn about Evander's going or staying, the Christian community wholeheartedly, openly supported his staying.

Nowhere is the mission's "theory" of indigenization of theology more clearly seen than in its development of church music. Many of the missionaries had musical talents that they shared with the church. For them, "indigenization" meant taking Western forms, in this case Western church hymns, and translating
them into northern Thai. Otherwise, they assumed without question that Western instruments, musical notation, tunes, and content met the church's needs for its own music. (44) Indigenization meant simple-minded translation.

By now, we should not be surprised that these specific mission attitudes fit in with its larger ideological and ecclesiological positions. It was all very logical: if northern Thai society was "heathen," filled with darkness and under the control of Satan, no ideas taken from it could possibly be of use. Since northern Thai Christians were child-like, they could not possibly contribute anything to theology. The result also fits into the historical processes at work in the northern Thai church. The church became fully dependent upon the mission for formal, systematic theological understanding, but since the mission had so little time for the churches they left the churches mostly in ignorance, without a coherent theological voice.

The Case of the Bible

Dependence on an over-worked, under-staffed, paternalistic mission had serious repercussions on the northern Thai church in another area. The Laos Mission found it difficult to get to translating the Bible and making it available to the churches. Before the founding of the Mission Press, the mission relied on the Siamese Bible and a few hand-copied northern Thai Scripture portions. Since few people in the North could read Siamese, the mission long sought to establish its own northern Thai press. (45) (see Chapter 3).

Although the press began in 1892, it did not publish the first two books of the Bible, Matthew and Acts, until the following year. The primary purpose of the two books was evangelistic, but the missionaries were also delighted to have them for use by church members as well. They filled a longtime need. (46) However, the pace of translation and publication remained slow (see Appendix III), and the whole New Testament did not appear until 1914, at which time Coffins wrote,

At the time of printing this report we are printing 2nd Corinthians which will complete the New Testament in Laos. Perhaps it is not wise to report that it has taken more than twenty years to complete it; due wholly to the fact that our over worked missionaries have had their hands more than full with evangelistic and medical work and the translation of the Scriptures has had to be given a secondary place. (47)

This slow rate of translation meant that churches received the Bible only in fits and snatches, piecemeal as first one book and then another came off the press. Since most of the Scriptures came out printed as single books (or collections of shorter books), converts did not necessarily even obtain all the portions available at any one time.

Consequently, the church remained largely ignorant of the Bible. For example, in 1900 a group of Chiang Rai Christians earnestly searched the seven books of the Bible available to them in northern Thai for a prohibition against drinking alcohol. Finding none, they started drinking, and the church eventually suspended four of them. (48) The dilemma and misadventures of the Chiang Rai group may seem somewhat comic and inconsequential were it not for the fact that Christian groups and churches generally displayed ignorance of the Bible throughout the history of the Laos Mission. Dodd tells of two cases: in the first, a missionary assistant mistakenly used a chapter from the Westminster Confession of Faith thinking it was from the Bible. In the second, one Christian advised another to stop reading storybooks and devote himself to the Bible. The "story book" the first man was reading was the Book of Job. (49)

The mission did not purposefully set out to withhold the Bible from the churches. Considering the circumstances of geography, the problems in establishing the press, and the weight of other commitments, the missionaries did what they could. Yet, because of those circumstances and limitations, the mission could not provide the churches with adequate access to the Bible. Freeman, writing in 1910, admitted that the churches needed more thorough and systematic biblical instruction. However, the pressure of other work on the small Laos mission force prevented it from meeting the need. (50) The crux of this problem (and many others) originated in the mission's insistence that it had to oversee virtually everything. Too busy to translate...too busy
to teach... and, at the last, too busy too busy too busy to show the "natives" how to do for themselves what it could not do for them.

Although after 1914 the mission did give more attention to Bible distribution within the churches and encouraged more Bible study, there is no evidence that their attention and encouragement had appreciable results. (51) Even then, this emphasis came nearly fifty years after the founding of the mission and in the closing years of its existence.

Summary

The northern Thai church was an ignorant church. It lacked access to the Bible. It lacked regular Bible study. It did not know the Bible. It lacked a theological voice of its own. It lacked training in theology. Consequently, what theological expression it had either came from mission or from pre-Christian traditional beliefs. The Laos Mission purposefully limited the theology that the people did hear to one particular Western expression of theology.

Maen Pongudom summarized the situation well in his discussion of the effects of mission attitudes about Thai and northern Thai culture on the church. He concluded that mission attitudes prevented it from cultivating a substantive and effective proclamation of the Gospel and prevented the converts from developing their own theological voice so they could proclaim the Gospel effectively. He wrote, "Consequently, the missionary has imprisoned and dwarfed the Gospel." (52) While stated somewhat polemically, Maen's observation carries weight in light of the historical evidence available. The locus of instruction for church leadership and the laity in general remained firmly in mission hands with a result precisely the opposite of that intended. The mission intended to protect the "purity" of the Gospel from "heathen" influences by dominating the content and the teaching of the Gospel in the North. What it accomplished, in fact, was to prevent the church from discovering its own understanding of the Gospel, thus, leaving it to try to adapt in some vague fashion as best it could beliefs about phi and winyan to what it understood of Christianity.

Conclusion

The fact that impresses me personally the most about Laos Mission leadership training is this: in general education, in medicine, and in technology, the various members of the mission performed near wonders in institution building. They introduced an impressive array of changes in the North. They persevered against all manner of obstacles to establish schools, hospitals, and even a press. The Collins', the Harris', the Campbells' and others were competent administrators. McKean built up a hospital and then established the first leprosarium in Siam. Why was it, then, that this mission with all of this talent and all of these institutions failed to establish a credible, stable program for leadership development and theological education? How was it possible?

Chapter 6

Church and Ministry

Ideologically, the Laos Mission believed that its convert churches could not provide their own leadership without many years of training and guidance by the mission. The leadership training the mission gave to potential church leaders failed because it did not actually train for leadership, because it emphasized evangelism to the exclusion of pastoral skills, because it failed to root the church in the Bible, and because it eschewed theological creativity and balance. The Laos Mission, then, failed to participate in any meaningful way in the late nineteenth century missionary movement's redefinition of the purpose of that movement. Creative missionary thinking shifted from simply spreading Christianity to the establishing of self-propagating, self-supporting, and self-governing indigenous churches in "non-Christian" areas.
This chapter focuses attention on the actual historical development of northern Thai church leadership, especially the clergy, in light of the issues discussed in chapters 4 and 5. Its examination of that development immediately involves us in the larger issues of self-reliance in evangelism, stewardship, and church government. My purpose here is to see how mission ideology and leadership training affected the emergence of indigenous church leadership.

The Pastor's Revolt of 1895

The events of the Pastors' Revolt of 1895 form the most important single complex of events in the history of the northern Thai church since September 1869. Prior to the early 1890s, the church grew without much thought given to planning. The mission showed no concern that the churches either run themselves or have financial responsibility for themselves. But, by 1894 new ideas permeating the international missionary movement began to influence events in northern Siam. The mission itself had grown larger, more complex, and now it entered a time of ferment resulting from the clash between opposing interpretations of how to develop a self-reliant northern Thai church. The importance of these events was that the church and mission came to a fork in the road where the choices were significant change, a break with the past, or continuity, embracing the past.

Nan Ta, who received ordination in 1889 and proved himself to be a capable evangelist and church leader, who impressed and pleased the mission with his work. (1) Some of its members felt a need for more men like him, and in December 1893 the North Laos Presbytery ordained Kru Wong and "licensed" Noi Lin, both students of the Training School, and made them pastors of the Mae Dok Daeng and Wang Mun Churches, respectively. In the meantime, the understaffed Chiang Mai Station, considerably distracted with the Evander McGilvary case, called upon Nan Ta to take over most of the pastoral duties of the Chiang Mai Church while an elder took over the Sunday School. This was the first time that "First Church" found itself almost entirely in northern Thai hands, and the end of 1894 potentially marked the first signs of the emergence of a pastoral system for the northern Thai church. (2)

During 1894, several other men at the Training School prepared for the ordained pastoral ministry. Dodd, who opposed ordaining any more northern Thai, happened to be in the U.S., and Irwin's voice as head of the Training School carried considerable weight in the weakened Laos Mission. Irwin saw that the churches needed pastoral leadership and believed that the best way to get that leadership was to train northern Thai Christians for it since it was their work and responsibility anyway. He also believed that the churches could supply enough men for their own leadership. (3)

Then came the next annual meeting of presbytery in December 1894. According to McGilvary, the presbytery decided to ordain one or two more men, but when they began to select candidates they kept thinking of others nearly as qualified, nearly as ready. Presbytery did not want to discourage or disappoint them, and so it ended up ordaining six more men, for a total of eight, to the ministry while licensing another three. The presbytery assigned all eleven men to pastoral or evangelistic work. (4) It also voted to assess churches pastored by them for part of the salaries of their pastors since it was felt that the churches should begin to be responsible for paying their own pastors. Irwin, who also served as chairman of the Evangelistic Committee at this time, tried to make a number of financial changes in conjunction with placing pastors in the churches. First of all, he and other Chiang Mai missionaries (including McGilvary) visited the churches to explain the need for self-support and create enthusiasm for it. Secondly, Chiang Mai Station sent out a letter to the other stations and churches urging the necessity of self-support. Finally, Irwin reduced the number of paid elder-evangelists and the amount of pay those remaining received. Evidently, in cutting evangelists' pay he also cut off the pay some of the now ordained men received from evangelism, thus making them dependent on the churches for their income. (5)

Without planning or preparation, the Laos Mission and the North Laos Presbytery embarked in December 1894 on a daring experiment. Considering the fact that only Chiang Mai Station showed any
enthusiasm for the experiment while missionaries in the other stations opposed the self-support and self-government movement, (6) things went surprisingly well. For his work in 1894 as "assistant" pastor (though with full responsibility), Nan Ta received a promotion to the office of "co-pastor" of Chiang Mai Church. Seven of the nine men assigned their own churches did well enough to be reassigned to the same churches for 1896. Some of the churches, however, did not respond as well in terms of financial support—although Mae Dok Daeng did pay half of Kru Wong's salary and Chiang Mai paid all of Nan Ta's. (7) Under the influence of Irwin in Lamphun, the Lamphun, Bethel, and Wang Mun Churches all supported their own pastors in 1896; and even smaller groups in the area pledged to join together and support pastors. Even after Irwin left Lamphun in 1895, both the Lamphun and Bethel Churches sustained their own pastoral leadership until 1899. (8)

Throughout 1895, however, an undercurrent of unrest built up among the pastors and their churches, and as the year went along Irwin became more and more isolated from important elements in the mission and the church. First of all, he ran into trouble with McGilvary over the issue of paid evangelists. McGilvary felt that Irwin had gone too far and too fast and in one or two cases had been unfair about cutting evangelists' salaries and reducing the number getting salaries. At the same time, both the northern Thai pastors and the churches were uneasy and unhappy. The pastors felt they did not get enough pay. The churches felt they had to pay too much. And just to make things all the more exciting, the champions of the go-slow faction in the mission, Dodd and Collins, both returned from furloughs. Thus, the Laos Mission itself fragmented into two groups: Irwin and a group of younger and less influential missionaries (Campbell, Denman, and Freeman among them) against the strong voices of the second generation missionaries including especially Dodd, Collins, and Taylor. McGilvary vaguely sided with Irwin, but he displayed less enthusiasm for the changes Irwin sought.

Robert Irwin

Four issues rendered the "deliberations" of presbytery at its annual meeting in 1895 nearly chaotic. One, the northern Thai pastors demanded salaries of thirty baht per month, twice or more their current salaries. Two, the churches refused to pay these salaries although some churches did not object to doing so voluntarily. Three, a number of missionaries expressed anger with Chiang Mai Station for its letter on self-support arguing that Chiang Mai had improperly usurped power in sending it. Four, Irwin's opposition sought to reinstate the old paid evangelists system.

And an amazing thing happened: the eight pastors, with the full support of the eight organized churches, pushed through two motions in the presbytery meeting over the negative votes of the missionaries: first of all, they voted higher salaries for the pastors. Secondly, they voted that the churches could not be forced to pay those salaries, effectively shifting the burden over to the mission. It was a revolution and the only instance in which the churches and their leaders ever took a stand against the missionaries publicly. Eventually, the presbytery appointed a committee of elders and missionaries chaired by Collins to straighten out matters, and the committee arranged compromises on the matter of pastors' salaries (raised, but not as high as wanted) and on paid evangelists (reinstated). Irwin himself played little role in the meeting, as he was quite ill and weakened.
by fatigue. The vigor of Dodd and Collins, just back from furlough and in good health, dominated most of the meetings. (9)

Subsequent correspondence with the Board (which supported Irwin) voiced a number of criticisms of Irwin as his opponents sought to explain what had happened. They wrote that Irwin forced pastors on the churches and then forced the churches to pay for them. They argued that Irwin worked too fast and that the whole scheme for getting pastors into the churches had been only the idea of missionaries. They argued that he upset both the churches and the pastors, none of whom understood what he expected of them. (10)

An evaluation of the event suggests that the matter was more complex than stated in these criticisms. The presbytery meeting of December 1894 involved no coercion of anyone either in the matter of ordaining pastors or calling on the churches to pay for those pastors. The meeting enthusiastically endorsed the former and accepted the latter. The evidence suggests that the events of 1894 when so many were ordained or licensed did not result from Irwin's "planning" them. Rather, having taken such relatively drastic steps as ordaining men and placing them in churches, Irwin seems to have tried to preserve those gains while also making other changes. He knew that the strongest voices in opposition to his views were absent and that the time he had to effect change was limited. He had only a limited amount of time, and it seems that he used that time for all it was worth.

However, Irwin may be charged with not playing the game wisely. By pushing self-support in which the churches had to pay for their pastors and cutting off the funds of the elder-evangelists at the same time, he greatly weakened his standing with church leaders, the leaders from whom he needed support. Irwin must have known from his experience in Lamphun that the churches could have pastors and pay for them - it was not a matter of asking them to do the impossible. He was unwise in confusing the matter of self-government and self-support at the local church level with the touchy issue of paid evangelists, a matter of deep concern not only to the evangelists but also to most of the missionaries, people committed to winning converts in numbers. Thus, the issues of self-government and self-support became confused and entangled with other matters that obscured the possibility of self-reliance that Irwin pursued.

As for the other criticisms of Irwin, it is difficult to take them seriously. Every missionary agreed with Irwin's objective of a self-reliant church. Normally, they did not object to pursuing goals of their own without consulting the churches, and the criticism of Irwin that he pursued plans not wanted by the churches rings very hollow in this mission. The whole matter came down, finally, to trust and timing: Irwin believed the churches could be more self-reliant and should be so immediately. Dodd and the dominant voices of the mission believed they could not and should not.

In view of all of this, it is worth noting again that in those churches Irwin worked with personally, the Lamphun churches, considerable progress in financial self-reliance and the creation of a pastoral system took place. The weight of historical evidence consistently supports Irwin's trust and his sense of timing.

The Myth of the Incompetent Pastors

In spite of the fact that Irwin failed to bring about radical changes in northern Thai church history at the time of the Pastors' Revolt, the event itself proved to be a key event in the history of the church, a key "non-turning" point if you will. For out of the event and its aftermath a myth spread about the pastoral abilities of the men ordained in December 1894. Hence, the Pastors' Revolt dominated mission thinking about developing northern Thai leadership for years afterwards.

The "myth" (I use the word in the popular sense) claimed that all of the ones ordained in 1893-1894 failed as pastors and soon gave up pastoral work and active ministry. Speer quoted Laos Mission members as claiming that within a year of placing those men in churches their pastoral relationships had to be dissolved—that is, at the time of the Pastors' Revolt. (11) Commenting on Kru Chai Ma's failure with the Khamu (see Chapter
3), the Lampang Station Report observed that his moral lapse, "serves as an index of the Laos character and invites caution in developing and using the weak material at our command." (12) Fourteen years later one missionary commented on the events of 1894-1895 by saying that, "Experience has shown that there are no Lao men as yet competent to be made pastors." (13)

We have already seen that as one consequence of the events of 1894-1895 serious theological training lapsed for sixteen years. Was the reaction of the mission to those events and their aftermath warranted? Did that reaction reflect reality? It will serve us well here to briefly look at the careers of the seven pastors ordained in 1893 and 1894.

*Kru Wong*...served Mae Dok Daeng as pastor/stated supply for three years, but he had to leave because of problems with the church, namely, he did very little pastoral visitation. He went to Nan to work with Irwin and started the Christian community at Muang Thoeng where he became embroiled in controversy (see Chapter 3). Inactive from 1903, he retired to Chae Hom and sometimes helped the Christian community there. (14)

*Kru Lin*...served at Wang Mun for four years, but he did very little work and the people disliked him. He later assisted Dodd in the Kengtung Station for a while, but he was largely inactive from 1898 until his death in 1910. A greedy man, he caused the mission headaches with his demands for help when he migrated with a small group of Christians from Lamphun to the Wiang Pa Pow Church in 1901. (15)

*Kru Chai Ma* (from Bethlehem Church)...performed ably as an evangelist under the Lampang Station and as an assistant pastor for the Lampang Church for five years. He disappeared from mission records entirely after his "lapse" among the Khamu in 1901. (16) [It turns out, as I learned later, that Kru Chai Ma stayed on with the Khamu after his infamous "lapse," and the mission did lose all track of him until the 1920s, when it resumed contact with the Khamu. It discovered that he had continued to work as a pastor among the Khamu for all of those years, and one article published in the Presbyterian press in the United States described him as "faithful" and "competent.' See *Presbyterian Magazine* 33 (November 1927), 616.]

*Kru Pook*...served as a very capable pastor at Bethlehem Church and in later years as an evangelist for Chiang Mai Station. When Kru Pook died in 1912, missionaries praised him for his excellence as a pastor and evangelist. (17) Oddly enough, no one commented that his abilities and personality served as an "index" of the "Laos character" as had been said (above) of the lapsed Chai Ma.

*Kru Supa*...worked as an excellent, irreplaceable pastor at Bethel Church until he died in 1900. Although he had his share of problems at Bethel, Kru Supa overcame them to do commendable work and proved himself an invaluable asset in the Lamphun area churches. (18)

*Kru Pannya*...had some trouble finding himself as a pastor at first. Eventually, he became the outstanding assistant pastor at Chiang Mai Church and an instructor in the Theological Training School. In both of these capacities, he received fulsome praise for the quality of his work, and for a time he took up the mantle of Nan Inta and Nan Ta as the single most important northern Thai leader in the church. (19)

*Kru Chai Ma* (from Mae Dok Daeng Church)....had his problems at first, as well. After a year at Chiang Rai, he moved to the Muang Phrao area to work with the Chiang Da Church, but he soon lost interest when the church did not pay his salary. However, in about 1901 Chiang Mai Station began to employ him for work in the Chiang Dao-Muang Phrao area, and as the years went by this elderly man became an increasingly capable and respected pastor. (20)

These were not the men of the myth, but, rather, older men ordained into the pastoral ministry without pastoral training for churches that had no heritage of having pastors and often did not want to pay them. In spite of all of these limitations, they proved themselves able pastors more often than not. Campbell, who witnessed the events of 1895 as a young missionary, commented twenty years later that the mission put these men in
churches and left them there with no visits, counsel, or support from the mission. He concluded that with greater mission support a pastoral system could have been made to work in 1895. (21) The weight of his testimony becomes all the more conclusive when we consider that the three men licensed to preach in 1895 all proved to be capable pastors, particularly Kru Chailangka. (22) If to this little pot of bubbling leadership we add the many years of service of Nan Ta, we find that out of eleven ordained and licensed men only three proved to be failures as pastors while at least five proved to be from good to outstanding local church pastors.

We now begin to see the depths to which Laos Mission ideology and ecclesiology went: it so rigidly defined the church as child-like that it could not see the plain reality in front of it. And that is prejudice, which is precisely one of the points of this study: that the Laos Mission prejudged the northern Thai church as child-like and, therefore, incompetent, when the facts did not warrant that judgment. Robert Speer, on his official Board visit in 1915, confessed himself "dumbfounded" by this prejudice. He stated that he did not accept, on the basis of Board experience in other mission churches, the statement that the "Laos" could not raise up a capable ordained clergy. He found the mission's belief that it would have to run the church for another fifty to one hundred years "disconcerting." The elimination of pastoral leadership in northern Siam deeply troubled him since such leadership was a source of strength for other "native" churches. (23) In point of historical fact, Speer had reason for his doubts. The possibility of capable pastoral leadership was there. The mission, simply, failed to accept its existence.

The Myth of the Improvident Churches

The Pastors' Revolt of 1895 had serious repercussions for the development of pastoral ministry in northern Siam. It also initiated the debate over how the mission could get the churches to take more financial responsibility for themselves. When Irwin began pushing pastors for the churches, he linked with it the idea that the churches should support those pastors. Irwin tried to move even further down the road of self-support when he cut off the paid evangelists, again, arguing that the churches and not the mission should take responsibility for the evangelists. The principle of self-support transformed itself into a debate over means and timing. Appropriately enough, it also gave birth to another long cherished myth.

According to that myth, the mission claimed (and believed) that it had "tried" the Nevius Plan, an advanced program for ecclesiastical and Christian institutional self-support, and it failed. Writing fifty years after the fact, Taylor misremembered many of the events of the Pastors' Revolt of 1895 while contending that the Laos Mission in 1894-1895 tried the Nevius Plan with the result that mission work came to a "stand-still" for a decade. By claiming that the Nevius Plan did not work in the North, he actually meant that the mission tried to institute financial self-support and failed. They felt that the reason they failed was that the churches were not "ready" for self-support. (24)

"We tried the Nevius Plan and it failed." This statement betrays a fundamental misunderstanding both of the "Nevius Plan" and actual events in the North. Briefly, the "Nevius Plan" resulted from the work and writing of John L. Nevius, a Presbyterian missionary in China, who in 1885 began publishing his ideas for changing mission work. He became influential in missionary circles, particularly among American Presbyterians, and the best known application of his principles was in Korean Presbyterian missions. Nevius proposed four fundamental goals for mission work: one, missions should keep their churches from depending upon the missions financially; two, missions should emphasize Bible study and Christian education using more knowledgeable Christians to teach the less knowledgeable ones; three, missions should not establish foreign systems of church government and church work; and four, missions should work to improve the economic life/independence of the churches. Nevius did not say that missions should not have paid evangelists although he himself tried to limit the numbers hired. He did support the idea of the churches paying their own pastors when they themselves decided that they wanted pastors. (25)

In fact, the Laos Mission never applied the "Nevius Plan" in any systematic way although its principles did influence some of the actions of the mission. The rationale behind self-support as pursued by the mission
and as outlined by Nevius were quite different. Where Nevius emphasized self-support in all facets of church life and especially in Christian education and the Bible, the Laos Mission saw self-support only as a matter of finances. That misunderstanding, however, did not lessen the intensity of the debate between Irwin and his opponents in the mission. For, once again, the matter came down to one of timing. Irwin sought immediate change while Dodd, Collins, Taylor, and others argued for a gradual approach that educated the churches first and won their consent for self-support. (26)

It is unlikely, in light of later events, that the majority approach of "gradualism" would have made much headway. However, events overseas now intervened: during the 1890s the American economy fluctuated considerably so that by 1897 the Board found it necessary to cut mission budgets. At first, many of the missionaries in northern Siam expressed considerable alarm over the heavy reduction they experienced, but within a short time most of them showed a more positive attitude. The budget cuts had forced the mission to spend less money on paid evangelists and direct local church support with the result that the churches had to take on more financial responsibility for themselves. (27) Particularly in the matter of paid evangelists, the mission adopted a stringent policy of limiting them to one per station, and more generally it greatly reduced the number of mission employees. (28)

However, the mission's enthusiasm for fiscal self-support did not last very long. The mainspring of the drive to return to the good old days of numerous mission employees came from the mistaken impression that volunteer evangelism could not win as many converts as paid evangelism. Dr. Peoples, writing in 1903, claimed that the policy of limited paid evangelism instituted in 1897 was "suicidally parsimonious", and as a result, he requested that year's annual meeting to reverse the policy by allowing him two paid evangelists for Nan. A special committee deliberated on the issue and came out in favor of increasing the numbers of paid evangelists as did another special committee appointed in 1905. (29)

One person, at least, objected to the widespread sentiment to return to the system of mission paid evangelists. In 1904, when the movement back was just beginning, Dr. Briggs pointed out that the mission was about to make a serious mistake in changing its policy because it was bypassing the churches. He felt that the responsibility for evangelism should be in the churches and that the mission should only assist the churches with supplemental funds. They should pay the evangelists they hired themselves. Briggs also concluded that the whole concept of mission paid evangelists violated the principle of self-government by perpetuating the church's subservience to the mission. (30)

Nevertheless, the mission did gradually shift back to the paid evangelist system and in the process quietly dropped the whole push for self-support. After 1900, mission records hardly mention the matter at all for more than a decade. In 1909, Briggs concluded with some discouragement that the larger issue of self-support would have to wait for at least another generation as the churches were just not prepared for it. Bachtell in Chiang Rai commented in 1916 that the whole idea of self-support was a new one for the northern Thai church. After 1900 the only one who remained committed to the goal of self-support in practice was Irwin who worked towards that goal in Nan and then Phrae. (31)

The retreat from fiscal self-support for the churches reflected the Laos Mission's primary commitment to evangelism, that is, to the converting of large numbers of non-Christians. The fear expressed by Peoples and Taylor (above) and widely believed in the mission was that unless the mission paid for its evangelism the churches would not engage in it and the numbers would cease. In point of fact, a number of missionaries in the 1890s had pointed out that paid evangelism actually discouraged the church from taking responsibility for evangelism because most Christians saw it as a profession, one they did not get paid for and therefore did not engage in. The paid evangelists (usually elders) themselves discouraged others from doing "free" evangelism and often showed that they worried more about numbers than the quality of conversions of those numbers. (32) On the other hand, the missionaries themselves observed (in other contexts) that most new Christian groups came into existence through the (unpaid) efforts of converts who took their new faith home with them or Christians who moved into a new village. (33)
Yet the belief persisted that paid evangelism worked better. Campbell wrote in 1913 that the accumulated experience of the mission proved the wisdom of hiring paid evangelists in numbers. (34) This in spite of the fact that mission statistics indicate that in the period 1899 to 1902, after the brief dip in church growth immediately after the Pastor’s Revolt, the churches grew at a rate of 6.4% per year without paid evangelists. In the period 1904 to 1910, after the restoration of the paid evangelism system the churches grew at a lower rate of 5.7%. And the best year for church growth of that period was 1904 when the system had not yet been widely reinstated. (See Appendix II. 1903 is not included because it was a year of serious political instability when conversions dropped sharply. The period after 1910 is also not discussed here because it was a special case. See Chapter 8). While these statistics may not be taken as conclusive, what they do suggest is that no firm evidence for the relative merits of paid evangelism could be taken from actual church growth rates. Indeed, those rates suggested that volunteer evangelism equaled or bettered the numerical rates of church growth of paid evangelism.

It was not a coincidence that the "movement" for self-support lost its steam as the mission reinstated paid evangelism in 1903 and afterwards. The mission felt it could not entrust the churches with evangelism. It also felt that the churches showed little inclination towards supporting themselves more generally. Thus, once again the mission took action to preserve its major concern, evangelism, while acquiescing to the churches' passivity in the matter of self-reliance. The majority in the mission was not willing to sacrifice its conversion rate for a self-governing, self-supporting, self-propagating church because it feared that the sacrifices needed for the latter would destroy the former. Push evangelism! Go slow on the rest! Again, the results of this policy of putting other matters before the life of the church resulted in ultimately frustrating the goals of the mission. The evangelism-over-all policy resulted in, among other negative repercussions, a church that could not sustain evangelism.

Nevertheless, the myths of the incompetent pastors and the improvident churches remained firmly in the minds of a generation of Laos Mission missionaries. The power of the myths was that they confirmed the mission’s adherence to structures and procedures that remained unchanged as a result.

**Regional Church & Regional Ministry**

Take a core sample of the northern Thai church: Lampang, 1911. The Christians of Lampang Station were organized into two churches, the Lampang Church and the newly founded (1910) Muang Yao Church. The Revs. C.R. Callender and H.S. Vincent served as co-pastors of the city church while its six elders and two deacons functioned as "an efficient board of advisors." The two pastors were just initiating a new scheme by which the two full-time

and three part-time evangelists employed by the station would itinerate through four circuits of villages where the church had members. In addition, the station would continue to send out leaders from the city to lead worship in the various rural groups. During the year, Kru Nan Ti and Elder Noi Kwang from Chiang Mai spent some time working with the rural groups of the church, and Kru Nan Ti proved especially helpful at Chae Hom (under Vincent) where the station planned to establish another church. In addition to these and other native assistants, Kru Noi Wong of the Muang Yao Church, just ordained, also worked with the station. Since he was heavily engaged in itinerating evangelistic work, he spent very little time with his home church. In fact, he spent about six months of 1911 working in Phrae with the church there because they had no resident missionaries. His work was reported to be very good wherever he went. (35)

This core sample indicates that a regional ministry grew up to serve the "regional church" describes the main features of that ministry:

+ church leadership proceeded from the center, the station and its "city church," outward. Thus, the urban Christian community dominated the rural communities. Church leadership, including pastoral leadership,
was sent to churches rather than called by the churches. The churches passively accepted those sent rather than actively supported those called.

+ at the very center of the urban center stood the missionary pastor-evangelist in whom was vested all authority over the Christian communities. The session of the city church functioned as merely an advisory body while those who visited the churches as quasi-pastors were employees of the station. All real power rested in the hands of the missionaries.

+ the model for church leadership and pastoral care came from that of the itinerating evangelist-missionary who moved from community to community.

+ the system removed capable local leaders, such as Kru Noi Wong, from their local churches and gave them itinerating assignments while failing to fill the leadership "breach" left by the absence of a capable local leader.

This system had two important consequences for the churches: first of all, it encouraged dependency on the mission and the city churches for formal leadership and effective program. Secondly, it did not localize the church, which remained, for all practical purposes, institutionally and structurally an amorphous conglomerate of disconnected, scattered small groups.

The regional church system had its roots in the very early days of the church when the missionaries traveled widely, established scattered groups of converts, and often trained convert assistants by taking them along on their evangelistic trips. Always the mission had to work from the center outwards. When new groups of inquirers appeared it served them by sending out elders, and by the mid-1880s the habits of itineration and centralization of authority had taken hold so that when Nan Ta "joined" the mission team he was assigned evangelistic work on the model of the itinerating missionary. The mission's habit of using elders for itinerant evangelism only served to strengthen the system. (36) The model became increasingly institutionalized in the 1890s, and in 1900 Dodd very aptly described pastoral work as involving a great deal of horseback riding. (37)

Because of its incorporation into the regional ministry system rather than remaining a purely local church office, the office of elder developed into a surprisingly complex position. When it became apparent that a pastoral system was not emerging in the church, many of the duties and functions of the pastoral office, sometimes including observing the sacraments, fell to the local elders even as they also often worked as itinerant evangelists. It has even been argued that a system where local elders served as de-facto pastors, "...harmonized with the social structures under which the people lived." (38) In fact, the elders did not evolve into pastor-like figures partly because they lacked pastoral training but also because the regional ministry system co-opted many of the best for work away from the local church. By the mid-1890s, the mission hired significant numbers of elders for itinerating evangelism, and by 1905 large numbers of them had been incorporated into the itinerating vaccinator-evangelist program of the Chiang Mai Hospital. (39)

The regional ministry model came to fruition in the ministry of Howard Campbell, pastor of the Chiang Mai Church. He developed a team-ministry approach in which he served as senior pastor and supervisor to a team of elders and clergymen. In 1908, for example, the two northern Thai clergymen assigned to the church plus four elders served under him - three in city work and three in rural work. Campbell not only itinerated but also gave much time to counseling and conferring with this team. It was typical of the regional ministry model that he spent about one-third of his time away from Chiang Mai. (40)

From about 1900 onwards, the few remaining northern Thai clergymen became fully incorporated into the regional ministry system so that they too worked mostly in itinerating situations based in the urban centers. (41) In sum, the regional ministry created an urban clergy responsible to the mission and distant from the local rural Christian communities. The ordained ministry existed apart from the churches. It was evangelistic in form rather than pastoral.
By the late 1910s, the institutional structures of the Laos Mission, educational and medical, received most of the mission's attention. All members of the Chiang Mai Station except Campbell, for example, were directly and deeply involved in institutional work. (42) The churches received far less attention. There was, in the closing years of the Laos Mission, no effective attempt nor even any will to attempt to correct the inadequacies of the regional church-regional ministry complex. Therefore, the northern Thai churches remained dependent on outside, foreign, and urban leadership.

Therefore, the northern Thai churches did not develop a tradition or system of strong *local* leadership. The elders and pastors were continually being drawn off to do work other than church work. The direction of "church" leadership was away from the church.

Did it have to be this way? The events in Phrae after 1900 give some interesting insights into the answer to that question.

**The Self-Governing Church in Phrae**

Phrae Station opened in 1893, and for the next ten years it went understaffed and suffered through numerous personnel changes and some very difficult interpersonal tensions. It acquired a reputation as the weakest station in the mission, one that added numbers to its church only slowly. The Phrae Church in 1903 had just 151 members that were scattered widely across the countryside. (43)

In 1904, the mission transferred Irwin to Phrae, and he immediately moved to turn it into an experiment in his confidence in northern Thai church leadership. For a number of reasons, it looked as though the mission might have to close the station, thus Irwin saw that he had an opportunity to prepare the church to run its own life. He started by placing all administrative responsibility for the church in the hands of the Session, improving the church's oversight of local rural groups by having them select their own heads, and turning himself into merely an advisor to the Session. (44)

During the first year of the experiment (ending June 1905), Irwin felt that the Session did a reasonably good job of running the church. The elders shared in pastoral duties, and even though the rest of the mission predicted that the church could not run itself even for such a short time, things worked out well. The elders were all now able to lead worship and preach, and since all of the ones he had chosen to share in pastoral work had temple religious training he felt sure they could take on this added responsibility. He was sure of success. When the Session asked him to please take back full responsibility for the church, he refused and merely gave them suggestions for improving their administration of the church. (45)
He felt particularly proud of the church when, in a unique departure from standard procedures in other stations, the church itself conceived the idea for an all-member convention (then popular in other stations, see Chapter 7) and organized the entire matter without him. Even the question box, usually the preserve of the missionary, was handled by an elder. Irwin felt the church coming alive. (46) The Session made mistakes, of course, such as when it set up a "permanent trading fund" for church members to borrow from and promptly ran out of money, or when the Session set up a school with insufficient funds. The elders clearly did not want as much responsibility and authority as Irwin gave them, but when pressed again to take it back he again refused. (47)

In December 1905, the mission closed the Phrae Station, and Irwin returned to the U.S. where he resigned from the mission for reasons of health. Phrae became an out-station of Lampang with Roderick Gillies in nominal charge of the church. Gillies appointed one elder, with permission to administer the sacraments, head of the church. The church was not very happy about all of this claiming that the mission had "orphaned" it. (48) But, for the next year, 1906, things went along fairly well with Nan Chi serving as moderator of the church and the Session fully responsible for all aspects of its life. Two problems did arise: the Session largely ignored the village groups; and it proved difficult for the Session to discipline church members without a missionary to back them up. The church pleaded for the missionaries to come back. Margaret Gillies, after a visit to Phrae, expressed an opinion of the church quite different from that of Irwin. She pitied the poor people; they acted like sheep without a shepherd. Yet, she did note that they seemed to do a good job on their own in spite of it all. (49)

Yet, by 1907 Roderick Gillies and the rest of the mission were convinced that the Phrae experiment had already failed and regretted that the mission had ever "abandoned" Phrae. Previously convinced that the experiment could not have worked, the mission now laid plans to reopen the Phrae Station before, as some feared, the church there died. (50) The whole matter took on urgency when it seemed in 1908 that things were rapidly deteriorating in Phrae. Two more elders quit the church (one had already left previously) and village work remained totally neglected. But, then, reports from Phrae in 1909 showed that the situation had stabilized with Nan Chi, Ai ("Elder brother") Loom, and their wives showing themselves increasingly capable leaders. They still eagerly awaited the promised return of the missionaries; yet, the condition of the church was improved with women's work being particularly strong. (51)

For a brief five months in 1910, the Callenders re-opened the Phrae Station, but they soon had to leave. The station remained closed. The pace of renewal at Phrae did not suffer, and in 1911 the church had its best year yet made even better with the assistance of the very able Kru Noi Wong from Lampang who spent six months with the church. Not only did the church grow by 31 members, it also established its own boarding school under Noi Chun. (52) Never had the church itself been stronger or more active than in 1911.

Finally, the mission reopened the Phrae Station in 1912 with two families assigned to it. According to the record, all of the problems the station faced and dealt with during its first year had to do with station administration, buildings and grounds, and medical and educational work. It had to find a new site for the station, build new buildings, and reestablish institutional work. On the other hand, church renewal, the justification for reopening the station, received very little attention. (53)

At first things seemed to go exceedingly well, as the church increased rapidly because of the medical work of the station during a period of intense epidemic. Growth was rapid enough so that the church group at Ban Pa Pung was constituted as a full church with 95 members in May 1914. Things were not quite as rosy as they seemed, however, and Marie Parks expressed considerable discouragement in 1915: firstly, most of the new converts had been more interested in medicine than religion and showed little interest in spiritual matters; secondly, because of mismanagement of funds the station was left without money for evangelistic, educational, or medical work. An article in the Laos News, "official" magazine of the mission, indicated that the Phrae Church and especially the Ban Pa Pung Church both suffered for want of good leadership. Meanwhile, the station largely ignored its two churches because of its heavy load of institutional and administrative work. (54) Events over the next four years proved Parks' discouragement well founded, and by 1920 the situation had
gotten nearly out of hand as the Phrae families were reassigned to open the Chiang Rung (Yunnan, China) Station and temporary replacements had to be brought in. (55)

Irwin's experiment at Phrae was the only instance in which a missionary consciously prepared a church for and gave responsibility for its own government. The conditions of his experiment were not encouraging. The Phrae Church was weak to begin with and showed no enthusiasm for self-government. Irwin had only two years to work with the church, and for six months of the period he was incapacitated by illness. Furthermore, the other members of the mission did not expect the experiment to succeed and did not really support it. Gillies, one of those skeptical from the beginning, was assigned to look out after the church from his post in Lampang. Thus, Irwin's experiment had to be carried out in the weakest station of the mission, with the weakest church around, and in a general atmosphere of skepticism. It was a formula for failure if ever there was one.

All of these liabilities make the results of the experiment all the more convincing as the record indicates that by 1911 the Phrae Church had made good progress towards self-government. It grew. It developed its own leadership and its own program. The church's situation may not have been greatly exciting in 1911, but it was encouraging. Yet, one missionary commented on that situation to the effect of how much better it would have been, as good as it was, if missionaries had been present! Acknowledging that "native" leadership had performed acceptably, the missionary still assumed that anything the church could do the missionaries could do better. (56)

Given what actually happened in Phrae, the proposition that the missionaries could run local churches better than local church leadership is hard to accept. What happened was that the missionaries confused the Phrae Church's desire to be irresponsible with what it could actually do on its own. Where Irwin gently refused to allow the Phrae Church to use him as a convenience, the rest of the mission took the plaintive cries from the church for missionary leadership at their face value. They believed that those cries proved the necessity of missionary leadership. The record described above shows that the mission, in actual fact, could not lead the Phrae Church better than the church could lead itself. Perhaps, rather, I should say that even poorly trained lay leadership given the opportunity to lead proved to be better than mission "leadership" because the missionaries ignored the church. Between illness, personnel changes, building up the physical plant, and running the institutions, the station had no time left for the church. (57) Again and again, the pattern of the Laos Mission was that it prevented the emergence of indigenous leadership while failing to exercise that leadership itself.

Conclusion

Self-propagating. Self-supporting. Self-governing. The ideals. One of those patterns in the records of the Laos Mission that eventually sinks in to the researcher thus betraying an underlying tendency in the mission is this: when members of the mission wrote about these three ideals of self-reliance they frequently dropped the last one. They wrote of the goal of a self-propagating and self-supporting church, that is, a truncated "Two-self" movement. (58) The Laos Mission vigorously avoided doing those things which might actually have resulted in a more self-reliant northern Thai church. Had it not been for Irwin, the historian might draw this conclusion with less certainty. His ministry in Lamphun, in Nan, and in Phrae provided clear evidence for what the northern Thai church could have been given a different mission environment.
Part III - Reaping

The aim of the Church is not to *win* the world, but rather to identify with the world, even to loose itself in the world, in such a way as to bring nearer the kingdom in which the distinction of Church and world will be lost. What is important is the manifesting and propagating of Christ's self-giving love, and the awakening of this in ever wider areas of human society.

John Macquarrie

*Principles of Christian Theology* (1966), pp. 40, 51

Chapter 7

The Retrenched Decade (1901-1910)

After the tumult of the 1890s, the first decade of the new century turned out to be relatively quiet for the northern Thai church and for the Laos Mission. In the 1890s, the mission wrestled with divisive issues such as self-support, self-government, and paid evangelists. While the mission did opt for some changes after 1900, those changes turned out to be short-term ones. The deeper channels of the mission flowing out of the 1870s and 1880s continued on much as they had in the past. Church-mission relationships did not change. The era 1900-1909 became a decade of "confirmation" in which all of the non-changes and the old patterns entrenched themselves more deeply in church and mission.

The regional church-regional ministry pattern was confirmed by the failure to train or ordain new clergymen and by reinstating the paid evangelist system. Membership in the churches grew by 70% from 2257 members in 1899 to 3821 members in 1909, but only three new churches were constituted with the consequence that the church found itself more regionalized and less localized than ever. The mission itself did not grow: there were 42 missionaries assigned to it in 1899 and 43 in 1909. (1) In fact, unusual amounts of illness made these hard year for the mission. Only in the development of the medical and educational institutions did it seem to make progress.

How little had changed may be seen from the fact that the burning issue throughout the decade had nothing to do with church in the North as such. The expansionist ideology continued to be as strong as in the 1890s, but now the focus had shifted to a new phase: the greater Tai race beyond Siam. (2)

The Expansionist Ideology Again: The Kengtung Question (3)

In the late 1890s, both the Presbyterians in northern Siam and the Baptists in Burma evinced an interest in the Kengtung State, one of the Shan States in eastern Burma. Each denomination believed that God called their church to work there. As might be expected, the chief advocate for expanding the Laos Mission work into Kengtung State was Dodd. Briggs, a fellow member of the Chiang Rai Station, gave his staunch support to Dodd's vision.

They argued that the mission was not called simply to the "Tai" people of northern Siam but rather to the greater Tai race throughout the heartland of Asia. Their argument grew out of the vision inspired by the long tour taken by McGilvary and Irwin in 1893 into Kengtung State. The prospect of opening work there excited
Irwin to the extent that he offered to go himself, but the matter came into doubt when the Laos Mission learned that the American Baptist Burma Mission planned to open a station in Kengtung. Irwin's reaction: fine, give the place to the Baptists. Dodd and Briggs, however, rejected that response and urged the Board to move into the area quickly before the Baptists. The Presbyterians, they claimed, could do a much better job there.

From that time onwards, the "Kengtung faction" consistently and frequently called for establishing a Kengtung Station. The mission was more divided. For example, when Dodd took the opportunity of a furlough in 1894 to lobby for Kengtung with the Board in New York, letters from the field showed considerable resistance to expanding at that time. Most felt Kengtung expansion was a good idea but the mission simply could not undertake yet another station. (4) Over the next eight years the issue came up frequently but nothing happened.

Finally, in 1903 Dodd again visited the U.S. on furlough, and this time he convinced the Board to approve opening a Kengtung Station. He returned to the field in early 1904 with great enthusiasm and with reinforcements for the new station. Several other mission members still expressed their doubts. The problem also arose that the Baptists actually did open a mission station in Kengtung in 1901. Nevertheless, the new two-family station opened in 1904 with every indication of success. At first, Baptist-Presbyterian relations were cordial; however, strains in the relationship quickly led to open antagonism. The Baptists wanted the Presbyterians out! In 1904, 1905, and again in 1907, the Kengtung Question was the major issue discussed in the annual mission meeting. Dodd and his supporters fought a strong rear-guard action against those on the Board and in the mission who wanted to close down the station. (5)

The Board finally did order the station closed in 1908 citing financial problems and the comity issue as the reasons. Even prior to this, McGilvary wrote New York to say that he personally felt the mission was working against Providence in the matter of Kengtung. The Dodds, deeply disturbed, moved back to Chiang Rai but kept Presbyterian work alive in Kengtung by making visits there and sending Chiang Rai elders over regularly. (6)

Dodd did not give up his dream for expanding the work into Burma, China, and French Indochina. His next move came in 1910 when he made a remarkable thousand-mile journey from Chiang Rai through Kengtung and Yunnan to Canton, China, surveying the extent of the Tai ethnic groups in that vast territory. He then proceeded on to America where in early 1911 he gave a rousing presentation of his findings to the Board. For a brief moment, he had the full and enthusiastic attention of the Board for this new, vast, and totally untouched mission field, and the Laos Mission indulged itself in laying grandiose schemes for 25 new stations and 560 missionaries to evangelize the Tai race. (7) More to the point, Dodd argued that this vast scheme and all further plans for expansion hinged on the reoccupation of Kengtung.

But, then, the months dragged out into years. The old problems of money and the Baptists remained. More reams of correspondence and slavishly prepared and minutely documented reports only wasted more time. The Board lost its enthusiasm for the Tai race. In those heady years of global missionary expansion, China, Korea, and the Philippines excited a greater response than the backward, difficult to reach, and apparently unimportant Tai race. Finally, in June 1913 the Board decided that all Presbyterian work in Kengtung must be closed or turned over to the Baptists. At the same time, it gave permission for opening a station in Chiang Rung, Yunnan Province, China when funds became available. The Laos Mission majority by this time had caught the Dodd-Briggs vision of the greater Tai mission and, consequently, felt intensely disappointed in the Board's decision. Long after 1913, the mission still held on to contacts with its former converts in Kengtung State. (8)

As one of the goals the mission pursued for its churches after 1900, it tried to involve the churches in "foreign" missions. Irwin encouraged such involvement in the Training School (see Chapter 5). The Lampang Church showed especial interest in Khamu work. The mission now encouraged the churches to provide financial support with the aim not only of supporting the Kengtung work but also of promoting the church's own evangelistic outreach. (9)
Even so, the impact of this extra-Siam phase of mission expansion was mostly negative. First of all, incredible amounts of time went into an imposing array of surveys and reports "proving" that the Presbyterians had a better claim to Kengtung than the Baptists. No single topic or issue in the entire history of the Laos Mission absorbed so much effort and time as the Kengtung Question. Yet, not one single line of even one report or letter contributed to strengthening or ministering to the existing churches in the North. In a decade when the development of the churches in the area of self-reliance lost momentum and the mission itself was weak, the distraction of Kengtung only contributed to the loss of momentum and the weakness. One faction in the mission realized this and opposed rushing into Kengtung, but the passionate zeal of Dodd and his supporters always won the day (within the mission) for expansion.

Secondly, the Kengtung Station drained off two families, the Dodds and the Callenders, badly needed elsewhere, in a period when the mission was understaffed and over-extended even within Siam. It also wasted many months of time per year for others, such as Dr. Peoples, who were called to serve on committees and commissions regarding the Kengtung Question. (10)

Thirdly, the Kengtung Question further weakened the overall work of the mission precisely because it caused divisions and hard feelings within the mission. Many resented the tactics of Dodd and Briggs, for example, when Briggs threatened to resign at one point if the mission did not vote to support the Kengtung Station before the Board. And the whole issue also caused tension between the mission and the Board further distracting all from attending to the problems of the churches.

All-in-all, the Kengtung Question of whether or not the Laos Mission should have a station in Kengtung State and push expansion northward out of Siam proved to be a potent distraction that brought into sharp relief the self-defeating side of the expansionist ideology: while the purpose of mission work was to "convert the heathen" and create a "native" church, expansionism constantly drew the mission away from that purpose by consuming its energies in touring, itineration, surveying, station building, and then starting the process all over again further down the road. It is paradoxical: the motivation, spreading the Gospel, that brought the missionaries into the North transformed itself into the ideology of expansionism, which then prevented effective evangelism and church work.

Institutional Development

While the Laos Mission invested a great amount of its time and effort trying to maintain the expansionist momentum of the 1890s, the only area in which it did maintain that momentum was in institutional growth. By 1909, Chiang Mai Station had enlarged on its two schools and hospital with the Boys' School, renamed Prince Royal's College, shifted to a new site on the east side of the Mae Ping River. In 1908, the station set out on a new institutional venture when Dr. McKean started a leprosarium on an island in the Mae Ping River. Lampang Station likewise maintained and expanded its schools and medical work. Chiang Rai was in the process of building its Overbrook Hospital and by 1909 had a Boys' and a Girls' School both developing rapidly. Nan Station had a more permanent if still inadequate hospital/dispensary set-up and had finally established a permanent school although it was still not stable at the end of the decade. Only Phrae, under northern Thai lay leadership (see Chapter 6), lagged in the matter of institutions.

The real measure of the growth of the institutions was in missionary assignments. Of its 37 missionaries in 1909 who had definite assignments, the mission assigned ten to medical work, ten to educational work, six were on furlough, four did translation/literature work, two managed the press, and only five members of the mission took as their primary assignment church and evangelistic work. These figures are all the more impressive when compared with those of 1899 when of 33 missionaries with specific primary assignments, nine engaged in "evangelism" which included church work while thirteen had institutional assignments. (11) While some of those assigned other work gave considerable time on weekends and vacations to visiting rural Christian groups, they were limited in what they could do. Effectively, the mission put more than four time the emphasis on institutional work that it did on church and evangelistic work. The missionaries themselves observed that the
institutions grew in their demands during the decade while church work received less attention and developed less rapidly. (12)

An important thing happened in this decade: as the churches languished and the institutions grew amidst the great distraction of Kengtung, the northern Thai Christian community found itself with two foci rather than one. Mission attention and resources centered on the medical and educational institutions, which, in turn, became the centers of patronage and employment in the Christian community. The institutions became powerful magnets, and we will see in a latter section of this chapter that these magnets caused a major Christian migration away from Lamphun towards Chiang Mai. Consequently, the church did not encompass the Christian community but had to compete with the institutions, founded entirely outside of its jurisdiction, for the attention of that community. The church diminished in importance in the Christian community as the institutions grew.

The Church 1900–1909

The Laos Mission found itself trapped in its conflicting commitments to the two foci of the Christian community's life, the church and the institutions. Even as it committed itself to the institutions, the mission wanted to strengthen the churches; and it did try to take steps to that end.

**Mission and Church.** As the 1890s drew to a close and the Laos Mission came to think that its northern Thai clergymen could not pastor the churches (see Chapter 6), it stopped ordaining northern Thai into the ministry. Yet, it also saw the need for a better system of church supervision because the churches and rural Christian groups did not receive sufficient attention. Thus, in 1896 the North Laos Presbytery established a Committee on Presbyterial Oversight chaired by McGilvary and composed entirely of missionaries. The purpose of the committee was to create better understanding between the mission and the churches, to encourage self-support, and to oversee the churches. Although it had a great deal of authority, the committee failed to solve the problem of how to give more attention to the churches. By 1900, the mission felt even more urgently the need to work more closely with its churches, and to have a more direct supervisory role in their administration; but it took until 1903 for the mission to structure a closer relationship. In that year it ordered every station to divide its churches into districts with one missionary assigned responsibility for each district. The mission instituted, in effect, a formal structure for church governance without even referring the matter to presbytery. It created *ade facto* episcopacy with missionaries serving as bishops. (13)

After 1903, most of the missionaries related to institutions fell into the pattern of giving weekends and holidays to working with the churches. Mission reports and correspondence after 1903 suggests that the mission made considerable effort to work more closely with the churches. Even so, the whole system of weekend pastorates did not function effectively. More distant churches and groups continued to be ignored. The weight of other work plus the constant struggle with illness hampered all church work. Although more structured, the "new" system instituted in 1903 did nothing more than confirm the patterns of church and mission relations that first arose in the 1870s. It confirmed the primacy of the mission over the churches while ignoring for most of the decade the issues and principles of self-government and self-support. This system of missionary supervision over churches also drove out the hope of a "native" pastoral system growing up without actually providing very much pastoral care for the churches.

**The North Laos Presbytery.** After its official founding in 1885, the North Laos Presbytery remained closely linked to the mission since all of the ordained missionaries sat as members of it. According to later accounts, presbytery meetings, held in December with the annual mission meeting, were largely a matter of form attended by the "natives" at the behest of the mission. The fact that the meetings fell right around harvest time made them more than inconvenient for the men attending. However, after the tense meeting of 1895, the presbytery drifted into a period of decay in which it met only occasionally mostly just to rubber stamp mission decisions. Finally, the annual mission meeting of 1906 received a report from its Committee on Laos Presbytery which recommended that presbytery should begin meeting regularly at a time other than December. The next
year, the presbytery called a special meeting for December in order to reestablish the presbytery on a firmer basis.

    In March 1908, the presbytery held its first meeting in the "new" era. Although the number of missionaries attending was still fairly large, the presbytery showed its more northern Thai character by focusing on key issues relevant to the life of the local churches including the very thorny issue of intermarriage with Buddhists. (14) Since the mission wanted the presbytery to be more of an independent body, presbytery decided that it would hold its 1909 meeting away from the mission centers. It met at Wiang Pa Pao, and of twenty delegates only three were missionaries. The meeting elected Kru Pannya moderator and discussed the invitation of Siam Presbytery to appoint a committee to investigate the establishment of a national Siamese church. It also considered sending its own "missionaries" into French territory to work with the Khamu. (15)

    The 1910 meeting elected Kru Semo as moderator and again discussed key issues for the life of the church. More than ever, the presbytery took on a northern Thai identity. By and large, the presbytery continued to develop in this direction in later years although after 1911 the missionaries again took greater part in its deliberations. (16)

    In actual fact, while the rebirth of the presbytery did give the church greater voice, and, perhaps, a new sense of its own identity, it did not give the church greater authority over its own life. Something more than merely cosmetic, the change did not effect the system of church government. The locus of authority and the source of funds did not change. The growing influence of the institutions did not change. Thus, unlike the traditional Presbyterian system in which presbytery reigns supreme over local churches, the North Laos Presbytery never actually exercised sovereignty over its churches.

**New Movements in the Church.** Even though the churches continued to labor under insufficient pastoral care, changes did take place in them. There was movement.

    The first of these movements was the holding of station conventions organized by the missionaries for strengthening the churches, giving them a greater sense of unity, introducing new ideas and projects, and involving the churches in planning and carrying out activities. Chiang Mai Station organized the first conventions in 1903 and 1904. These proved such a great success that in 1905 all five stations held them. In 1906 only Lampang, Nan, and Chiang Rai held conventions, and the Chiang Mai Station held the last recorded convention in 1907 at Mae Dok Daeng.

    These conventions brought together as many church members from throughout a station as possible for several days of meetings, services, and activities. Besides worship and entertainment, the meetings included opportunities for discussions on important topics, Bible study, health education, asking questions about faith, and participating in evangelistic work. (17)

    Generally reported as successful, useful, and entertaining, there is no record of a convention being held after 1907. It is likely that conditions in the mission after that period hindered holding further conversions since the years 1908 and 1909 were particularly bad years for missionary health. They were also lean years financially. More than likely, the stations had neither the will nor the money to conduct conventions after 1907. (18)

    A second movement that swept the churches in this decade was the chapel building movement. Even in 1867, McGilvary wanted a chapel as evidence of the permanency of Christianity in the North. The mission built its first chapel on a corner of station property in 1876; from that time on other churches and village Christian groups built small bamboo chapels from time to time. Chiang Mai Church occupied its permanent building in 1891, and in 1890 Chiang Mai Station included groups in 22 village that held regular worship of which nine had their own chapels. (19)
The real movement in chapel building began after 1900, and especially after 1903 a passion for erecting church buildings swept the church. Many of those chapels remained simple structures, but a significant number were constructed of more permanent materials. The mission supported and promoted this movement for three reasons: first of all, it felt that involving the churches in building programs made them more active and self-reliant; secondly, the buildings "proved" that Christianity was here to stay; and, thirdly, the missionaries believed that good church buildings attracted more converts as Buddhist society tended to judge Christianity by the quality of its buildings. (20)

In this period, at least twenty new chapels were erected in eighteen organized churches. The most impressive of these was the Hyde Park Chapel in Nan built along Western architectural lines with stained glass windows. The building was completed in 1908 with the aid of overseas funds. (21)

The chapel building movement showed that the Christian community now had enough "mass" to build its own buildings. Although the regional church framework remained potent as ever, the village Christian communities began to fill out somewhat. Communities remained scattered but were larger than previously. The chapel building movement also provides further insight into the mission's "theory of indigenization" (see Chapter 5 also). In the case of chapels, the mission accepted without question northern Thai cultural values regarding the place of beautiful, elaborate/ornate buildings in religion-values that paralleled the missionaries' own society, which also constructed elaborate religious structures. The Laos Mission unquestioningly accepted and pursued a basic northern Thai cultural value even while branding the society and culture as "heathen." Whereas Buddhist temples represented darkness and evil to the mission, it readily accepted the value by which such buildings were desired. This meant, in effect, that the mission attacked the form while accepting the basic content of the underlying values behind those forms. Indigenization, then, was a matter of changing forms to protect the "purity" of the church but accepting basic values so as to remain evangelistically attractive to non-Christians.

The third church-wide movement in the North in this era was the rural parish schools movement. Realizing that its highly valued educational system did not reach into the rural areas very well, the mission encouraged a "second level" of schools, ones located in the villages and run by the churches. The first mention of such a school goes back to 1885, but the actual movement to establish village schools throughout the church began about 1902. The movement sought to put a Christian school within the reach of every Christian child and to form the basis for a church-wide educational system. In 1903, Chiang Mai Station had twelve village schools while Chiang Rai had one. In 1904, the mission included fourteen day schools with sessions of from three to eight months each. (22)

Although the schools often started with the assistance of or at the instigation of missionaries, the churches administered the schools and often funded them (at least in part) as well. One of the most difficult problems facing these schools was finding teachers, and the schools often had to depend on young people who had studied for some time at one of the boarding schools. The curriculum varied considerably but tended to emphasize hymn singing, Bible memorization, and simple academic subjects especially reading. The schools generally used the traditional rote memorization method of instruction so that the mission found it difficult to maintain the level of quality it desired in them. School buildings were usually made of simple bamboo or teak. The students sat on the floor and had very few textbooks. The schools were primarily for Christians although Buddhist children did attend. (23)

In 1908, six years after the village school system started to grow, the mission's educational system included five boarding schools, 23 village and urban day schools, and three training schools totaling 1096 students. It was not until 1912 that the village students formed a truly significant part of this system:

Their number rose from 350 in 1911 to 801 (out of a total of 1677 in all schools) in 1912. This sudden increase may be attributed to a mission attempt to compete with the rapidly expanding government-sponsored system of
temple and public schools. The growth in the village schools was tempered by the fact that in many of them, the ones without direct mission supervision, the terms were short and the pupils fewer. (24)

While it is difficult to evaluate some aspects of the village schools, they did represent a positive change in the churches particularly because they often grew out of the desire of village people for a better education for their children—a desire just then emerging. (25) Unlike other mission institutions these schools were located in the churches, run by and for the churches. They represented an attempt to get some Christian education, at least for the children, into the churches. Even though they depended on the urban schools for teachers, some support, and to continue the education of better pupils, the schools represented an exercise in self-reliance in church work in the North. They further symbolized the growth of the rural communities into groups large enough to actually sustain their own educational programs, however humble.

Church migrations represent the last movement of the decade I will discuss here. Two congregations experienced serious changes because their members migrated to other areas.

Although all three of the Lamphun area churches experienced migration problems after 1900, that migration affected the Wang Mun Church the most seriously. The movement of Christians out of the area began in 1901 when Noi Lin and a group of nine families moved from Wang Mun to Wiang Pa Pao for economic reasons. By 1906 half of the Wang Mun people and a total of about 75 Christian families from all three of the Lamphun churches had relocated themselves in and around Chiang Mai. Migration continued until at least 1908, leaving the Wang Mun Church in a very weakened condition. (26)

Freeman, the resident missionary in Lamphun, cited three reasons for this migration of Christians away from Lamphun: first of all, mission employment in Chiang Mai, especially at the Mission Press, attracted many; secondly, the desire for a better life and higher income compelled many to go to the Chiang Mai area for jobs or land; and, finally, the students sent to the Chiang Mai schools from Lamphun usually stayed in Chiang Mai. (27)

The Chiang Saen Church, still one of the strongest and most independent of the churches, also experienced migration. The congregation suffered for the fact that most of its members lived on the French side of the Mekong River and were denied contact with the mission by French authorities. Finally, in 1906 eight of the Christian families decided to move over to Pa Kuk in British territory, and twenty non-Christian families moved with them. At first, the church had trouble settling in to its new site, but it soon recovered and grew rapidly. In 1917, the church had ninety members and still had a reputation for strong leaders and a strong congregational life. (28)

During this decade the presbytery established only two new churches in northern Siam: in 1902 it organized the Muang Phrao Church, which split off from Chiang Dao. And in January 1906, it reorganized the Chiang Rai Station churches by adding substantial territory to the Wiang Pa Pao Church, reducing the territory of Chiang Rai Church, and creating the Nang Lae Church. In 1906, the Kengtung Station established a church, which remained on mission rolls for many years but eventually quietly faded away. (29)

Church and Society

As seen in Chapters 1 and 2, the church faced serious problems in its relations with society from the day that Nan Inta received baptism. Not only was the new religion closely linked with foreigners in the general public's mind, but it also challenged traditional society and beliefs in many ways. After 1900, the church continued to experience repression, especially in those areas where it had only recently entered. (30) And even-though the general impression we have is that outright repression and persecution was less intense, the church still had to face certain issues in maintaining its life in the midst of a Buddhist society.
The Shan Rebellion. The Shan Rebellion of 1902 represented a crisis in the life of the church. That rebellion started in Phrae when a group of Shans (from what is now eastern Burma) rose in rebellion against the Siamese authorities, killing many Siamese and pressing the local Chaos into support of them. Suddenly, the Christian community had to choose between loyalty to the Siamese central government, with which there existed widespread dissatisfaction, or the representatives of rebellion. The Christians lived in all of the areas-Phrae, Nan, Lampang and Chiang Rai -threatened by rebellion, and it did not help matters for them that the Laos Mission was again in yet another period of internal weakness.

In all known cases, the Christian community sided with the Siamese, and in some instances it actively assisted the government in suppressing the rebellion. In Phrae itself, for examples, Christians helped ethnic Siamese escape the city while the Christians themselves refrained from looting. Siamese authorities in Muang Thoeng showed particular pleasure with the Christians there because they were virtually the only ones who did not flee the city when attack seemed likely. Briggs reported that in Chiang Rai Christians played an important role in carrying government dispatches, in uncovering and reporting a plot against the authorities, and in setting a calming example for others. (31)

Thus, like its missionary patrons, the northern Thai church showed a solid inclination to support the Siamese government's policy of centralizing its power in the North. The impression that the Christian community stood in the forefront of the forces of the economic, social, and political modernization in northern Siam is strengthened by its response to the Shan Rebellion. In any event, that response distinguished it from the larger society, which had no particular love for Bangkok. The tiny Christian minority saw its interests allied with and tied to the most powerful agent, the Siamese government, for social change in the North. (32)

Intermarriage. Whenever Christians gathered to discuss their concerns and problems, one of the issues they always brought up was that of Christian-Buddhist marriages. These marriages were often short and unhappy, and the mission discouraged them because it found it difficult to teach or maintain the "sanctity of marriage" in them. The missionaries also worried that Christian children might come under "bad" influences. Christians themselves disagreed on whether or not one should marry a non-Christian, and one of the sources of unhappiness in many such marriages was that the Christian spouse sometimes put pressure on the non-Christian to convert. The Buddhist spouse often resisted. McGilvary observed in 1904 that the problem of marriage prevented some young people from converting to Christianity. (33)

Thus, those social and family problems that faced the very first generation of converts back in the 1870s remained a problem forty years later. Christians continued to be socially isolated and their religion a source of interpersonal tension. One of the peculiarities of the Christian minority was that its minority status had no ethnic foundation, and since it was scattered geographically as well, the community remained quite vulnerable to social pressure and tension. That tension often followed the individual Christian right into her or his home.

Legal Status. Like every other facet of traditional society, the legal system in the North grew out of the religious center of society. The legal status of Christians, again a problem since Nan Inta frustrated his patron by his refusal to work on the Sabbath, also continued to be an issue. As late as 1905, the local government in Phrae still forced Christians to do corvee labor on Sundays, something that so greatly disturbed the Christian community that at one stage it considered passive resistance to such orders even if it meant going to jail.

The Christians in Lampang faced a similar problem. The Chao Muang there required that all of his subjects perform corvee labor except on the Buddhist lunar holy days, which seldom coincided with Sundays. The Christian community dealt with the problem by asking the resident missionary, Taylor, to intercede for them and request that Christians be allowed to pay a tax in place of the labor. Later, when the Siamese Commissioner moved to institute just such a system for all of Lampang, he asked Taylor to convince the Christians to pay immediately as an example to others. He also asked Taylor to have the Christians inform him immediately if they discovered instances in which the Chao Muang tried to obstruct the new taxation system by continuing to demand corvee labor. A delegation from Chae Hom, led by a Christian, did later report to Taylor
that the Chao Muang unfairly demanded rice from them. Taylor reported the case to the Commissioner who corrected the situation.

This example gives us an interesting insight into how the Christians stood in the northern Thai legal system. While in tension with traditional political structures, the Christians had an advantage in the evolving situation because of their "allegiance" to a patron, the missionary, who was allied to other agents of modernization and centralization, notably the Bangkok government. One is particularly struck by the way in which the Siamese Commissioner actively cultivated the assistance of the Christians both as examples for responsible conduct and as "spies" against the Chao Muang. As in the more general case of the Shan Rebellion, these events in Lampang add even further weight to the conclusion that the Christian community had everything to gain and little to lose in the growing power of the Siamese government over the North.

Nevertheless, the Christians remained a legal anomaly. They faced a particular problem when called upon to give evidence in courts-of-law as the oaths taken normally had to be sworn before a Buddha image. In 1907 the mission appointed a committee to lobby the northern authorities for modification of those oaths. There is no evidence that the committee was successful, but there are cases recorded in which Christians did not have to take the Buddhist oaths. (34)

Thus, the legal situation of the Christian community was a mixed affair in which the community suffered in some ways for being a minority religion while deriving certain benefits in other ways through their association with an influential patron.

Medical Care and the Church. Because "native" medicine included the uses of charms and spirit propitiation, the mission as a matter of course forbid its converts from accepting traditional medical aid. As long as the Christians had missionary medicine within reach medical assistance posed no particular problem. However, many Christians lived at a distance from mission centers and could not avail themselves of mission medical services. These people faced a serious temptation to seek traditional cures when they became ill. Thus, for example, the Chiang Dao Church lost a number of families in 1903 because someone in each family fell ill and the families called in traditional doctors. Chiang Dao seldom received missionary or medical evangelist visits. The Phrae Church faced the same problem in 1906 when the Phrae Station closed. Individuals immediately went back to using the traditional cures because there was no missionary present to help them. And the Christian community in Fang, a great distance from the nearest mission station, experienced precisely the same problem. (35)

Mission doctors and/or their medical assistants constantly traveled into the country-side to treat ailing Christians, and one of the motivations for developing a system of medical evangelists was to keep local Christian groups from being dependent for medicine on traditional cures. Since medicine was one of the primary tools of missionary evangelism and people converted because of it, when mission medicine was no longer available to Christians the gravitational pull back to traditional ways became all the more difficult to resist.

Summary. In each of the above issues, the heart of the social issue facing the northern Thai church was that it stood apart from the rest of society. To what extent the Christian community believed, as the missionaries believed, that the larger society was evil and satanic is difficult to ascertain. I have suggested earlier (see Chapter 5) that their beliefs were likely to have actually been closer to those of the surrounding society than to the missionaries. Nevertheless, practically they felt themselves to be different, to have an identity distinct from the rest of their society. The structures of society around them, familial, legal, and medical frequently did not recognize the validity of that identity and almost never honored it. It did not sympathize with the Christian community's "peculiarities" of religious expression.
The social issues related to being a Christian kept coming up in presbytery meetings and in the station conventions. For the Christians, the key issue of the day referred not to expansionism nor institutional development but how to maintain their Christian identity in that unsympathetic environment.

**Conclusion**

1900 to 1909 was in many ways a dull decade for the church. The great fiery debates of the decade, over Kengtung, happened far away from the church. The creative growth of the decade, in the institutions, also took place at a distance from the church. The only experiment in serious change, the Phrae experiment, came to nothing. It was profoundly a decade of stagnation. No new ministers. Only two (not counting Kengtung) new churches. Potential changes such as station conventions or the revived presbytery had little long-term results.

It was the "wait-and-see", "slow-but-sure" decade. And, as we look back across the years to this decade, it has a special relevance all of its own. This decade was an eloquent reply to the ferment for change fomented in the years 1894-1895. By delaying theological education for another decade while cementing into place the ineffective regional church-regional ministry system and confirming all meaningful power in mission hands, this decade slowed the development of a self-reliant northern Thai church. Even at the beginning of the decade some missionaries felt the malaise in church work that had set in noting that the momentum and hope of a decade earlier had been lost. (36)

And, yet, the shards of the shattered vase of necessary and needed change still littered the landscape. In presbytery and in the station conventions, the church experimented with a voice of its own, testing issues and concerns of its own. That had not happened in the 1890s except, momentarily, in the cataclysm of the Pastors' Revolt. The churches established and party financed their own educational institutions for the first time, institutions that emerged from their own perceived needs. Christian communities coalesced and built up their own infrastructure of property and buildings. And, almost offstage from the great events of the decade, came the muted call (from the Siam Presbytery) for discussions towards the formations of a national church. The call somehow was lost in the shuffle. But there it was...the first faint glimmer of an alternative to another fifty or one hundred years of mission rule.

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**Chapter 8**  
The Stagflated Decade (1911-1920)

In some ways, the decade following 1910 seemed more alive and exciting than the previous ten years. The 1910s were a period of ferment, unrest, and new ideas during which the Laos Mission attempted to make up for the "lost decade" of 1900-1909 by founding the Theological Training School, by resuming the ordaining of northern Thai clergy, and by opening a new drive for self-support among the churches. Robert Irwin made a reappearance as the dynamic agent of the American Bible Society. The years 1911-1914 showed a remarkable surge in church growth statistics while the mission also established closer ties with the Siam Mission and developed a program for women.

Meanwhile, the older leadership of the mission started to die away. Both church and mission experienced a deep sense of loss in 1911 as first Wilson and then McGilvary died. Leading figures of the "second generation" soon followed these two great first generation men. Collins died in 1917. Briggs and Dodd, the great advocates of expansion, died in 1919. Sarah Campbell and Dr. Peoples died the following year.

In truth, however, even in this decade of ferment the swelling river of continuity out of the past flowed more strongly than ever. If anything, the northern Thai church received less attention from a Laos Mission distracted by other matters. The grandiose plans of this decade had to do mostly with expansion and institutions.
The age-old limitations on mission effectiveness did not change in the least while the trend after 1903 whereby institutional missionaries spent weekends and vacations with churches reversed itself.

The record of the 1910s, then, was one of rampant stagnation...the economists call it "stagflation."

**Wagons Ho! On to Yunnan**

The Kengtung Question spilled over past 1910 until the Board decision in June 1913 brought the overt Kengtung territorial dispute between the Baptists and Presbyterians to an end. Yet, even as the Kengtung Question came to a weary close, the Laos Mission looked around for other possible areas of expansion beyond the boundaries of Siam. The siren call of expansion lost none of it potency, and the mission had options aplenty: it still planned to open at least one station in Yunnan Province, China, where a large population of Thai Lu, ethnic cousins of the northern Thai, lived. It also entered into discussions with the Siam Mission over the possibility of opening Presbyterian work in northeast Siam, which both missions understood to be the responsibility of the Siam Mission. However, when the Laos Mission agreed in 1915 to assign the Freemans to the Siam Mission for the purpose of opening a station in the Northeast, the Board promptly rejected the whole notion as financially impossible. (1)

Another arena of expansionist interest was French Indochina. Ever since local French authorities refused Laos Mission permission to work with the Khamu (see Chapter 3), the mission had searched for a way to reverse that decision. But by 1912, "feelers" put out by the Board through international ecumenical circles and through diplomatic channels in Washington failed to resolve the situation. Brown advised the mission that the French might not object to a "quiet" entry, and so having failed to get into Indochina across the Mekong, the mission decided to go through the "front door", Hanoi. In the first half of 1913, Dodd and Vincent made a Board-sanctioned tour of "Tonkin" to ascertain the prospects of Presbyterian mission work with the Tai peoples of Indochina. The prospects seemed good although it was clear that such a mission could not be officially or obviously related to a mission in Siam. The French would not likely tolerate that. Whatever hope the Laos Mission might have had for starting something in Indochina was quickly dashed, however, after the Board received Dodd and Vincent's report. Brown, Board Secretary, wrote that while the Board would have sanctioned Laos Mission-based expansion into French Laos, it could not agree to starting a whole new mission in Indochina. Soon thereafter, word came back to the Board through diplomatic channels that the French government absolutely opposed any proselytizing in Laos. (2)

Northeast Siam? Beyond reach. French Indochina? Closed. That left Yunnan. Even here the prospects for a new station seemed slight. In 1913, Brown reported that even though the Board sanctioned the eventual opening of a station at Chiang Rung in Yunnan, the time had not yet come. And throughout the next three years the mission could not move on the matter in spite of plans it made, appointments it made, and survey trips it authorized. (3) There was no money. In late 1916, the mission again officially urged the Board to give permission for Chiang Rung. Initially, the Board responded negatively to this plea because it still had no funds for Chiang Rung. However, within days of that negative reply a second letter arrived announcing that the Board had just received a check for $40,000 from a private estate and agreed to apply part of the check to opening a station in Chiang Rung. The mission hurriedly laid its plans and in September 1917 had missionaries on the field in Chiang Rung starting the station. (4) As might be expected, the hard work of establishing the new station occupied most of the time of those missionaries who, consequently, had little time for evangelistic work. Among other problems, the new station lacked good evangelists, building supplies, good personal servants, and the confidence of the local people. (5)

Just as in the case of Kengtung so now in the case of Chiang Rung, mission expansion exacted from the northern Thai church a price. Expansion proved itself to be a decade long distraction. From 1910 to 1913, the mission fought for its dream of returning to Kengtung, only to lose. From 1914 to 1916, the mission directed its energies towards obtaining permission to open a station in Chiang Rung. Then, from 1917 to the end of the decade, it had to staff and fund its new and very distant station. Expansion began costing the churches in 1913
when Dodd and Vincent made their Indochina tour while both the Chiang Rai and Lampang stations went without staff to carry out church work during their months' long absence. After the Chiang Rung Station opened, it depended on the northern Thai church for financial assistance and, more especially, evangelists. In 1919, three mission stations sent a total of nine evangelists for varying periods of time. In 1920, the already weak Phrae Station came to a virtual halt when the mission sent two families from there to Chiang Rung (see Chapter 6). (6) As in previous decades, the northern Thai church continued to depend for its leadership, its program, and even its income on a mission, which devoted inordinate amounts of time and resources to a "plan" of expansion that ignored the life of the churches already established.

Grandiose Plans

In 1911, an exasperated Arthur J. Brown sent out a circular letter to all Presbyterian missions deploiring their constant demands for and reliance on money. In their letters, the missions demanded more money. On their furlough visits to New York, Presbyterian missionaries called for more money. Brown went on at length about the "perils of an undue reliance upon money and re-enforcements." (7) In the years after 1911, Brown must have sighed and shaken his head over letters from northern Siam as the Laos Mission hatched one grandiose and expensive plan after another. In expansion, the mission sought to do everything everywhere all at once...the Northeast...Indochina...Yunnan, and we have already seen that in 1912 it concocted a fabulous master plan to occupy the Asian interior with 25 stations in 25 years (see Chapter 7). The silence from New York on that one was deafening.

But there were other plans. Take, for example, the proposal for a "Laos Christian University": this scheme appeared during the visit of the Bradt delegation in 1912. The mission wanted a university with three faculties (Arts & Sciences, Theology, and Medicine) at an initial cost of about $475,000. Brown replied, "...we are a little dazed by the proposal of one Mission that the Board commit itself to a definite program of over a million and a quarter ticals for the educational and medical equipment of a single mission." He called it an "impracticable program," which violated previous policy decisions about the development of the church in the North. (8)

At the time the mission sought its Christian University, it also undertook to convince the Board to support, if not the whole scheme, at least the founding of a medical college. Once again, the Board lacked funds, and Brown questioned the mission's ability to manage such an institution. Nevertheless, the mission went right ahead with its plan and actually inducted a class of seven medical students under Dr. Cort in 1915. The mission tried to run the school out of its available funds, but by 1920 this scheme too had to be abandoned. (9)

The significance for the church of most of the great proposals of the decade was that they had nothing to do with the churches. Nearly all of the plans and the creative thinking of the decade centered on the institutions. In a conference held in New York in 1910 at which the Laos Committee and the Executive Committee of the Board met with Dr. McKean and Mabel Gilson, the Board worked out a program of development specifically for the northern Thai church. The conference found that the churches lacked adequate leadership, depended too heavily on the mission, and that the mission did not have adequate resources (financial or personnel) to carry the churches. The conference then stated that, "It is vital that we should at once take measures to secure a larger native force...We shall never see a strong and self reliant native church unless we have the right kind of men to lead it; and we shall never have these men unless we have schools to develop them." The conference proposed four recommendations. Three of them had to do with strengthening existing educational institutions in Chiang Mai or setting up new ones. Only one recommendation, for the establishment of a theological training school, focused on the church. And even here the method of assistance was to set up another institution rather than work within the churches directly. (10)

The decade closed with yet another example of the potency of the Laos Mission's institutional orientation, an orientation shared by the Board of Foreign Missions in New York. In 1916, the Board approved a special funding drive for the two Siam missions, the "Siam Extension Fund". The fund totaled $50,000 and
took some time to collect, but in 1920 the Board in consultation with the missions prepared a budget for the extension fund. Just at 70% of the allotted funds went for institutional expansion and development. Another 21% was designated for "evangelism" which may have included church work as well. The remaining 9% fell under the categories of new stations and church buildings. (11)

The churches could not compete with the institutions for mission attention. In October 1916, for example, Julia Hatch returned to the field to do full-time village women's work with the rural churches, a task she had proven herself adept at in Phrae two decades earlier (see Chapter 3). Hardly had she begun her work, however, when the Chiang Mai Girls' School lost its principal. The mission immediately moved Hatch from Chiang Rai to that position, a move that she herself made reluctantly. (12) By 1920, then, the central focus of the Laos Mission was solidly on its mission educational and medical institutions. Institutional thinking became a habit that could hardly be questioned, let alone broken.

Great Growth

The impression one has from the records of the day, however, is that the Laos Mission after 1910 did not quite appreciate how dominated by institutional needs it had become. There seemed to be a great deal going on in the churches. A number of new initiatives for developing the church appeared during the last decade of the mission. Never did church work seem so hopeful, particularly in the earlier years of the decade when the church experienced a great burst of growth.

In the latter part of 1911, reports filtered out of the North telling of a serious epidemic of "malignant malarial fever". The center of the epidemic was located in the area of the Bethlehem Church to which the Chiang Mai Station hurriedly sent Noi Intah, a Chiang Mai elder, to distribute medicine and care for the sick. Collins, "pastor" of the church, reported hundreds of people dying in the vicinity. As Noi Intah gave treatment, he exhorted non-Christians to give up their animism and accept Christianity. Some two hundred adults did so making 1911 the most fruitful year for accessions in the mission's history. (13)

The epidemic continued into 1912, and Dr. McKean tagged it the worst epidemic of malaria in the North since 1880. Small pox also appeared. The mission sent out its own teams of medical evangelists under the direction of Collins and Campbell and also supplied vaccine for the government's relief work. Conversions to Christianity mushroomed. A jubilant mission opened its 1912 report saying, "The Station reports of the North Laos Mission for 1912 are cheery, hopeful, aggressive in an unwonted degree. The Lord of the Harvest has granted us a larger share of His ingathering than ever before." The church grew by 1,044 members in 1912 so that at the end of that year one of every four Christians in the church joined it in 1912. (14) The mission's Epidemic Committee (Collins, McKean, and Campbell) confidently predicted future conversion rates several times as high if only the Board could get them money for more medicine and more medical evangelists. (15)

The Board found it difficult to respond. The Siamese government hampered the Board's efforts to collect humanitarian aid from sources such as the Red Cross by denying it needed assistance in the North. (16) In a rather curious letter dated 5 September 1912, Briggs reprimanded Brown for seeking humanitarian aid especially through cooperation with the Siamese government. Briggs wrote that the government knew the mission used this epidemic as an opportunity for converting people; and, therefore, it would rather allow hundreds die than permit assistance to be channeled through the mission. The mission very consciously used its funds where it expected the most converts, and therefore it should not, concluded Briggs, use philanthropic moneys. (17)

The Board also attempted to collect funds in American church circles, but very little money came in because church people there deplored the way in which the Laos Mission seemed to be buying converts among the ill. The Board received protest letters about a circular written from the Laos Mission claiming that with more funds it could convert people at the rate of about two dollars per convert. Brown trusted that the mission simply worded the statement poorly and did not actually intend to buy converts. (18)
Although the epidemic affected many areas in the North including Lampang and Phrae, the highest rates of conversion because of the epidemic took place in the Chiang Mai Station, notably at Bethlehem, Mae Pu Kha, and in sections of the Chiang Mai Church itself, especially at Ban Tho and San Pong. The San Pong community grew large enough to form its own church in May 1914. Most of the converts were impoverished by the epidemics. (19)

By 1913, the epidemic began to abate in some areas, and each of the next two years found it dying away. From 1915 on, even in those areas where epidemic conditions still existed, such as in Chom Thong to the south of Chiang Mai, people did not convert even when they accepted mission medical assistance. The epidemic ended by 1916, and in that year the churches showed little growth. Indeed, various missionaries began to grumble once again about the lack of evangelistic zeal among the average church members. Harris wrote, "But one cannot but note the fact that our Christian people have not advanced as far as we could wish in assuming personal responsibility for the spread of the Kingdom. (20)

The missionaries in some cases attributed their evangelistic success in the years from 1911 to 1914 to the fact that the epidemic and famine conditions of the country shattered many peoples' confidence in spirit propitiation. In those areas served by the mission's medical services, it must have been evident that those who took the medicine recovered while many of those who did not died. (21) It is likely that missionary medicine resulted in a large number of conversions for other reasons as well: in the first place, it was much more widely available than previously; secondly, after 1910 the Christian community experienced more social acceptance than previously thus making people more willing to take Christian medicine; and, finally, the "forces" of change were much stronger in the North by 1910 so that people would likely have been more receptive to its use in any event.

The contrast between 1914 and 1916 in terms of numerical growth is quite striking, (see Appendix II). Although some mission members argued that the converts from the epidemic period did not drop away when it ended, what evidence we have does not agree. First of all, one has the impression that some of the figures given for conversion were a bit inflated. For example, Collins claimed that the Bethlehem Church grew by over 300 members in May 1912 alone. But, then, he later gives a three-year total (1912-1914) of only 346 conversions at Bethlehem based on his personal annual reports. But, then, he gives as his single figure for the three years only 240 (in the 1914 personal report) while stating that the church had less than a dozen "backsliders." (22) Total church enrollment figures for the Bethlehem congregation actually dropped in 1915 as the result of a "major" revision, which indicates that people dropped out of the churches at a rate greater than conversions, an almost unheard of phenomenon in the church's past experience. Smith estimates that about 31.4% of all accessions in the period 1911-1914 were lost in the years after 1914. (23)

Thus, the great numerical expansion of 1911-1914 came to a crash with a resounding whimper. Hughes has concluded that in the years after 1914 the reasons why people converted to Christianity prior to that time lost potency even as Siamese nationalism began to assert that in order to be "truly Thai" one must also be a Buddhist. (24) After this brief period of explosive growth, the church in northern Thailand entered a long period in which it hardly grew at all.

The Church After 1910

The rapid growth of the churches in the early years of the decade resulted in a significant number of new churches. In all, the North Laos Presbytery established seventeen churches between March 1912 when the Ban Tho Church was organized and February 1916 when it established the Fang Church (see Appendix I). Although the manner in which these churches were pastored and otherwise led did not change, what was reported of the Suan Dok Church (Chiang Rai Station) may have been more generally true. The church's missionary "pastor" reported that the people of the church showed more interest in its affairs and felt that it was more theirs after it became an independent congregation. Whether such feelings were widespread or more than just a passing fancy
is impossible to judge, but the observation itself does suggest how distant and unreal the prior regional church might have seemed to local Christian communities. (25)

Symbolic of the permanency and growing age of the churches was the way in which they found more acceptance in society. In 1911, King Vajuravudh, only recently crowned, distributed large standing clocks to the churches and institutions in the North in memory of his father, King Chulalongkorn. Churches invited their non-Christian neighbors to special dedicatory services, which helped to impress upon those neighbors the fact that the King himself held Christians in favor. Throughout the decade repression of Christians dropped, and the missionaries observed that the Christians were more socially acceptable than in earlier years. (26)

Otherwise, the churches after 1910 engaged in much the same activities as they had in the previous decade. The chapel building movement continued as before and gained new impetus in 1915 when so many new churches were organized. The city churches in both Lampang and Chiang Rai built large new chapels partly with overseas funds, and just as before chapel building remained a major activity at the local church level. In like fashion, the village school movement also grew and remained the other primary activity of most churches. However, even after the village church school system expanded in 1912 (see Chapter 7), these little schools still had problems maintaining the quality of education the mission desired. Teachers were extremely difficult to obtain, and when the government raised teacher qualifications the problem only became worse. (27)

Schools and buildings... these formed the foundation of an active congregation. Thus, for example, in 1911 Chiang Rai Station reported that the Christian community at Muang Phan showed the marks of a strong Christian life and concluded that God was transforming lives in that church. The evidence provided for that conclusion included: one, a new church building; two, an interest in education; and, three, respect in the larger community. (28)

Another activity that churches engaged in during the decade was the distribution of Scripture portions. Scripture distribution by the churches came into its own when Robert Irwin returned to Siam as an Agent of the American Bible Society Agency for Siam and Laos and assumed full control of the agency in October 1912. Irwin placed a large number of "colporteurs" in the stations of the Laos Mission where they were under missionary supervision. They distributed tens of thousands of tracts and Scriptures throughout the North. Irwin himself made frequent trips to the North visiting stations, teaching the Bible, and conducting training programs in local churches. As far as the churches were concerned, Irwin not only involved them in literature distribution to a greater extent than ever before but also gave considerable time to working in them. He even went so far as to fill in from time to time in areas, Lamphun for example, temporarily without missionary supervision. (29)

Overall, one might summarize the decade of the 1910s for the churches as one of stability that generally continued the patterns of the previous decade. The great period of conversions in 1911-1914 increased the bulk of the Christian community even as that community settled somewhat more comfortably into society, a society itself having to cope with more and more change each year. Although it had greater access to the Bible than previously (see Chapter 5), the church did not change for that fact. By the end of the decade, village churches had less contact with missionaries, but their traditions and forms were so well developed that the dwindling contact, never intensive anyway, made little difference. The patterns and directions were set. Inertia did the rest.

Ethnic Outreach

The Karens. Laos Mission awareness of the Karen went all the way back to McGilvary whose interest in them clashed with Kawilorot's fear that a missionary-Karen axis might cause him political problems. He blocked contact with the Karen. Thereafter, the Laos Mission showed little interest in the Karens whom they assumed to "belong" to the Baptists in Burma. In fact, the mission readily accepted a small cluster of Baptist Karen churches near Lampang and even made occasional visits to them. Prior to 1910, the only known Karens belonging to churches of the mission were one small group of four or five families living in Thung Tom, south of Chiang Mai. (30)
Things might have continued in this manner had not the Freemans in Lamphun discovered a number of Karen villages in the Wang Mun Church area that showed some previous contact with Christianity. They reported two villages seeking instruction, and during 1914 seven Karens came down to Lamphun for two weeks to study with them. In 1915, six young Karens spent half of the year with the Freemans. In the meantime, Freeman convinced Kru Enny (or Annie), an ordained Karen Baptist minister residing in Chiang Mai, to visit these Karen villages (in 1914). Kru Enny showed little enthusiasm or interest, thus justifying, in Freeman's mind, Presbyterian involvement with them. Freeman felt that the Presbyterians could better help them find a place in northern Thai society. Eventually, the Freemans baptized one village and placed it under the care of Wang Mun Church, which sent evangelists to visit it and other Karen villages. (31)

Even as the Freemans started their modest Karen Presbyterian community, another missionary found his visits to the Karen Baptists north of Lampang somewhat disquieting. Hartzell visited the three Karen churches in 1916. He found that no missionary had visited them since 1908 and that, while one of the original four villages had fallen back into "heathenism," the other three displayed a very active Christian life - without any outside support. They even had their own pastors. Hartzell wrote, "They receive no financial help whatsoever from outside and I marvel at the work we have seen here because I know of no Presbyterian church in Siam of which this is true." Hartzell later asked a northern Thai elder if his church could survive without missionary visits for eight years. The elder replied that his congregation would die in half that time! Hartzell observed, "I trust that he was mistaken, but that fact remains that we have something to learn from our Baptist friends and they are to be congratulated on such work." (32)

The Chinese. Reports of Chinese converts in northern Siam go as far back as 1893 when the Lampang Church received a single Chinese member. Sometime later when the church accepted another Chinese member the family of this convert became so agitated that they murdered him. Lamphun in 1907 and Nan in 1908 both saw some interest among the Chinese in Christianity, but nothing seems to have come of it in either city, although one man did convert in Nan. (33)

The first movement toward Christianity among the Chinese in the North began in Lampang with the conversion of seven young men in 1913 through contacts with the station's schools and hospital. The station developed further contacts with the Chinese community in that same year when Vincent received an invitation from Chinese residents in Lampang to join in forming a "Republican Club." However, the event that actually gave impetus to the movement towards Christianity in Lampang and other northern cities was the visit of Dr. Tien Sueh, a member of Third Church in Bangkok, sent under the auspices of the American Bible Society. He presented the Christian message in Chinese for the first time in the North, and his visit resulted in a considerable number of conversions. (34)

From 1914, the churches in Lampang, Chiang Mai, Nan, and Phrae received numbers of Chinese converts. By July 1914, a total of thirty had been received throughout the mission, and at the end of 1914 Lampang alone had 43 Chinese members, all merchants or shopkeepers. The Chiang Mai Market Chapel provided a center for the Chiang Mai Church Chinese, as did the market dispensary in Lampang for Chinese Christians there. Although the total number of converts was not large, the mission saw in them a hopeful pattern for future growth. (35)

Within a short time, however, some missionaries began to refer to the "Chinese Question" as troublesome cultural differences between the urban, mercantile Chinese converts and the mission-shaped northern Thai church community emerged. It turned out that many of these merchants had wives in China as well as in Siam. Most of them refused to close their shops on Sundays, and some of them sold liquor in those shops. The various stations showed particular concern when the "ill-disciplined" Chinese started to influence northern Thai Christians as well. In Nan, for instance, northern Thai women members began going to market on Sunday, citing the "example" of the Chinese converts. Although reluctant to move too strongly against the Chinese for fear of losing them, the mission finally decided that it had to be firm in matters of discipline or the whole church would suffer. By 1919, most Chinese names had been stricken from the rolls of the various
churches, (36) ending what had appeared to be the most hopeful source of church growth after the end of the epidemics.

**The Birth of Women's Work**

In the aftermath of the Speer Delegation visit in 1915, mission women's work headed the list of "departments" that came in for more attention and organization. Prior to this decade, women's work, such as it was, meant mostly women's education, a concern that went all the way back to the 1870s when Sophia McGilvary started her little class of girls. Women did not have separate organizations of their own for the most part although they usually did not study with men in Sunday school or other educational programs. Only Julia Hatch appears to have worked with women in a context wider than the classroom.

One of the most enthusiastic of those engaged in women's education was Emma Freeman at Lamphun. She conducted classes in biblical education and in literacy in all three of the Lamphun churches with a considerable degree of success. In the years after 1900, a few other mission women began to receive specific assignments to "women's work". Dora Belle Taylor, for example, had that assignment in 1907 in Lampang and set up a group called the "Women's Aid and Missionary Society." At the same time, other missionary women came to the North to engage themselves specifically in women's work, one of the first after Julia Hatch being Elizabeth Carothers who took over from Taylor in Lampang in 1908. She enrolled a total of 81 women (Christian and non-Christian) in literacy and Bible classes taught by "Bible" women under her direction. (37)

Women's work remained a fitful, uneven matter in the mission, dependent on the abilities, time, and inclination of the women missionaries ("the wives") in any given station, until the annual mission meeting of 1915. At that time, the women met separately to lay plans for women's work, and they recommended to the stations that each woman missionary should personally train one woman for evangelistic work and also literacy and Bible classes. This meeting ended with the organization of the "Women's Guild of the North Siam Mission" which took as its aim the promotion of women's work. The Guild elected Ada Collins president.

The various stations took immediate steps to carry out these recommendations. They formed groups of "King's Daughters" (usually school girls), circles, and literacy and Bible classes. In the Phrae Church, for example, women's work included regular meetings of the women with programs that included Bible study, instruction in prayer, overseas-missions studies, or instruction in hygiene. The Chiang Mai Church branch of the Women's Guild organized itself in June 1916 with the women of the mission giving talks to explain the purpose of the new organization. Sixty women and children attended. (38)

In acknowledgment of her great influence over the rest of the mission in women's work, Freeman followed Collins as president of the Guild. More than ever, it promoted literacy and Bible study as the core of women's work. There is some indication that the actual purpose behind much of this educational activity was the preparation of women for their own leadership in women's work and also to "broaden" their understanding of the world. The Guild also promoted the more extensive use of women as evangelists and colporteurs. (39)

As was so often the case in this decade, the apparently innovative development of women's work provided little change from the past. Rather, the Women's Guild, entirely organized and run by missionaries, simply extended work already being done in some areas to others. Even then, excepting only Freeman's work at Wang Mun and Bethel, the Guild limited itself to the city churches. It did not touch rural women, and overall the Guild displayed all of the attitudes and weaknesses common to the whole mission.

**Where Have All the Clerics Gone?**

After 1895, the Laos Mission failed to take the steps needed to develop a viable ordained ministry for the churches. Indeed, the mission stopped ordaining men into the ministry entirely while it transformed those already ordained into "regional ministers" on the model of the missionaries themselves. However, even prior to
1910, the mission realized that it could not continue to pursue a policy of not ordaining northern Thai (see Chapter 5). As the few ordained men died, grew old, or fell away, the missionaries felt a greater and greater need to place adequately trained ordained pastors in the churches. In response to this need, the mission founded the Theological Training School to prepare those pastors. (40) It also began to ordain a few men once again.

Of the eight men ordained by the North Laos Presbytery in the nineteenth century, only three remained active in 1910 and one of those three, Kru Pook, died shortly thereafter, in 1912. (41) Kru Chai Ma, in his 70s, continued his effective but limited pastoral work with the Muang Phrao and Chiang Dao Churches, where he also engaged in evangelistic work from time to time. (42) Kru Pannya played a much more active role in church affairs. Aside from his duties as assistant pastor for rural groups of Chiang Mai Church, he also assisted at the Theological Training School and sat on a number of presbytery committees. (43)

In 1911 the presbytery ordained its first clergymen since December 1894 when it ordained Kru Noi Wong of the Muang Yao community, Kru Semo, and Kru Nan Ti, who died shortly thereafter. Interestingly enough, of these three only Kru Semo entered into pastoral work as Kru Noi Wong and Nan Ti both worked as station assistants in evangelism although each did work with local churches on occasion. Semo served as the assistant pastor of the Chiang Mai Church's city congregation. He preached regularly and had quite a reputation as an outstanding preacher. He was considered competent enough by the mission to be left in charge of the congregation (under Harris' nominal supervision) when Campbell went on furlough in 1916. (44)

Prior to 1920, the presbytery ordained only two other men, both in 1915. After ordination, Nan Luang continued to carry out his duties as the evangelist and director of the Market Chapel in Chiang Mai until his death just two years later in 1917. Kru Kham Ai joined the pastoral team at Chiang Mai Church where he shared in the itinerating duties as well as in assisting teaching in the seminary. (45)

The Chiang Mai triumvirate of Pannya, Semo, and Kham Ai often received praise from the mission for their abilities and their development as church leaders. They gained respect when they filled in capably at the seminary in its early days (see Chapter 5), and Campbell credited them along with Kru Chai Ma for much of the development of the Chiang Mai Station's work during 1917. (46) By-and-large, the five clergymen (including Kru Noi Wong) seemed to satisfy the wants and standards of the mission more than had the group ordained earlier. Yet, none of these five served as full-time pastors of churches in their own right. With the lone exception of the aging Chai Ma, the mission assigned all of its ordained men to positions that included duties other than pastoral work and usually included heavy doses of itineration.

Since the ordained clergy did not serve as pastors living with and serving in just one congregation, the mission had to find a way to fill the breach. Among other things, it now pressed elders into service in a new office usually referred to as the "pastoral assistant". The first mention of pastoral assistants appeared in 1911 when the Nan Church hired a "native assistant" to conduct home visitation and visit out-villages on Sundays. Most likely it was Nan No, an elder, who received this assignment—at least, it was he who was recorded in 1914 as being the pastoral assistant in Nan. By 1917, Nan No directed a team under missionary supervision that included five itinerating evangelist-pastors. (47) Chiang Rai also experimented with the pastoral assistant model in 1915, but within a year the evangelist elder, Nan Sao, appointed to the position proved unsatisfactory and the station discontinued the experiment. Phrae appointed Elder Loom assistant pastor in 1919 with preaching and pastoral duties. (48) The other station church that maintained a pastoral assistant over a number of years like Nan was Lampang, which first discovered its need for such an office after the very useful visit of Kru Nan Ti to Lampang in 1911. By 1914, Lampang Church had its own assistant pastor, an elder who visited church members, supervised various church groups, and took charge of the church when the missionary pastor went on tour. It is not certain, but Noi Chanta, pastoral assistant in 1919, may have filled that position from at least 1914 onwards. (49)

Very occasionally, village churches copied the pastoral assistant model of leadership. For example, Kru Peng of the seminary served the San Pong Church as "assistant pastor" for at least two years, engaging in both
Christian education and pastoral work with good effect. However, more typical of the pastoral work done in this decade was the system for regional pastoral care worked out in the Chiang Rai Station. In some of its churches, capable elders doubled as pastors. More generally, the station hired two assistants to visit the churches and conduct evangelistic work too while the American Bible Society supplied three colporteurs and the station an additional three medical evangelists, all of whom had contact with the churches. (50)

Mission records show that the missionaries spent less and less time visiting the churches as the decade progressed. The causes for this change included the passing away of some older missionaries, individuals more committed to church visitation, the increasingly heavy burden of institutional work, and a willingness to turn more direct church work over to northern Thai church leaders. In Chiang Mai Station, the seminary students absorbed much of the responsibility for church work: each student spent his weekends with rural churches performing essentially pastoral tasks in those churches. In addition to sending out evangelists, itinerating assistants, and students, the various stations maintained contact with the churches through special conferences attended by church leaders and station employees. The purpose of these "church workers' conferences" was to make plans, give instructions, and introduce new ideas to the churches. (51)

Even though the missionaries slowly withdrew from immediate contact with rural churches, the fundamental system for church governance and maintenance remained the same. The churches continued to be run from the top down and the center out, as it were. The only difference from the past decades was that in this last decade of the mission the mission created another layer of functionaries between itself and the churches. It had always sent out itinerating evangelists and station assistants, including ordained men, to visit the churches. It had always relied to a large extent on local elders to keep things running between missionary visits. Now, it relied more heavily on intermediaries than previously without otherwise giving up its control/supervision/authority over the churches. It did not change its fundamental relationship with the churches. While giving a somewhat larger role to church leaders, it maintained the regional church system with its centralization of power.

In Grave Danger: Self-Support

For well over a decade after the great self-support drive around the turn of the century (see Chapter 6), the Laos Mission did little to push the matter of self-support and stewardship among its churches. Although there were scattered attempts to initiate more faithful financial giving after 1910, the first innovation in stewardship did not come until 1916 when Beebe in Phrae introduced the "envelope system" of using small envelopes for weekly church offerings. Beebe reported that the envelope system resulted in a 23% increase in giving in Phrae. He presented the "Phrae system" at presbytery in April 1916, and other congregations picked up the idea so that by 1919 most of the churches in the North used it. Meanwhile, the mission and presbytery initiated a second important change in stewardship in 1917. They established a "Central Fund" to be collected from the churches for the purpose of supporting theological education and paying pastors of churches. The initial response to the Central Fund by the churches seemed to be good. (52)

Then came a bombshell. In a stern letter dated 8 November 1918, Arthur J. Brown, after reading the reports of both missions in Siam from the perspective of self-support, wrote that, "...I must frankly confess that I am somewhat disturbed." He found that total northern Thai church giving (including missionary personal giving) amounted to only about 15 cents per church member per year. He found that amount "disconcertingly small". He discounted the argument that the northern Thai church was too poor to do more. Much poorer churches in Africa and Asia gave several times the northern Thai church figure. Indeed, the average for all 26 Presbyterian missions ran to 73 cents per member per year. Brown then posed the question, "Is there not grave danger that the Christian Church (sic.) in Siam will not be placed upon a solid foundation and will not be a permanent force unless its members assume larger responsibility for it?" (53)
Brown's letter had the desired effect as it drove the mission and the presbytery to a more serious consideration of the church's stewardship responsibility. In particular, the churches increased their support for the Central Fund, and some even started pledging to the fund. (54)

**Church and Society**

In its last decade, the Laos Mission initiated a number of new programs and undertakings, which seemed to indicate that the mission had finally achieved some direction and purpose, in spite of the pessimistic attitude of some members of the mission (see Chapter 9). In women's work, theological education, ordination of northern Thai clergy, development of local church leadership, self-support, access to the Bible, and expansion into China, the mission seemed to be generating some steam at last. As we will see in Chapter 9, the mission was also in the midst of negotiating a union with the Siam Mission that gave many hope for a more effective and well-organized mission for the whole nation.

In fact, we have already seen that in many of these matters in which there seemed to be change, those changes were more apparent than real. Yet, at least, there was movement... ideas... activity. And there did seem to be a sense that, perhaps, finally some of the old thinking that had taken root well before 1895 was truly beginning to change.

Symbolic, perhaps, of the change in thinking and direction slowly appearing was the founding of the "Leper Church" in 1913 at the Mission Leprosarium outside of Chiang Mai. Founded by Dr/ McKean in 1908, the Leprosarium had a quite amazing impact on its patients who almost without fail converted to Christianity. Whereas (as we have seen), many converts accepted Christianity out of a sense of need that had little to do with religious concerns the leper converts converted more out of a sense of gratitude and as an expression of the liberation and acceptance they experienced through mission leprosy work. They soon gained a reputation as sacrificial givers, and they became the chief source of consistent growth after 1915. In a very real sense, here was church and mission at its best, accepting unconditionally the ones society deemed the least acceptable. In this simple act of mercy, church and mission questioned a deadening social value while bringing hope to the hopeless. (55)

And...yet...even as some things on the surface changed...those deeper channels of continuity flowed...flowed with a torrential strength...carrying even the unwilling into a future so much like the past.

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**Chapter 9**  
**In Retrospect**

As the reader may have perceived already, this study is as much about the present as it is about the past. I want to account for the present, for the world we are living in as I type these words. I want to understand it. This present first started to take shape in the past so that understanding the present means understanding the past. The past does not so easily divide itself into neat fragments such as, say, 1867 to 1920, the boundaries of this study. It moves on, accepting each days events, and weaving them into the larger fabric of historical patterns and themes.

Conversely, in a case such as this one where the subject studied is one in the "near past," the past is observable in the present. Not only is it a part of the present, but also the present serves to a certain extent as evidence for what the past was. Only 64 years separate this study from the end of the period under discussion, a period which in-and-of-itself showed amazing continuity from the 1870s down to 1920. Does the pattern of events in northern Thai church history described in this study make sense in light of those 64 years? What, in other words, is the underlying continuity between 1920 and 1984?
These questions have special importance for me. First of all, I believe that the condition and situation of the churches in northern Thailand has not changed in any fundamental sense since 1920. Secondly, I am convinced after my research into this subject that those who argue that the church here is the way it is because of Thai culture ("The Thai" are like 'that') have no historical grounds on which to base their assertions. The northern churches have the shape they now have because of the interaction of the Laos Mission with northern Thai culture, an interaction initiated and dominated by the mission. A different approach and attitude on its part would have resulted in a much different kind of church in the North.

In order to sustain these two points, I need to draw out, at least to some extent, the actual relationship of the life of the church under the Laos Mission to its present life. In order to do this, I will first of all describe the process by which the mission came to an end, for that process further underlines the failure of the Laos Mission to foster a strong indigenous northern Thai church. Then, I will use later evaluative reports from the 1930s and one from the 1970s to show how basic themes from before 1920 have continued down to the present.

The End of the Mission

In November 1910, Arthur J. Brown wrote to the two missions in Siam suggesting that they consider joining one another in a "federative" relationship. He named a number of benefits, but the one that surely caught the eye of those in Siam indicated that the two missions would have a stronger voice in New York if they spoke with a joint voice. Within a year, members of both missions took up Brown's "suggestion" and proposed that the missions at least set up a joint council. As a first step, Campbell and Gillies met with two representatives of the Siam Mission in Bangkok in September 1912. They recommended that the joint conference become a Joint Council. That recommendation passed both missions, and the Joint Council met for the first time in July 1913 to consider plans for closer cooperation between the two missions; at its second meeting in 1913 the Joint Council recommended that each mission change its name to, respectively, the "North Siam Mission" and the "South Siam Mission." One reason for this change was that Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior and one of the most influential figures in the government, complained about the northern mission clinging to the word "Laos," which did not refer to any geographical or political division in the now fully united nation. The missions duly made these changes, and from December 1913 the Laos Mission became the North Siam Mission. (1)

Impetus for further change came from the visit of the high-powered official delegation of the Board led by Dr. Robert Speer in 1915. Speer urged the two missions to join together in full organic union. In his benchmark critical evaluation of the work of the mission (see Chapters 4 and 6, above), Speer raised an issue that at first seemed unrelated to mission union but soon became intimately related: the issue of administrative reform for the North Siam (Laos) Mission. He demonstrated the need for some far-reaching changes. A number of members of the mission had long felt that the mission desperately needed a better organizational structure, among them Dr. Briggs. Briggs expressed his delight in Speer's critique of the mission even as he continued to criticize it himself for its lack of cohesiveness, direction, and constancy in policy. He particularly agreed with Speer's highly revealing comment that the mission was twenty years behind the times. (2)

It took another three years for the issues of mission union and North Siam Mission administrative reform to become fully entangled. In 1918, a dejected and anxious Dr. Charles Crooks, a member of the mission's Executive Committee and a former Mission Secretary, wrote, "The method of conducting our work and business in the Mission has come to such a condition that we are going to precipitate an irremediable calamity upon ourselves." (3) Freeman and Taylor, veterans of the mission, joined Crooks in decrying the massively chaotic, inefficient, and divisive administrative "structure" of the mission, and these men now proposed a startling departure towards reform. As they saw it, the whole issue of full union with the South Siam Mission had become intertwined with the issue of reform, whereby the smaller northern stations, especially Lampang Station, favored union as a means to achieve mission reform. The majority in the Chiang Mai Station, on the other hand, opposed union and reform because the present semi-chaotic situation worked to the favor of the bigger, more influential Chiang Mai Station. It had more pull in the struggle for power, personnel, and money in the mission. The "unionists" proposed that if Chiang Mai continued to obstruct union each of the smaller
stations should vote to leave the North Siam Mission and join the South Siam Mission, thus leaving Chiang Mai to herself! Things had become that tense, divided, and chaotic. (4)

This maneuver proved unnecessary. The sequence of events in late 1919 and early 1920 is unclear, but what is certain is that the Board voted that as of 1 April 1920 the two missions were to be united as one Siam Mission. (5) It took the rest of 1920 to effect the merger, but as of 1920 the Laos Mission came to an end and with it the history of the northern Thai church as a distinct thread in the history of the Church. [See Author's Note]

After the End

In his announcement to the Siam missions of the Board's decision to unite them, Brown ended with the following words:

The history of each mission has been one of toil and devotion which the Church will long remember. They are now to be merged into a new chapter which we trust, by the blessings of God, will become even richer in interest and achievement than the chapters which describe the pioneer days and the development of the Missions thus far. (6)

With these words, Brown quietly aligned himself with those who sought union as a means of reform. How did things work out?

1930s

In 1934, the year that the North Siam Presbytery (formerly North Laos Presbytery) joined with the South Siam Presbytery to found the Church of Christ in Siam, the American Presbyterian Mission conducted an extensive self-survey led by a team of three, the Rev. Paul A. Eakin, Bertha Blount McFarland, and the Rev. Pluang Suddhikham. (7) Only one of a number of evaluations conducted from the late 1920s onwards, this survey had the honor of being the most extensive and authoritative statement of the condition of the church and the mission to that date. It also had the official sanction of the mission, which in its annual meeting accepted all but three of the 73 recommendations made by the Survey Committee.

The report began by observing that the mission itself "just growed" without any plan or scheme behind it. It then went on to discuss the mission's "evangelistic" work by which the report meant the state of the Church of Christ in Siam. As in the days of the Laos Mission, this report continued the tradition that confused the tasks of pastoring and strengthening the church with evangelism. That did not change. The report observed that the Church of Christ in Siam,

...is far from ready to bear its three-fold task of self-government, self-propagation and self-support. Obviously one of the Mission's imperative duties at the present moment is to train and guide and strengthen its leaders so that they may carry their three-fold responsibility.

Nothing had changed. The Church of Christ in Siam still lacked the leadership it needed to sustain its own life, to be self-reliant. And the mission still held to the paternalistic notion that the church could become self-reliant only through the initiative and leadership of the mission itself.

The survey then proceeded to a district-by-district survey of the Church of Christ in Siam. The three northern districts together comprised 75% of the total membership of the church. Of District One (Chiang Mai), the report said that the district had an important financial role to play in the larger church because the mission paid one-fourth of all of its salaries in Chiang Mai and that mission salaries comprised an important source of income for the church. The trend is clear: once again the old pre-1920 form held in which the church still depended on the mission for its sustenance: Patron... client.
Of District Two (Chiang Rai-Lampang), the report observed that, "In both places, but far more in Chiang Rai than Lampang, the policy of giving special privileges to the Christians has crippled it as a self-supporting Christian Church." The leadership did not measure up to that in District One either. When the report came to District Three (Phrae-Nan), it used the bluntest language yet to describe Phrae: "Phrae is unquestionably the sickest spot in the Mission, and the missionaries there have the hardest task without a doubt." These words sound familiar. Phrae, the report claimed, suffered from a lack of continuity in mission leadership and long periods without resident missionaries. The report went on to say, "There is no National leadership worthy of the name." After all of the promises prior to 1912 that mission reoccupation of Phrae would solve its deepest problems and answer the cry for help from the church there, 22 years later the situation in Phrae was as bad as ever. Between 1893 the 1934 the best year in the history of the church in Phrae was still 1911, six years after Irwin moved it towards self-reliance. In the years after 1911, the mission very effectively stymied the emergence of church leadership.

In its discussion of theological education, the report struggled with the issue of pastoral leadership for the churches. A few years previously, the churches engaged in yet another round of chapel building, mostly brick chapels. One would have expected, according to the report, that the churches should then turn to hiring pastors for themselves. They could afford pastors. In fact, the churches showed no interest in having pastoral leadership. They wanted village church schools for their children. In short, the local church leadership situation had not changed in the fourteen years since the end of the Laos Mission. Furthermore, the Survey Committee proposed to deal with the lack of local church pastoral leadership by training young men in the seminary to be both teachers and pastors. The report noted that few of the seminary's graduates lasted very long in pastorates.

With regards to institutional work, the report acknowledged that that work threatened to overwhelm "evangelistic" work because it presented more immediate needs. The report made the following crucial observation about the relationship of educational and medical mission work to "evangelistic" work: The government was forcing higher standards for both schools and hospitals while competing with them by its own system of education and medicine.

The evangelistic group has been subject to no outside amalgamating force, and as a result shows the least cohesion and the least general plan in its effort...The foreign missionary in all departments of work has been so overburdened with the multiplicity of detail that he has found it hard to maintain his place of spiritual leadership.

The missionary aim of leading men into the presence of God was hard to do, the report stated, in the face of the missionaries' daily routine.

Just as in the "old days" of the Laos Mission, the mission invested so much concern in maintaining its institutional establishment that the churches languished spiritually and administratively. While maintaining that the church could achieve self-reliance only through the leadership of the mission, the report also pointed here to the factor making such leadership ineffective: the mission retained its predisposition to put its institutions ahead of the church.

Nowhere were the mission's priorities more clearly described than in the 73 recommendations the Survey Committee presented to deal with the multitude of problems facing the church and mission. Of those, exactly ten had to do with strengthening the church, five had to do specifically with evangelism, and 56, that is 78%, dealt with institutional needs and development.

Finally, the set of maps appended to the report showed that the basic physical-geographical structure of the church did not change between 1920 and 1934. The mission established few new churches. By-and-large, the church remained a "regional church" composed of clusters of small communities dependent on distant centers for program and leadership.
Every other report of the era (8) substantiated this picture of the church as given in the 1934 Survey Committee report. The report made by George Trull to the Board in 1930 indicated that the now united mission displayed all of the weaknesses of misadministration, disunity, and squabbling that had so hindered the work of the old Laos Mission. (9) In the deepest, most profound sense, nothing had changed since 1920.

1970s


The appearance, however, was deceiving. In 1979, the Rev. Brian Morgan in a report on his observations as a missionary described the state of the northern Thai churches he had visited over several years. He found those churches suffering in a state of spiritual malaise... few had pastors...few wanted them. Church leaders, lay and ordained, showed little understanding of the nature of the pastoral ministry... preaching tended to be evangelistic in tone...poor in quality. The average church conducted few activities. Poorly qualified, untrained teenage girls usually conducted what little Christian education existed. Church leaders lacked training. They did not understand what it meant to be "the Church." They had little sense of a personal ministry. The church at every level seemed to be going nowhere... to be divorced from its own culture...to be locked into a self-perpetuating cycle of mediocre leadership and program. (10)

The most revealing "document," the most descriptive "statement" of the way in which the Laos Mission established and maintained the northern Thai church up until 1920 is the northern Thai church of today.

And a Personal Response

When I studied the history of modernization in Nan, I "discovered" the Rev. Hugh Taylor, a bluff, opinionated, but very competent almost grandfatherly figure. Then, when I studied the history of the Chiang Mai Mission Press and its role in northern Thai modernization, I "discovered" the Rev. David G. Collins, a quieter man than Taylor and harder to get to know through the records. Yet, he was obviously a talented man and a competent administrator. Both of these men loved and cared for the church. Both gave of themselves sacrificially on the field. In as much as I know them, I like them.

Yet...yet...yet, in the year that I have devoted to preparing this study, my opinion about their work with the church has changed considerably; and not just them, but to one degree or another, all of the members of the Laos Mission. Like most, I suppose, I really did assume that some flaw in the Thai personality was at the heart of the weak little churches I became involved with in the Church of Christ in Thailand. Up front I tried not to say that, but I think that at heart I really did believe it. But, then, I started this study. And the more I read the more my whole outlook shifted. Something went very wrong here, something that did not happen in many other fields to the same degree as it happened here. It was almost as if all of the folly of the international missionary movement was distilled and then decanted in one mission field, the Laos Mission. Maybe, after all, there was something to Briggs' charge that the Board sent its least likely candidates to Siam. (11).

The summary of everything that I read is this: the Laos Mission persisted in demeaning, decapitating, dismembering, and ignoring the church it was supposed to train up, to raise up.

How do we understand missionary actions? How can we put those actions into terms that "explain" why the Laos Mission of the Presbyterian Church created such a truncated little excuse of a church? For me, personally, purely historical interpretations still do not cut to the heart of the matter. In trying to understand what was done to the northern Thai church, I start with the basic theological concepts of Law and Grace.
In Acts 10: 1-11,18, Peter is brought to a very fundamental encounter with the weight of his Jewish heritage, his past. In a vision, God places before Peter all manner of "unclean" animals and orders Peter to eat them. No! Responds Peter. No! Unclean! Heathen! As a practicing Jew, Peter could not eat those things, which were legally and ritualistically impure. Three times God put these unclean animals in front of Peter and three times ordered him to eat. Peter refused. And each time God enjoined Peter not to call unclean what God declared to be clean. Immediately after the vision Peter is called off to the home of Cornelius, a heathen Roman Gentile, and there a most astounding thing takes place: the Holy Spirit indwells in a group of impure Gentiles just as if they were clean, pure! The lesson is clear: these Gentiles did not have to go through circumcision, did not have to place themselves under the Mosaic Law in order to be saved. They did not have to remove themselves from the Roman community and enter the Jewish community in order to be saved.

One of the great debates in the New Testament church was over the issue of who could be admitted to the church and under what circumstances. The "Judaizers" upheld the principle that in order to become a Christian one must become a Jew first: be circumcised, accept the Law, and worship with the Jewish community according to its measure. The New Testament finally rejects this view and put trust in God's saving Grace in its place.

So what? Its like this: trapped in a Presbyterian-ish legalism, the members of the Laos Mission failed to understand the biblical freedom of expression of faith that allowed a Roman to be a Roman and a Christian and that might, just might, allow a northern Thai convert to begin his journey of faith with comparisons of Phra Intra and Gabriel. The Laos Mission appointed itself the protector of the purity of the church in a way strikingly similar to the Judaizers, those who insisted on preserving the Jewish purity of the Christian sect. They failed to understand that their own faith profoundly reflected their culture and not some mysterious, extracultural absolute dogmatic system. The Laos Mission did not take the step towards the northern Thai converts that Peter took towards Cornelius. It did not accept God's sovereignty in Thai culture. It could not eat what was "unclean".

Peter, Paul, and the early church accepted God's call to freedom. In spite of their own deeply ingrained prejudice against dirty, unclean Gentiles, they allowed divine grace to transform their definition of who could belong to the church. That is precisely what did not happen in northern Siam. The Laos Mission preached and lived a religion of Law... do this! ... don't do that!

Legalism led the members of the Laos Mission down a tortured path of indirection and misdirection. It led them to define northern Siam as heathenish, the realm of Satan. It led them to mistrust the converts because of their former association with Satan. It led them to assume that they had to "Christianize" and "Americanize" the culture to free it from Satan which meant they had to establish schools and hospitals and a printing press. It led them to scamper across the countryside in a futile attempt to be everywhere at once saving everyone last week.

So like the Judaizers. They were so like the Judaizers, the ones who said that in order to be a Christian you must first be a Jew. The Laos Mission said by its actions and attitudes that in order to be a Christian you must sing like us, sit like us, preach like us, build like us, learn like us, believe like us, and, ultimately, be like us.

The Judaizers lived by the Jewish Law and in that Law saw their salvation. They believed that if they lived in certain ways, subscribed to certain beliefs they could by their own effort create for themselves a "right relationship" with God. By keeping the Law, they thought that they could maintain themselves as ritually pure individuals, which meant that they kept themselves pure and acceptable to God. The New Testament rejected this theological strand in the early church as failing to understand the ministry of Christ and the meaning of the Good News. The New Testament affirms that we cannot do anything to attain a state of purity in God's eyes. Indeed, the only thing we can do is to accept divine grace and trust in it... and we will be transformed (slowly, painfully, screaming and kicking, resisting) by it. Letting go of our desire to save ourselves and our constant concern for ourselves will free us from the conditions that make our "salvation" impossible.
The ultimate sadness one experiences in spending a year with the records of the Laos Mission is this: the realization that for all of their admirable qualities and intense dedication, the missionaries in the North from 1867 to 1920 were trying to save the northern Thai church by their own efforts. They strived to protect its purity...but they were not themselves pure. They struggled to make sure that it believed what it should believe...but that only confused believing in doctrines with trusting in grace (a rather common modern Christian heresy). They placed before the northern Thai church a whole set of moral injunctions that they said must be followed in order to be a Christian, to be saved. Central to these injunctions was the one that said keep the Sabbath! Somehow in all of their devotion they missed the fact that Christ himself broke the Sabbath and showed no concern when his disciples did so. What concerned him was the attitude of those who thought that keeping the Sabbath was more important than helping others. (Luke 6: 1-11).

It is ironic...having condemned northern Thai animism as satanic...the Laos Mission simply preached its own form of spirit propitiation in which it tried to convince God that by its purity of doctrine and behavior it deserved to be in his Church. Anyone who has worked with rural church people knows that the seeds of the Law have been planted very deeply in the church here. To sit...in a circle of church members... discussing Galatians. To say that nothing we can do will save us...to say that God gives us His grace freely...and to hear the response: "Oh, Acharn, you know that is not true. You Know That We Must Live Right Or We Will Go To Hell." In a church that is dominated by Law, Grace is considered a heresy!

While it may not be the place of the historian to offer advice about the future, I do feel that the historian must share his or her thoughts on the meaning of the past for the present.

The point is that the history of the northern Thai church during the period of the Laos Mission leaves one feeling more hopeful than hopeless concerning the possibility of the church here. Robert Irwin demonstrated that the church here could be alive, faithful, and self-reliant. In four situations—the Training School, the Lamphun churches, the Nan Church, and the Phrae Church—he created conditions, which allowed the northern Thai church to show that it did have the resources to do for itself what the mission could not do for it. The fact that, finally, nothing ever came of his ministry in the North was not the failure of the church but of the mission. Particularly in the case of Phrae, there is no question but what the majority in the mission considered him na-ve and foolish. The whole fabric of northern Thai church history in that period shows that he was quite correct in his estimation of the ability of the church to run itself. He was the only missionary we know of who was not swayed by the desire of this church to escape from its freedom. Where others confused the desire on the part of many northern Thai Christians to be cared for by missionaries with their own belief that the church could not run its own life, Irwin knew it could and simply ignored its desire not to. Who was naive?

The present state of the church in northern Thailand has very little to do with northern Thai culture. There is nothing in the culture that mitigates the growth of a vital Christian church in the North. Time-and-again, I have heard both foreigners working with the Church of Christ in Thailand and members of the C.C.T. themselves conclude that some weakness in the church reveals a Thai cultural trait. Thus, they argue that it is simply "the Thai way" to not have capable local pastors... Rubbish! The church today does not have such a system because of specific events and actions in the years from 1895 onwards that had only to do with the unwarranted prejudices of the Laos Mission. The fact that few northern Thai churches have had regular pastoral care is not indicative of the nature of Thai culture. It is a heritage of the missionary past. And so on... The church today is legalistic, some argue, because it is still trapped in Buddhist culture. Nonsense! The early church was far more trapped in an aggressive legalistic culture and was still discovered by Grace. The legalism of the church in the North is part of its missionary heritage. Others will say that the church has failed to be a vitally growing, evangelistic force because "the Thais" are not aggressive enough, they lack fire. Ridiculous! Look to the missionary past and the manner in which the Laos Mission failed to cultivate a vital church that could carry on its own evangelism.

The fact, in the end, is that the human cultures found in every nation and people do limit us and hamper us in our journey towards trust in divine grace. There is nothing magical or strange in that. Eventually, the
whole Thai church must come to grips with the particular limitations that its real culture actually imposes upon it. My point is this: virtually all of those things, which people now believe are limitations on the church imposed by its culture, are nothing of the sort. In nearly every case, they represent only excuses people make to explain things out of their ignorance of the church's past.

The question that remains to be explored is the question of why the church in Thailand, in this case the Church of Christ in Thailand, has not yet discovered a strong, creative, faithful life, particularly at the local level. The second point I want to make here is that in spite of the hope I alluded to above the church still faces serious historical limitations on its witness within Thai society.

For, at the last, I would argue that the Laos Mission and the churches it created in the past continue to influence the church in the present to the extent that the serious weaknesses of the contemporary church may be traced back to the years prior to 1920. This is not comforting. The past has brought to the church of the present some very pressing and very difficult issues that have gone unresolved for over a century. They persist...these century-old issues...they persist through all of the superficial changes of each year. I refer the reader back to the first section, "Aftermath 1870-1875," of Chapter 2. That section identified seven patterns of northern Thai church history that had their beginning in that short period of time. It is positively astounding how relevant those patterns are to the present-day situation of northern Thai churches.

One. The churches continue to be alienated from their culture, walled off in their own ghettos, their own institutions, their own vocabularies and rituals. Whether individual Christians believe it or not, the church continues to act as if Thai culture is incompatible with Christian faith. It has not yet found a way to communicate the Gospel to Thai society that is both meaningful and liberating for that society. It immediately rejects for use in Christian circles any form or item that it identifies as "Buddhist," thus cutting itself off from the hearts of other people. I have often told the story of a young boy I met in Bangkok while on a search for a particular home: he said to me, "A lot of Christians live around here." Just to make a little conversation with the boy, I asked him, "And what about you? Are you a Christian?" He replied, "No, I'm a Thai." Until the church faces the fact that it is still a foreigner's religion in the eyes of the people, it cannot witness to the Cross in this society. Until the day comes when the church ceases to act as if its Buddhists neighbors are "heathen," the church will not be able to tell them of Christ's love in a meaningful and redemptive fashion.

Two. The stories one continues to hear today indicate that the contemporary convert to Christianity still experiences alienation from family and friends in many instances. Those stories suggest that many families still live in tension. Many nominal Christians find it easier to just melt back into the general crowd of nominal Buddhists.

Three. One continues to note in the church and its institutions a ready willingness to use foreign money for things that it cannot do for itself. At a deeper level, it is quite noticeable that Thai Christians frequently assume that things European and American are necessarily better than things Thai. And, at an even deeper level, it would be interesting for someone to study employment patterns in northern Thai churches. It is likely that a large number of northern Thai Christians still depend on former mission institutions (or ones founded more recently) for their income, in part or in whole. The patterns of dependency remain potent as does a certain sense of inferiority that agrees others can do "it" (whatever "it" happens to be) better than the Thai church can. Old habits of mind die only with great difficulty.

Four. The old Laos Mission stressed Law. Grace has not yet become operative in the life of the Thai church. Just as the Laos Mission, being less than pure, tried to protect the purity of the church, so now the church itself is still trying to attain its own purity by holding to legalistic patterns (at least, outwardly).

Five. The northern Thai church today, as Morgan observed above, continues to preach and conduct itself in an evangelistic manner. Its ideal is rapid growth though it has had no experience of rapid growth except in isolated instances since before 1920. One of its main activities remains the annual evangelistic services of the
institutions and some churches. There is no pastoral ideal...it has been driven out by the incessant need to talk/shout/yell about Christ. At weddings, funerals, or wherever a group of dedicated Christians has "a shot" at a bunch of Buddhists one is likely to hear verbal witnessing for Christ. The church still does not know how to think of itself in any terms but those of a missionary society. And for just as long as it does not understand itself as a church with a full life to live, just so long will its evangelism fail-along with the rest of its life.

Six. One of the most serious weaknesses of the Laos Mission throughout its history was that it failed to localize church leadership. Rather, it depended on a centralized urban leadership to go out to the churches-when they had time. In fact, the present-day rural churches still depend for program and leadership upon that urban leadership, which is located largely in the big city institutions. Local church leadership remains largely ineffective, without any clear idea what it should do or how it should do it. Many churches still depend on urban clergymen to perform the sacraments-when they can get around to it. The visit of the big city cleric to the rural church is treated as a big event. While the "Princes of the Church" may no longer be tall, thick, and white, they still do wear urban clerical garb and live far from the lives of the rural churches. One is constantly aware of how little effective voice the rural churches have in the councils of the church and how "loud" the voices of institutional representatives normally are.

They call it the "dead hand of the past", but it is more like a potent, living fist.

For as long as the churches fail to deal with this past, the serious limitations that the Laos Mission imposed upon the church-and which the church acceded to, usually without complaint-will continue to hamper its ministry, denude it of effective leadership, and leave it the ugly step-sister of the all-powerful institutions, educational and medical.

For the most part, I do not believe that history offers us "lessons" by which we profit. Rather, it tells us about ourselves. It is the honest back-looking search for understanding for the sake of looking forward. Yet, I do think that the history of the northern Thai church may well contain one lesson for the present. If so, it is this: the only place where one can effectively begin to assist the church in Northern Thailand to a life more faithful to its calling is by working in, with, and through local churches. For all of its weaknesses, the church remains the primary witness to the core of love at the center of reality that we Christians call "God" without much understanding of what we might mean by the word. Thus, the church here can be the church only as it rid itself of the influence of the so-called "Christian" institutions. It will be the church only when it raises up its own leadership that resides in the churches. It will be the church only as it ends its dependence on foreign money, foreign ideas, foreign theologies and expressions of faith.

In a sense, it is easy to give ringing calls for Reform! Change! And with some study, it is relatively easy to describe, as I have tried to do here, why the churches in the North are facing the problems they are now facing: The disconcerting thing is, however, that when one begins to consider specific ways by which the present situation can change one discovers that the patterns of the past make effective changes extremely difficult. The past is a living past that has insinuated itself into our present and created a portion of the present out of its own cloth. It has left to the present organizational and behavioral structures that have a great stake in-things-as-they-now-are. Thus, one necessity for the reformation of the northern church is that the whole role of the institutions be reevaluated and reduced. Yet, the very ones most likely to resist reducing the place of the institutions are the ones who now dominate the councils of the church and thus must authorize reducing their own role. It is in such ways that the past imprisons the present and preserves its own ways.

Thus, one cannot help but feel both hopeful and pessimistic about the future of the churches in northern Thailand (and the whole country). They can have a vital, liberating, servant-oriented ministry in their society. The only thing that prevents that witness from taking place is the heritage of the church in which it had to take second-place to many other concerns that seemed to strengthen it when, in fact, they only distracted church leadership from its tasks of pastoring and nurturing the community.
NEW DIRECTIONS... we have to think in terms of new directions. Not just in laying big plans, but in how church leaders use time. Begin with the local church. Always begin with the local church. What is it like? What are its needs? Let me say just one more time: start with the local church: teach it the Bible, teach it the meaning of ministry, and show it how to structure its own life and activities meaningfully. Seek new modes of worship. By holding to this starting point, those in positions of responsibility in the churches will already begin to change the deadening patterns of the past.

The thing I truly enjoy about the study of history is that once having done the research on a particular topic one realizes how many more topics there are to be studied, avenues to travel down from that original topic. Let me close this book by urging on you, my patient readers, the need for much, much more study of Thai church history. There are points at which this present study is so superficial and inadequate compared with our need to know that I despair at ever getting to the heart of things. If you want to know the truth, I did not write all of this so much to answer your questions as I did to open up the possibility of asking further questions and engaging in more debate. There is so much the church needs to know - but it does not yet know.
## Appendices

### Appendix I: Northern Thai Churches 1868-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Date Founded</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Chiang Mai</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Bethlehem</td>
<td>11 Jul 1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lampang</td>
<td>Oct. 1880</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Mae Dok Daeng</td>
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<td>5. Chiang Saen</td>
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<td>7. Lamphun</td>
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<td>8. Wiang Pa Pao</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Chiang Dao</td>
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<td>10. San Sai</td>
<td>21 Mar 1894</td>
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<td>11. Phrae</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Mae Pu Kha</td>
<td>1 Jul 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Wang Mun</td>
<td>1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Bethel</td>
<td>1895</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Nan</td>
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<td>16. Muang Phrao</td>
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<td>19. Chang Kham</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Nong Fan</td>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
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<td>22. Chae Hom</td>
<td>7 Apr 1912</td>
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<td>23. Leper Church</td>
<td>Jun 1913</td>
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<td>24. Mae Kha Wak</td>
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Sources: Records of the Board of Foreign Missions and Laos News & North Laos News

### Appendix II: Membership Statistics of the Laos Mission, 1869-1920

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Sources: Chiang Mai Church Sessional Records, the Records of the American Presbyterian Mission, Eakin Papers, & Records of the Board of Foreign Missions.

**Appendix III: Dates for Publication of Books of the Northern Thai Bible**

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(a) probable date of publication

Source: Records of the Board of Foreign Missions.
Bibliography

This bibliography includes only those resources directly related to northern Siam and the northern Thai church, excepting only a few useful entries not about those fields. All of the entries about northern Siam and the northern Thai church are available at the Payap College Archives.

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Papers of Dan Beach Bradley. Microfilm. The originals are at the Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, Ohio USA.

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Research Papers of Maen Pongudom. Photocopies of originals at the Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia USA.

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Backus, Mary (ed.). *Siam and Laos as Seen by Our American Missionaries*. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1884.


Hughes, Philip J. "Christianity and Culture: A Case Study in Northern Thailand." Chiang Mai: doctoral thesis, South East Asia Graduate School of Theology, 1983.


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End Notes

These notes have been abbreviated in order to conserve space. For complete citations the reader should consult the Bibliography. Abbreviations are used to cite primary sources. They are as follows:

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All references to primary resources are for BFM unless otherwise noted. Series One is indicated by a volume number (e.g. v.22) Series Two is indicated by a folder reference code (e.g. 84-1-la).

Volume numbers for LN-NSN are not consistent. With the April 1916 issue, the volume numbers were mistakenly reduced by one year. That issue should have been numbered as XIII, 2, but it was mistakenly assigned XII, the same as the second number for 1915. From 1916 onwards all issues reflect the new (mistaken) enumeration.

Introduction


Chapter 1


[8] Bradley to Whipple, 6 Dec 1859 and 15 July 1859, AMA; McGilvary to Executive Committee, 10 Feb 1864, v. 2; Whipple to Bradley, 2 July 1861, DBB.


[18] Laos Mission to Executive Committee, 30 Sep 1868, v. 3.


[23] McGilvary to Irving, 1 Nov 1869; Wilson, Mission Annual Report 1870, v. 3; and Wilson to Bradley, 7 July 1869, 84-2-Ib.


[29] Bradley to Sarah and Dwight, 7 June 1870, DBB.


[31] See Hughes, *Proclamation and Response*, 14ff; Wilson's comments on the Christian converts' poor quality and lack of spirituality are in Wilson to Irving, 25 May 1882, v. 4; and the comments that many converts became Christian only for social or financial gain are in Bock, *Temples and Elephants*, 200.

Chapter 2


[20] In 1885, the Rev. Chalmers Martin referred to the "Proclamation of Religious Liberty" issued "by the King of Siam," Martin to Irving, 9 June 1885, v. 5. A book on missions in Siam published the year before asserted that the Edict was issued by the King for all of the North and "by implication" applied to the entire Kingdom, Backus, *Siam and Laos*, 409. Freeman in 1910 called the Edict "the charter of their liberties" for the northern Thai Christians, Freeman, *Oriental Land*, 115. The general misunderstanding regarding the author and the significance of the Edict has continued down to the present. See Horace W. Ryburn, "Tomorrow Was Born Yesterday," an address to the Bangkok Rotary Club, 2 Feb 1961 (Bangkok: typescript, 1961): 3; and Smith, *Siamese Gold*, 72 which follows Backus cited above.


[25] Irwin to Speer, 15 Sep 1894, v. 11.

[26] For example, see Martin to Irving, 9 June 1885, v. 5; and McGilvary to Mitchell, 22 July 1886, v. 5.


[34] Wilson to Lowrie, 12 June 1880, v. 4.


[38] Wilson to Irving, 1 Aug 1882, and 31 Aug 1882, v. 4.


[45] Peoples to Mitchell, 14 Jan 1886, v. 5; Peoples to Martin (copy), 2 May 1887, v. 6; Peoples to Mitchell, 26 June 1888, v. 6; and Wilson, Lampang Station Annual Report 1888, v. 22.

[46] Martin to Irving, 9 June 1885, v. 5; Martin to Mitchell, 21 July 1885, v. 5; Martin to Irving, 31 Aug 1885, v. 5; Mission Annual Report 1885, v. 5; and Interview with Tip Sri Laum, Tape, at the Payap College Archives, 1980.


[49] Wilson to Irving, 1 Jan 1881, and 2 June 1881, v. 4; and Wilson to Irving, 5 March 1884, v. 5.


Chapter 3


[11] Irwin to Speer, 10 Jan 1896, v. 13; Campbell, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1897, v. 19. And see Lamphun File, PAE.


[14] Briggs to Grant, 12 Mar 1893; and Peoples to Grant, 13 Apr 1893, v. 9.

[16] Briggs to Speer, 27 Mar 1894, v. 9; Shields to ?, 30 Aug 1894, v. 9; Anabelle K. Briggs to Speer, 31 Oct 1894, v. 11; Briggs to Speer, 29 Nov 1894, v. 11; Lillian Shields, Phrae Station Bimonthly Report, 24 Jan 1895, v. 11; Shields to Board, 14 May 1895, v. 11; and Briggs to Speer, 26 Sep 1895. v.11.

[17] Irwin to Speer, 10 Jan 1896, v. 13; Thomas to Friends, 23 Feb 1896. v. 13; Thomas to Labaree, 16 Oct 1897, v. 13; and Hatch to Labaree, 16 Oct 1897, v. 13.


[20] See Phrae File, PAE.

[21] Virtually every secondary account dates the opening of the Nan Station as 1894. That date is incorrect as Peoples spent only a few weeks in Nan that year. The correct date is 1895. For the opening of Nan see Briggs to Speer, 27 Mar 1894, v. 9; Peoples to Speer, 30 Apr 1894, v. 11; Briggs to Speer; 17 Aug 1894, v. 11; Peoples to Dulles, 8 Jan 1895, v. 15; Irwin to Brown, 20 Sep 1898, v. 15. See also the Nan File, PAE; and McGilvary, *Half Century*, 158.


[24] Irwin to Brown, 23 Sep 1899, v. 15; and Mission Station Reports 1899, v. 16.


[29] Collins to Mitchell, 26 July 1890, v. 7; the Chiang Mai File, PAE; Evander B. McGilvary, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1892, v. 22; Phraner to Speer, 31 May 1894, v. 11; Mission Bimonthly Letters, Nov 1898, v. 22; Campbell Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1897, v. 19; McGilvary to Brown, 16 Feb 1899, v. 15; and "The Laos Mission Letter for the Quarter Ending April 30, 1900," v. 16.


[31] Taylor to Mitchell, 22 Sep 1891, v. 9; and Wilson, Lampang Station Annual Report 1894, v. 22.


[38] Mission Station Reports 1900, v. 281; McGilvary to Brown, 4 Jan 1899. v. 15; Curtis to Brown, 9 Jan 1899, v. 15; and Mission Bimonthly Letters, Aug 1899, v. 15.


[43] This discussion of the Mission Press is based largely on Swanson, "This Seed," 1983. See also in reference to the rationale for the press Taylor to Mitchell, 11 Feb 1890, v. 7; Fleeson to Mitchell, 22 Feb 1890, v. 7; and Irwin to Mitchell, 7 July 1891, v. 9.


[47] Irwin, Lamphun Station Annual Report 1895, v. 22; Denman, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1895, v. 22; Thomas to Friends, 1 Jan 1896, v. 13; McKeen to Speer, 30 Mar 1896, v. 13; Peoples to Labaree, 12
Chapter 4

[1] For two cogent statements regarding the importance of developing "native" church leadership and self-reliance in Presbyterian missions see Brown, Rising Churches, 168ff; and Speer, Christianity and Nations, 127ff.


[14] For examples see, Chiang Rai Station Annual Report 1907, v. 281; Hartzell, Lampang Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a; Collins', Personal Annual Report 1916, 84-1-8b; Callender, Phrae Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a; Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1906, v. 281. See also mission evaluations of the Mae Dok Daeng Church from the 1880s onwards in which years with many converts were designated "good years" and years with few or none were labelled "bad years": Martin to Mitchell, 21 July 1885, v. 5; Dodd to Mitchell, 15 Jan 1892, v. 9; and William Harris, Personal Annual Reports 1900, 1905, 1907, v. 281.


[17] for an excellent description of this same type of missionary attitude in India see Hollis, Paternalism, 1962.

[18] McMullin, Lampang Station Annual Report 1916, 84-1-9a. See also Presbytery work assignments for 1900: of nine committees with a total of 31 members only six places were assigned to northern Thai (five to Kru Pannya alone). The key committee, Church Oversight, had no northern Thai members. "Assignment of Work 1900," v. 280. For other examples of the mission making church policy decisions unilaterally see Mission Annual Meeting Minutes 1901, 1903, v. 280.


[23] Briggs to Speer, 26 Sep 1895, v. 11.


[27] Data collected in the file "Correspondence and Statistics, Shortening Term of Service in Laos," 1894-1896, v. 21; Harris to Brown, 20 July 1908, v. 277; and Freeman to Brown, 11 June 1920, 84-1-11c.


[33] Campbell to Speer, 5 Sep 1895, v. 11.

[34] McGilvary, *Half Century*, 416-417; Thomas to Friends, 7 Dec 1898, v. 15; Irwin, Nan Station Annual Report 1898, v. 22; Hatch to Brown, 11 Jan 1899, v. 15; Denman to Brown, 5 Jan 1904, v. 273; Crooks to Brown, 26 Dec 1914, 84-I-5c; and Harris to Brown, 2 Jan 1917, 84-I-8c.


[38] Speer, *Deputation*, 67-68, 105.

[39] George H. Trull, "Report to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions on Visitation to Siam February 3 to 26, 1930," RPM; and Swanson, "Kengtung Question," 63-64, 75.

[40] See Trull Report above; and Hanna, Letters From Hazel, 28.

[41] Speer, *Deputation*, 76.


**Chapter 5**


[15] Crooks to Brown, 28 July 1919, 84-1-10c; and Freeman, Lampang Station Annual Report 1919, 84-1-12a.

[16] Dodd to Mitchell, 30 Dec 1889, v. 7; and Dodd, Tai Race, 262-623.

[17] Dodd to Jessup, 10 Apr 1890, v. 7; and Dodd, Chiang Mat Station Annual Report 1890, v. 22.


[30] Freeman, Mission Annual Report 1913, 84-1-6a; Nan Station Annual Report 1913, 84-1-6a; Chiang Mai Station Report 1914, 84-1-7a; Chiang Mai Station Report 1915, 84-1-8a; and White, Chiang Mai Station Report 1916, 84-1-9a.

[31] White, Theological School Annual Report 1917, 84-1-10a; Winella Callender, Phrae Station Annual Report 1918, 84-1-11a; White, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1918, 84-1-11a; and White, Theological School Annual Report 1918, 84-1-11a.


[34] See Wakeman, "Sri Ngam Church," 14.


[37] McGilvary to Irving, 18 Jan 1881, v. 4; and Wilson to Irving, 1 Aug 1882, v. 4.

[38] McGilvary, Half Century, 337; Evander B. McGilvary to Mitchell, 7 Jan 1892, v. 9; Briggs to Speer, 17 June 1894, v. 11; and Peoples to Speer, 21 May 1894, v. 11.

This discussion is based on BFM correspondence, v. 11, esp. Taylor to Speer, 14 May 1894, Phraner; et. al. to McGilvary (copy), 15 May 1894; Peoples to Speer, 21 May 1894; Wilson to Speer, 12 June 1894; Briggs to Speer, 17 June 1894; and Evander B. McGilvary to Dulles, 11 May 1894.

Phraner et. al. to Board, 24 May 1894, v. 11.

Gillies to Brown, 8 Oct 1909, v. 278.

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"The Laos Mission Letter for the Quarter Ending April 30, 1900," v. 11; and Briggs to Dulles, 22 Dec 1893, v. 9.


Phraner, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1893, v. 22; and Taylor, Lampang Station Annual Report 1893, v. 22.


Mission Stations Reports 1900, v. 281.

Dodd, Tai Race, 262.

Freeman, Oriental Land, 160.


Maen, Apologetics. 148.

Chapter 6


[27] Curtis to Labaree, 29 May 1897, v. 13; Thomas to Labaree, 28 June 1897. v. 13; Freeman to Brown, 2 Feb 1898, v. 15; Taylorto Brown, 11 July 1898. v. 15; and Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1901, v. 281.


[34] Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1913, 84-1-5b.


[36] Smith, Siamese Gold, 84; McFarland, Historical Sketch, 279; McGilvary, Mission Annual Report 1876, v. 3; Wilson, Mission Annual Report 1879, v. 4; McGilvary to Mitchell, 3 July 1885, and 18 Aug 1885, v. 5; Martin to Irving, 31 Aug 1885, v. 5; Taylor, Lampang Station Annual Report 1893, v. 22; and Evander B. McGilvary, Chiang Mat Station Annual Report 1892, v. 22.


[38] McFarland, Historical Sketch, 230; and Dodd, "Narrative of the State of Religion within the Bounds of the Presbytery of North Laos for the Year ending November 30th. 1890," v. 22. See also Chiang Rai Station Annual Report 1904, v. 281; and Callender, Phrae Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a.


[40] Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1908, v. 281; LN VI, 1 (Feb 1909): 5-6; Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1904, v. 281; Chiang Mat Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a.

[41] For descriptions of the work of the clergy see Mission Annual Report 1902, v. 281; Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1908, v. 281; Dodd, Mission Annual Report 1908, v. 281; Starling, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a; Callender, Phrae Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a; and White, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1916, 84-1-9a.

Chapter 7


[2] See Dodd, Tai Race, for one of the fullest expressions of the mission's dreams for expansion beyond Siam.


[19] Wilson to Irving, 2 Dec 1867, v. 3; McGilvary to Irving, 17 Dec 1867, v. 3; McKean, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1891, v. 22; and Dodd, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1890, v. 22.


[22] "Teaching them to Observe all Things," LN I, 1 (Jan 1904): 16-17, 18, 19; and "Teaching them to Observe all Things," LN II, 1 (Jan 1905): 23-26.


[34] Irwin to Brown, 7 Nov 1905, v. 274; Taylor, Missionary, I, 180- 184; Mission Annual Meeting Minutes 1907, v. 280; and LN VI, 3 (Aug 1909): 70.


[2] Brown to Laos Mission, 9 Nov 1912, APM; Dodd & Vincent to Board, 7 May 1913, APM; Brown to Laos Mission, 9 July 1913, APM; and Brown to Laos Mission, 15 Oct 1913, APM.


[7] Brown to Missions, 18 May 1911, APM.


[9] Brown to Laos Mission, 16 Sep 1913, APM; NSN XIV, 1 (Jan 1917): 6; Crooks to Brown, 28 July 1919, 84-l-10c; and Crooks to Brown, 6 Apr 1920, 84-l-11c.


[15] Freeman, Mission Annual Report 1913, 84-l-6a; Callender to Brown, 24 Oct 1913, 84-l-4c; Campbell to Friends, 8 May 1913, 84-l-4c; and Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1913, 84-l-5b.

[16] Brown to Laos Mission, 10 June 1912, and 20 June 1912, APM.

[17] Briggs to Brown, 5 Sep 1912, 84-l-3c.
[18] Brown to Laos Mission, 16 Sep 1913, APM. See Brown to Laos Mission, 10 Oct 1912, 14 Apr 1913, and 24 June 1913, APM.


[20] Harris, Personal Annual Report 1916, 84-1-8b. See also "Ye Editor's Corner," LN XII, 2 (Apr 1915): 31; White, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1916, 84-1-9a; Cort to Brown, 11 Oct 1916, 84-1-8b; Mason to Brown, 30 Sep 1916, 84-1-8b; and Freeman, Mission Annual Report 1913, 84-1-6a.

[21] Callenders' Personal Annual Report 1912, 84-1-4b; Callender to Brown, 1 Feb 1912, 84-1-3c; and Starling, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a.

[22] Collins, Personal Annual Reports 1912, 1913, and 1914, BFM.


[26] Freeman, Personal Annual Report 1911, 84-1-3b; Crooks', Personal Annual Report 1912, 84-1-4b; and Hartzells, Personal Annual Report 1915, 84-1-7b.


[29] Dunbar, "ABS History," 1, 23-27; Swanson, "This Seed," 15, 25; Callenderto Brown, 13 Feb 1912, 84-1-3c; Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1914, 84-1-6b; Bachtells, Personal Annual Report 1918, 84-1-10a; and Beebe, Personal Annual Report 1919, 84-1-11b.


[31] Freemans, Personal Annual Report 1914, 84-1-6b; "During the Hot Season," LN XII, 3 (July 1915): 60; Freeman to Brown, 19 Mar 1914, and 13 July 1914, 84-1-5c; and NSN XIV, 2 (May 1918): 39.


[33] Taylor, Lampang Station Annual Report 1893, v. 22; Freeman to Ware (copy), 20 Sep 1907, v. 276; and LN V, 3 (July 1908): 64-65.
[34] Freeman, Collins, & White, Mission Annual Report 1912, 84-1-5a; Crooks, Lampang Station Annual Report 1913, 84-1-6a; Freeman, "The Exceptional Population of Northern Siam," LN XI, 3 (July 1914): 82-83; and "Personal and Otherwise," LN XI, 3 (July 1914): 76.


[36] Marie Park, "Phrae Station Annual Report 1915, 84-1-7a; Hartzell to Speer, 23 Aug 1916, 84-1-7c; Taylor to Speer, 1 July 1915, 84-1-6c; and Freeman to Trull (copy), 23 May 1919, 84-1-10c.


[42] Starling, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a; Callender, Phrae Station Annual Report 1914, 84-1-7a; and NSN XIV, 2 (May 1918): 58.

[43] Starling, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a; Preston, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1917, 84-1-10a; and Campbell, Personal Annual Report 1918, 84-1-10a.

[44] Starling, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a; Callender, "Pre and Lakawn Notes," LN VIII, 3 (July 1911): 91-92; Callender, Lampang Station Annual Report 1911, 84-1-4a; Collins, Personal Annual Report 1912, 84-1-4b; Callender, Phrae Station Report 1914, 84-1-7a; Preston, Chiang Mai Station Annual Report 1917, 84-1-10a; and Harris, Personal Annual Report 1916, 84-1-8b.


[47] Starling, Nan Station Annual Report 1917, 84-1-10a; LN IX, 1 (Jan 1912): 6; Beach, Nan Station Annual Report 1915, 84-1-8a; and NSN XIV, 1 (Jan 1918): 23.


[52] McMullin, Lampang Station Annual Report 1911, 84-l-9a; Beebe, Phrae Station Annual Report 1916, 84-l-9a; LN XII, 2 (Apr 1916): 45; and Gillies to Brown, 16 July 1919, 84-l-10c.

[53] Brown to North and South Siam Missions, 8 Nov 1918, APM.

[54] Gillies to Brown, 16 July 1919, 84-l-10c; Campbells, Personal Annual Report 1919, 84-l-11b; Gillies', Personal Annual Report 1919, 84-l-11b; and Preston to Trull, 13 Oct 1919, 84-l-10c.


Chapter 9

[1] Brown to Siam and Laos Missions, 25 Nov 1910, APM; Cooper to Callender, 12 Oct 1911, APM; Briggs to Brown, 9 Nov 1911, 84-l-2c; Joint Conference Minutes, 5 July 1913, and 10 Oct 1913, APM; and Brown to Laos Mission, 19 May 1914, APM.

[2] Freeman to Brown, 1 July 1915, 84-l-6c; Hartzell to Speer, 22 Sep 1915, 84-l-6c; Briggs to Brown, 9 Nov 1911, 84-l-2c; and Briggs to Speer, 17 June 1915, and 26 July 1915, 84-l-6c.


[4] Crooks to Brown, 28 July 1919, 84-l-10c; Freeman to Brown, 16 July 1919, 84-l-10c; and Crooks to Brown, 6 Apr 1920, 84-l-11c.

[5] Brown to North and South Siam Missions, 9 Mar 1920, APM.

[6] Brown to North and South Siam Missions, 9 Mar 1920, APM.


[9] George H. Trull, "Report to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions on Visitation to Siam February 3 to 26, 1930," RPM.